# 2024 Adv Answers

## 2024

### 1nc – disinformation fails

#### Russian disinformation will always fail in the face of Western government transparency

**Hiday ’22** (Jeffrey Hiday, director of the Office of Media Relations at the RAND Corporation, “Russia Will Struggle to Sustain Its Disinformation Machine, Former New York Times/BBC Chief Tells RAND Europe”, RAND Corporation. 5/24/22. https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/05/russia-will-struggle-to-sustain-its-disinformation.html)

As former head of the New York Times and the BBC, Mark Thompson has tackled disinformation on both sides of the Atlantic. One of his big takeaways: It's not as easy as you might think to sustain a successful disinformation campaign. “The Russian disinformation machine has taken some good kicks because of facts on the ground,” Thompson told attendees at a 30th anniversary gathering of RAND Europe council members and staff. “It turns out doing disinformation well is not pathetically easy. The Russian disinformation army seems to have been caught short when the rubber met the road.” Thompson, quizzed on stage by Trusted News Initiative founder and former BBC journalist Jessica Cecil, noted former President Obama's recent line that disinformation is like flooding the public square with raw sewage. “That's a powerful message, but it's the kind of diagnosis I find inadequate—as if the public are innocent victims of disinformation and the only policy challenge we face is dealing with the bad actors who either create or distribute it.” Thompson suggested paying more attention to the “demand side” of disinformation. Many members of the public go out and actively look for it,” he said. On the plus side, Thompson reckons lessons must have been learned from the “wholly inadequate” messaging around Afghanistan withdrawal. “We get to early 2022 and now we're seeing highly effective, proactive, and sometimes preemptive Western messaging” about Russia's designs on Ukraine. Those messages, particularly from U.S. and British government spokespeople, were more proactive and transparent. “Western messaging indicated what would happen—and then it happened. That reinforces trust in government messaging,” Thompson said. That's not what emanated from the U.S. government at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, in Thompson's view. Once you start lying to the public, then the public says, well, why should we believe you now. Even quite small, well-intentioned mistakes like that can really impair public trust. Mark Thompson Share on Twitter “We saw well-intentioned disinformation,” he said. “Essentially, we were lied to about actual knowledge of use of masks, which we knew from SARS worked. It's hard to overestimate how damaging that was. It poisoned the water right at the beginning of the pandemic. Once you start lying to the public, then the public says, well, why should we believe you now. Even quite small, well-intentioned mistakes like that can really impair public trust.” When it comes to freedom of speech, Thompson, perhaps not surprisingly from the perspective of a journalist, sees the biggest danger as coming from government. “The more zeal and passion I see for government to 'do something' about disinformation, the more nervous I get.” Potential solutions? Thompson has a few. “One good premise is to think of people we're addressing not as helpless sheep but as people as smart and savvy as we are,” he said, referring to fellow journalists. Another: “The government should start telling the truth—painful though it can be, all the time without fail—to the public.”

### 1nc – election inevitably a disaster

#### Trump’s misinformation is entirely independent of Putin – the aff’s i/L is wrong

Pilkington 21 (Ed Pilkington; Chief reporter at Guardian US, Experienced Chief Reporter with a demonstrated history of working in the publishing industry. Skilled in Digital Strategy, Journalism, Corporate Communications, Newspapers, and Social Media; “‘Terrifying for American democracy’: is Trump planning for a 2024 coup?”; Nov 14 2021; DOA: 6/25/22; <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/nov/14/trump-president-2024-election-coup-republicans>) // bh

Since Joe Biden was inaugurated on 20 January, Trump has dug himself deeper into his big lie about the “rigged election” that was stolen from him. Far from cooling on the subject, he has continued to amplify the false claim in ever more brazen terms. Initially he condemned the violence at the US Capitol on 6 January. But in recent months Trump has emerged as an unashamed champion of the insurrectionists, calling them “great people” and a “loving crowd”, and lamenting that they are now being “persecuted so unfairly”. Trump recorded a video last month praising Ashli Babbitt, the woman shot dead by a police officer as she tried to break into the speaker’s lobby, where Congress members were hiding in fear of their lives. Babbitt was a “truly incredible person”, he said. Michael Waldman, who as president of the Brennan Center is one of the country’s authorities on US elections, told the Guardian that Trump was normalizing the anti-democratic fury that erupted that day. “He has gone from being embarrassed to treating 6 January as one of the high points of his presidency. Ashli Babbitt is now being lionized as this noble martyr as opposed to a violent insurrectionist trying to break into the House of Representatives chamber.” Over the past year Trump has spread the stolen election lie far and wide, telling supporters at his regular presidential campaign-style rallies that 2020 was “the most corrupt election in the history of our country”. He has used his iron grip over the Republican party to cajole officials in Arizona, Pennsylvania, Texas, Wisconsin and other states to conduct “audits” of the 2020 election count in further vain searches for fraud. One of the most eccentric of these “audits” (or “fraudits”, as they have been called) was carried out in Arizona by a company called Cyber Ninjas, which had virtually no experience in elections and whose owner supported the “Stop the Steal” movement. Paradoxically, even this effort concluded that Biden had indeed won the state, recording an even bigger margin for the Democratic candidate than the official count.

### 2nc – election inevitably a disaster

#### US elections already derailed

Schouten 22 (Fredreka Schouten, CNN Election deniers are winning political nominations across the country," CNN, 6-15-2022 https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/15/politics/nevada-new-mexico-election-deniers/index.html) CL)

**(**CNN) Republican voters this week picked Nevada businessman [Jim Marchant](https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/15/politics/jim-marchant-nevada-secretary-of-state/index.html) as their nominee for secretary of state, bringing yet another 2020 election denier closer to overseeing elections in 2024 in a presidential battleground state. Last month, Pennsylvania Republicans chose as their gubernatorial nominee a staunch defender of former President Donald Trump and his election falsehoods. And [in New Mexico this week](https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/14/politics/new-mexico-primary-results-otero-county-certification/index.html), a GOP-led county commission refused to certify the results of the June 7 primary election in the county, citing concerns about election fraud. The move prompted legal action from Democratic Secretary of State Maggie Toulouse Oliver, who this fall will face [a Republican rival](https://www.facebook.com/melindaa.rivera/videos/396611125633260) who has called the 2020 election that Trump lost a "coup" and has argued that vote-tallying machines manipulate election results. As a House committee investigating the January 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol seeks to shed light on the falsehoods that swirled around the last presidential contest, a growing number of midterm results underscore how much deep suspicion of the 2020 election has taken root among Republican primary voters and some of the officials they already have installed in key positions. "Week by week, **the dangers to the integrity of the election system are increasing**," Richard Hasen, an election law expert at the University of California's law school at Irvine, told CNN on Wednesday. "It wasn't just the Marchant victory in the primary, and it's not just a rogue county board not doing their job to certify election results. It's also a purge within the party of those voices who have stood up to Trump," he said, citing the politicians who have dropped out of their reelection bids, were stripped of their GOP leadership posts or lost their seats as the former President has sought revenge. On Tuesday, for example, South Carolina GOP Rep. Tom Rice became the first of the 10 House Republicans who voted for impeachment last year to lose a primary to a Trump-backed opponent. It's not a given, by any means, that the election doubters elevated to date will prevail in general elections this fall. In New Mexico, for instance, Oliver won her 2018 election by a landslide. But the rise of these candidates in state after state -- along with the move by commissioners in one New Mexico county to decline to certify the election results -- set off fresh alarms among voting rights experts this week. "We're in a really dangerous spot right now," David Becker, executive director of the nonpartisan Center for Election Innovation & Research, said Wednesday. "The pieces of tinder being laid right in front of our eyes." Election deniers advance Marchant, who has led a coalition of 2022 candidates who insist the 2020 election was rigged, is the latest proponent of election fraud claims to move closer to reshaping the election system in a battleground state crucial to the next presidential election. (The Silver State, won by President Joe Biden by a little more than 2 percentage points in the last election, has seen many Democratic victories in recent years but remains increasingly competitive.) Marchant, a former state assemblyman, has thrust election doubts into the center of his campaign to become the state's next election chief, saying on his website that his No. 1 priority would be to "overhaul the fraudulent election system in Nevada." After **Marchant lost a 2020 bid** for the US House to Democratic Rep. Steven Horsford, he brought a lawsuit claiming voter fraud, but it was later dismissed. **The candidate has said he would not have certified** [**Biden's**](https://www.cnn.com/specials/politics/joe-biden-news) **more than 33,500-vote victory** in Nevada had he been secretary of state in 2020. And, more recently, Marchant has lobbied local governments to abandon the use of machines to cast and count votes. He wants to return to [hand-counting ballots](https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/31/politics/handcounting-ballots-voting-machines/index.html) -- a move experts say will cause errors, delays and chaos in future elections. He will face attorney Cisco Aguilar, who ran unopposed for the Democratic nomination, in the fall. Marchant did not respond to interview requests Wednesday. He joins several other Republicans who have sought to cast doubts on the 2020 election and now are closer to overseeing elections in key states themselves. In Pennsylvania, for instance, state Sen. Doug Mastriano --- who played a key role in efforts to overturn Biden's victory in the Keystone State -- is the Republican nominee for governor. The Pennsylvania governor appoints the secretary of state, the person in charge of running the state's elections. And in Michigan, delegates to the state GOP convention backed **Kristina Karamo's nomination for secretary of state** -- a political newcomer who gained attention after the 2020 election when she **alleged witnessing fraud as a poll challenger during** the counting of absentee ballots. She also signed on to an unsuccessful US Supreme Court challenge to Biden's win. More candidates who are aligned with Trump's election views are on the ballot in states with upcoming primaries, including Arizona. The state become a breeding ground for election conspiracy theories, exemplified by the widely disparaged 2021 review of the 2.1 million ballots cast in its largest county that, in the end, reaffirmed Biden's narrow victory in Arizona. New Mexico drama In New Mexico, Oliver has sought and won emergency action from the state Supreme Court to force the Republican-led commission in Otero County to certify the June 7 primary -- a step required for the candidates who won last week's contests to advance to the November ballot. The commissioners had voted 3-0 on Monday not to certify the results, citing their distrust of Dominion voting machines. On Wednesday, the high court sided with Oliver and ordered the commission to act by Friday, the deadline for counties to sign off on primary election results. (In a statement Wednesday, a Dominion spokesperson called the county's action "yet another example of how lies about Dominion have damaged our company and diminished the public's faith in elections." The company has filed several defamation lawsuits against people who have spread falsehoods about their machines.) In all, more than 7,300 voters in Otero County cast ballots in last week's primary election, according to the secretary of state's office. **Among the Otero officials voting against certification this week: Commissioner** [**Couy Griffin**](https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/22/politics/couy-griffin-verdict-january-6-trial/index.html), a founder of Cowboys for Trump. He **was found guilty** in March **during a bench trial of trespassing** **on** the US Capitol grounds on **January 6,** 2021, while then-Vice President Mike Pence was there. Griffin is scheduled to be sentenced later this week. He did not respond to an interview request. In court filings, Oliver said other **New Mexico counties may choose to balk at certifying their results in the days ahead**, citing a "statewide attempt to influence other county canvassing boards." Alex Curtas, the top spokesman for the secretary of state's office, said Oliver moved quickly in order to avert a potential broader rebellion. "One of the biggest concerns is that this will spread to different counties and different states and have this become part of the national trend that we've seen since 2020 to deny the election with no proof," Curtas told CNN earlier Wednesday. **"There are ramifications of this for people's safety**, **the** potential **disenfranchisement of voters and the overall degradation of trust in our** system of government and **elections**."

#### 2024 elections “will be a mess” – has nothing to do with Russian disinformation

Saric 22 (Ivana Saric; Breaking News Reporter, Newsdesk Reporter; “Rep. Adam Kinzinger warns 2024 election "is going to be a mess"”; Jun 19, 2022; DOA: 6/26; <https://www.axios.com/2022/06/19/adam-kinzinger-2024-election-mess>) // bh

Rep. Adam Kinzinger (R-Ill.) told ABC's "This Week" on Sunday that he is "very worried" that the 2024 presidential election could be embroiled in the same election denial controversies as the 2020 election was. Driving the news: Kinzinger warned that one thing to watch for will be disputes over the certification of election results and the use of certain voting machines, pointing to the refusal last week by a Republican-led commission in New Mexico to certify the results of a primary election as an example. The commission's decision, which cited concerns over Dominion voting machines, underscored the extent to which former President Trump's illegitimate claims of election fraud have manifested in distrust in elections on all levels, including locally, Axios' Erin Doherty writes. Dominion was the subject of baseless conspiracy theories after the 2020 election, when Trump and his allies promoted unfounded claims that the company rigged the election. What they're saying: "We focus so much on what goes on in D.C., in Congress and the Senate, but when you have these election judges that are going to people that don't believe basically in democracy — authoritarians — 2024 is going to be a mess," Kinzinger said. "Wake up, America. Wake up, Republicans. Because this is not going to be good for you if you think it is," he added.

### 1nc – no civil war !

#### Despite political division, Civil war in America is unlikely

Pazzanese 22, (Christina Pazzanese, Harvard Staff Writer, January 11, 2022 “We don’t need a civil war to be in serious trouble”, https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2022/01/harvard-political-scientist-says-u-s-civil-war-unlikely/)

As the House Select Committee investigating the Jan. 6 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol prepares for televised hearings later this month, public attitudes toward the attack are divided sharply along partisan lines. With extremist movements and rhetoric on the rise, a growing number of people, including some historians and many opinion writers, believe the U.S. is on the brink of disaster. A Zogby poll in the fall found that 46 percent of Americans think the country is headed for another civil war. In late December, a survey by The Washington Post and the University of Maryland revealed that one in three Americans think that violence against the government is sometimes justified. But are we really on the brink of armed conflict or is it just that the political vitriol makes it feel that way? Jay Ulfelder is a political scientist who studies civil wars and former research director of the Political Instability Task Force, a U.S. government-funded program that helps policymakers understand and anticipate political crises around the globe. Currently a fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard Kennedy School, he spoke with the Gazette about the prospect of civil war in the U.S. The interview has been edited for clarity and length. Q&A Jay Ulfelder GAZETTE: First, how is civil war defined today? Second, is the country heading down this road? ULFELDER: I’m glad you asked the definitional question. When anybody asks “Is it going to happen?” my first response is, “What do you mean by civil war?” The answer depends tremendously on that. In academic work, civil war is generally defined as a violent conflict between two organized, armed groups within a country that kills at least 1,000 people. Sometimes it’s a certain number of people per year — usually, in the hundreds — and where those people are killed directly by violent clashes between those armed organized factions. So it matters that we’re not talking about armed troops or police massacring unarmed civilians. One important thing to know about civil war is that it’s very rare. There are civil wars that last a long time, but onsets of new civil wars are quite rare, especially in the last several decades. We’re usually talking not more than a few around the world in any given year. And, very importantly, almost never in very wealthy countries, and certainly not in very wealthy democracies — that almost never happens. One of the rare exceptions is the conflict in Northern Ireland. But that kind of thing is virtually unheard of in wealthy, ostensible democracies in the last half-century. “There are so many bad things that can happen well short of civil war that I wish we, as a country, were talking more about.” My knee-jerk reaction is that it’s really unlikely to happen here. Last year was extraordinary in recent U.S. history in terms of how politically divided the country is, how violent things got, how tense they were — and you still had a number of deaths that was not anywhere close to civil war. You’d have to see a tremendous escalation of violence from where we are now to get to what political scientists usually think of as civil war. In a way, I think it’s the wrong question. I’m not faulting you for this, because I know this is the question people are kicking around a lot right now. There’s a tremendous range of things that can happen between where we are now and what would get construed as civil war. There are so many bad things that can happen well short of civil war that I wish we, as a country, were talking more about. GAZETTE: What worries you the most? ULFEDLER: What really worries me is we absolutely have seen the radicalization of one of the major political parties in the U.S., both in terms of the political ideas it’s putting forward, but also, its embrace of violence as a legitimate means to achieve those ends. The rhetoric coming from the right — “Watering the tree of liberty with blood,” “It’s back to 1776” — Jan. 6 was a reflection of that. There has been a lot of small-scale street violence around protest activity in the last couple of years, especially since the summer of 2020. Also the use of intimidation to try to push policy agendas and political agendas, especially at the local level, with people showing up at school board meetings and county council meetings and threatening people and staging outside with guns. That’s new-ish and it’s really bad, especially if you live in the areas where that is happening. But it’s not anywhere close to civil war. We’re getting into this weird space where the variance in how democratic things are, and how violent things are, is widening and is now quite large across the country. And that fragmentation and balkanization of politics, I think, is going to get worse. That’s what really worries me a lot more than, are we going to get to hundreds of people shooting each other? GAZETTE: Is it a bad sign that something apolitical like a pandemic became political so quickly? ULFELDER: Yeah, and that’s part of the issue here. I’ve also heard people talk about how “If the Democrats could just push forward on certain kinds of social welfare policies that would help the vulnerable people who are susceptible to radicalization on the right, that would solve the problem.” They’ve got the causal arrow going the wrong way. The radicalization is driving people’s response to these things. Even if you could get those policies passed, I’m super skeptical that people would suddenly start thinking differently about those things. They would just move on to the next issue in that “us versus them” narrative that they’re already stuck in. GAZETTE: What can be done to help cool tensions and stop the country from sliding into further conflict? ULFELDER: I wish I had a good answer to that. I can point to various things that I think are part of the cause. One is a constitutional design problem that disproportionately tips power toward parts of the country that are most desirous of preserving a white, Christian, patriarchal order that they think of as the “real America.” I also think social media is quite relevant. The way social media platforms work has accelerated political radicalization. That’s one small piece of it, but important for people not to lose sight of. Trying to address that aspect of it may be an important part, long term, of trying to get out of this hole. Part of the curse of having worked on this topic internationally for a long time is the knowledge that in situations where politics becomes factional in this way — it gets called polarization, but it’s primarily in the U.S. a function of the radicalization of one side, not both sides equally running away from each other. But polarization or factionalism tends to be very persistent once it sets in. It’s really hard to get out of it. It takes many years and there’s not some obvious thing that explains why it gets resolved when it does.

### 2nc – no civil war !

#### No civil war – civil wars are rare and risk is very low

Koren 1/2022 (Ore Koren - Assistant Professor of Political Science, Indiana University. “Civil war in the US is unlikely because grievance doesn’t necessarily translate directly into violence.” The Conversation. January 14, 2022. https://theconversation.com/civil-war-in-the-us-is-unlikely-because-grievance-doesnt-necessarily-translate-directly-into-violence-174456)

The potential for violent extremism in America to erupt into full-fledged conflict across the country is a common topic of discussion nowadays. A 2021 FBI report highlights an increasing risk of violence against government institutions, private organizations and individuals. The possible perpetrators: primarily “lone wolves,” but potentially also militias and other organized groups such as animal activists, anti-abortionists and white supremacists. Claims that America is at the greatest risk of civil war since, well, the Civil War, recently received additional support from some experts in the field of political science. But civil wars are rare events. Before the 2020 election, I analyzed the risk of a so-called “Second American Civil War” that some speculated might ignite on or around Election Day. I concluded the risk was very low, while also emphasizing the uncertainty of the times. Despite the ugly Capitol riot of Jan. 6, 2021, and anti-racism protests of the past few years, some of which included rioting, violent confrontation, and property destruction, my analysis has held, and I remain unconvinced that America is likely to descend into civil war in the near future. Before proceeding, I want to stress that, as a scholar who studies civil conflict, I discuss the manifestations of violence here not on the basis of their underlying political ideologies but in relation to empirical definitions of different types of political violence. Grievance doesn’t translate into violence. Researchers usually define civil wars based on a certain threshold of combatant deaths, often 1,000 or more. In 2020, for example, only eight conflicts crossed that threshold worldwide. They happened in countries – including Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Yemen – experiencing rampant poverty and underdevelopment, nondemocratic or dysfunctional political institutions, and a long history of conflict along ethnic and religious lines. When trying to assess the likelihood of civil war, researchers first look at whether people are willing to engage in violence. Willingness is often attributed to anger and grievances over inequality or political marginalization. Individuals or groups may have grievances with specific state or national policies, or with other groups. As their anger grows, these people may not only use aggressive and demeaning language, but also become more accepting of the idea of using violence. Anger and grievances are probably the most frequently highlighted issues in the mainstream media, and especially in social media outlets. Studies of social media outlets have found that their algorithms are designed to amplify anger to appeal to wider groups. Aggrieved people, however, exist almost everywhere, even in the world’s happiest countries. Feeling aggrieved and even using harsh and violent rhetoric does not mean a person is willing to take up arms against the government or one’s fellow citizens. Risks to joining a rebellion. But even if they are fully willing, in almost every case, civil war will not happen unless these very angry people have the opportunity to organize and use violence on a large scale. Joining a rebellion is extremely risky. You can die or be severely wounded. Your chances of winning are low. If you don’t win, even if you survive unscathed, you still risk prosecution and social alienation. You may lose your job, your savings and even your home and put your family at risk. It doesn’t matter how angry you are, these considerations are usually prohibitive. All these calculations are part of what economists call “opportunity costs.” Opportunity costs basically measure how much you would have to potentially give up if you were to engage in a given activity, such as rebellion. In most countries afflicted by civil war, poverty, economic downturn and even food insecurity mean that these costs are relatively low. An unemployed farm laborer in rural Mozambique has, from an economic perspective at least, less to lose from joining an extremist insurgency than, say, Robert Scott Palmer, owner of a cleaning and restoration company from Largo, Florida. Apparently willing to risk his livelihood by using violence against police during the Jan. 6 riot, Palmer was thwarted by other factors that are highly relevant in determining the potential for a full-fledged rebellion – the government’s capacity to punish and deter violence, and the opportunity, or lack of opportunity, for dissidents to organize and mobilize effectively enough to start a war. For example, people who want to organize and rebel against the government will find it easier to do in remote areas where the government cannot know or reach them. Tora Bora – the cave complex in the mountain of eastern Afghanistan – is an example of such a place. Insurgents can hide and train there, practically unknown to, and untouchable by, Afghanistan’s military, which generally lacks the capabilities and capacity of its American counterpart. The high levels of American policing and intelligence capacity mean that insurgency opportunities are rare in the U.S. Individuals who organize, arm themselves and decide to act against the government risk being detected and thwarted before they can become real threats. Moreover, because of the low urban density of the U.S., even if such rebels are successful in organizing – in rural Alaska, for example – they will be unable to reach, let alone conquer, big cities or threaten American sovereignty in significant ways. ‘Intensified domestic terrorism.’ These low opportunities suggest that civil war in America is still unlikely. But this does not preclude the occurrence of other forms of less intense violence. Concerns about increased violent extremism in the United States recently led the U.S. Justice Department to establish a new domestic terrorism group. It is possible we might see a rise in the number of organized domestic terror attacks – along the lines of the British experience during its conflict with the Provisional Irish Republican Army or the U.S. experience with the Weather Underground during the 1960s and 1970s

# Latin America Adv Answers

### 1nc – disinformation failing now

#### Latin America is fighting disinformation now

Rauls 21 (Leonie, Leonie Rauls was the development and external relations coordinator at the Inter-American Dialogue from 2018-2019. She graduated summa cum laude from Amherst College with a BA in Political Science and Spanish, focusing on development policy, “How Latin American Governments Are Fighting Fake New,” Americas Quarterly, October 19, 2021, https://americasquarterly.org/article/how-latin-american-governments-are-fighting-fake-news/)

Governments and civil society have tried a number of different approaches to fight misinformation. But the barriers are formidable. Latin America has among the world’s highest rates of social media use, making countries fertile territory for fake news. But several of the proposed solutions infringe on free speech or can be easily abused by authoritarian governments with their own agendas, among other flaws. Below, AQ compiled five categories of initiatives being tested, discussed or implemented in parts of Latin America. 1. Government-run fact-checking and monitoring servicesIn June 2019, Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador launched Verificado, a fact-checking operation, as part of the government’s newswire Notimex. As of August 2021 it had no activity. Civil society and journalism groups expressed concerns the tool could be politicized and undermine the credibility of independent fact-checkers. (Verificado also faced a legal battle over the name itself, as several Mexican fact-checkers were already using it.) In Argentina, the Public Defender’s Office launched the Observatory of Disinformation and Symbolic Violence on Digital Media and Platforms (NODIO) in October 2020, to “detect, verify, identify and disarticulate malicious news.” Critics across the region said the initiative could be akin to censorship and a few politicians in the opposition tried unsuccessfully to sue the public defender who created the unit. 2. LegislationThe most common response to misinformation in the region is to try to create legislation to stop it, said Columbia University researcher Laura Duarte. In Brazil the Internet Freedom, Responsibility and Transparency Bill, popularly known as the “fake news” bill, was approved by the Senate in 2020 and is now in the lower chamber. The bill aims to combat the spread of false information by making social platforms responsible for combating disinformation and creates an “internet transparency council” with members from government and civil society. After Venezuela’s controversial 2004 Law of Social Responsibility in Radio, which was followed by a change in the country’s penal code in 2005, several Latin American countries are looking to criminalize the dissemination of fake news—with sentences of up to 10 years as in Nicaragua’s Special Cyber Crimes Law from 2020. Critics say Venezuela’s and Nicaragua’s legislation are effectively tools for political persecution. Other proposals making fake news a crime are being discussed in Chile, Colombia, Panama and El Salvador. According to the International Press Institute, 17 nations globally have passed some form of regulation targeting disinformation during the pandemic, with many other bills still pending in legislative bodies. 3. Working with social media companiesSeveral governments are trying to work with social media companies to tackle the main tools used to spread fake news. Mexico’s National Institute of Elections (INE) signed collaboration agreements with social media companies prior to the 2018 elections. As part of those accords, INE staff received training on using and monitoring the Facebook platform, while Google pledged to disseminate on YouTube information generated by INE about the electoral process, as well as other initiatives such as marking voting locations on Google Maps. Argentina’s electoral authority signed a memorandum of cooperation with Facebook, which pledged to amplify official electoral information while curbing the visibility of false posts. Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court (TSE) also partnered with social media platforms, with the creation of an official court chatbox on WhatsApp where people can send inquiries about dubious posts directly to TSE officials. Another tool allows electoral officials and WhatsApp to receive and collect information on social media accounts suspected of spreading messages in bulk, which also violates Facebook’s terms of use. 4. Ethics pacts among political partiesIn Uruguay the six political parties with representatives in Congress signed an Ethical Pact Against Disinformation in April 2019, pledging “not to generate or promote false news or disinformation campaigns to the detriment of political adversaries.” The pact was proposed by the Uruguayan Press Association as part of a three-pronged campaign against disinformation that also includes training media professionals and a fact-checking tool. 5. Media literacy training Researchers and specialists are almost unanimous that media literacy programs are the most effective long-term tool against the dissemination of fake news. The state of São Paulo in Brazil included media literacy as an elective class for middle schoolers to help them recognize what is news and how to check sources. Argentina’s fact-checking group Chequeado put together a handbook with UNESCO to help train others to spot disinformation. Outside the region, Finland has introduced a media literacy program at public schools in 2014 that teaches children from the age of six to read sources critically. Children are taught to evaluate and fact-check websites, and hunt for dubious sources. In 2019, the government of Finland topped the European Media Literacy Index that measures countries’ resistance to misinformation and disinformation.

### 2nc – disinformation failing now

#### Latin American companies are developing technology that stops the spread of misinformation

Tameez 5/16 (Hanaa’, staff writer at Neiman Lab, “Factchequeado launches to combat misinformation in Spanish-speaking communities in the US,” Neiman Lab, May 16, 2022, https://www.niemanlab.org/2022/05/factchequeado-launches-to-combat-misinformation-in-spanish-speaking-communities-in-the-u-s/)-AT

Last month, Factchequeado launched as a way to address misinformation in Latino and Spanish-speaking communities in the United States. Founded by Laura Zommer of Chequeado in Argentina and Clara Jiménez Cruz of Maldita.es in Spain (both are fact-checking organizations), The idea for the venture emerged when Jiménez started noticing that misinformation in Spanish targeting U.S. Latinos was also reaching Spanish speakers in Spain. She figured that the misinformation must have made its way to Argentina too, so she reached out to Zommer. “We’ve been seeing in Spanish-speaking countries in the past five to 10 years that misinformation travels in a different way and very often has specific topics targeting specific communities,” Jiménez said. “So at Maldita, we thought maybe all these things that we’ve learned over the years can be applicable in the U.S. and we can launch [a] fact-checking project there for Spanish speaking communities that can also benefit our own communities in our own regions. Because we see that this information has no borders, this misinformation fabricated in the U.S. comes to Spain and to Latin America, and misinformation fabricated in Spain and Latin America is probably reaching the U.S. as well.” Jiménez and Zommer also pointed out that Big Tech companies focus their efforts and resources on combatting misinformation in English, even though misinformation on social platforms is a problem in many languages, including Spanish. That means smaller, sometimes non-profit fact-checking outlets like Maldita.es and Chequeado shoulder the responsibility of fact-checking in Spanish. Zommer noted that when the Plandemic video came out and went viral, Facebook linked in English to the World Health Organization’s website. But with the Spanish version of the video, Facebook linked to a group called “Médicos por la verdad” (Doctors for Truth), which disseminates misinformation about issues related to the coronavirus. “One of our approaches here is thinking if we manage [to get] platforms and the companies to put attention into Spanish-language misinformation in the U.S., that is going to benefit our regions and our languages in the long term,” Jiménez said. Factchequeado, a team of five, is a service journalism project and its model is based on collaboration. It partners with English- and Spanish-language publications in the U.S. that want to republish its fact-checks and explainers. In return, Factchequeado asks that the organizations help them reach broader audiences and learn more about their news and information consumption habits by sharing its WhatsApp chatbot number. So far, Factchequeado’s partners are Conecta Arizona, Conexión Migrante, Documented, El Detector, Enlace Latino NC, FactCheck.org, La Esquina, MediaWise, PolitiFact, and Telemundo’s Verifica. Factchequeado determines what to debunk with two factors: virality and level of danger. Its team won’t cover something that only one person forwarded them on WhatsApp if the reach of the content in question is low because doing so could lead to amplification. It will also focus on misinformation that surfaces in times of crisis, social movements, and elections. Since its launch, Factchequeado has covered cryptocurrency scams and how to protect yourself from them, fake polls about Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the Amber Heard and Johnny Depp trial, and what will happen to abortion access if the U.S. Supreme Court overturns Roe v. Wade. Spanish speakers in the U.S., of course, aren’t a monolith. Jiménez and Zommer know that different communities in different regions have all kinds of interests and consumption habits, and that WhatsApp is commonly used among Spanish speakers around the world. In Factchequeado’s pilot year, they want to quantify that information more and understand where certain narratives come from, how they get to certain communities, and what the takeaways from those findings are in order to better combat misinformation in Spanish. Then they can show how tech companies answer misinformation and disinformation in Spanish differently than they do in English, Zommer said. But to get all that information, building relationships with news consumers and social media users is key. “One of the approaches that Maldita and Chequeado have taken throughout their time is the idea of building trust by doing the public a service,” Jiménez said. “What we do on a daily basis is listen to the audiences, understand what their needs are and try to answer them. Once they trust us, we can start [giving them] other kinds of information that is not necessarily the one that they [came to us for].” Factchequeado plans to experiment with different formats to reach users as well, something that Chequeado and Maldita already do. Many of Factchequeado’s stories start with, “if you only have a few minutes, read this” and a few bullets that summarize the piece. Most people likely don’t have or want to spend the time reading 2,000 word articles, but they do have 20 seconds to understand that something is false. They’ll test out shorter pieces, images, short videos and audio files to see what what resonates most with its users. Its tone gives more “friend telling you something at the bar” vibes instead of “journalist trying to explain the world at you,” Jiménez said. “We as journalists often [face] pieces of misinformation that we might not think are super important or that they’re going to make us win a Pulitzer,” Jiménez said. “But they’re the ones that build trust within communities because you answer the questions that they have and afterwards, they will stay for the rest.”

### 1nc – US relationship with Latin America low

#### Old fault lines between Washington and the leaders of Latin America drive current tensions

McKinley 5/25 (P. Michael, senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, served for 37 years as an Ambassador in the U.S. Foreign Service and is former Secretary of State, “Beyond the Summit of Americas: Resetting U.S. Policy in Latin America,” United States Institute of Peace, May 25, 2022, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/05/beyond-summit-americas-resetting-us-policy-latin-america)-AT

Despite the Biden administration’s efforts to outline a new, positive vision for engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean, old fault lines are likely to come into play at the upcoming Summit of the Americas, which kicks off in Los Angeles on June 6. Both U.S. domestic politics and governments in the hemisphere with a more skeptical view of Washington and its intentions contribute to these tensions. A new U.S. perspective is required — one that takes into greater account the region’s diversity, priorities and political complexity. Without such a shift, the perception and reality of declining U.S. influence are only likely to deepen. The tri-annual regional summit is in trouble. The heads-of-state of Mexico, Brazil, many Caribbean countries and other nations are threatening to boycott — largely, but not only, because of the exclusion of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela. While the softening of sanctions legislation on Cuba and Venezuela is welcome in the region, it’s being viewed as a belated effort to respond to concern over their exclusion. Whether or not a widespread boycott of the summit ultimately materializes, the stresses in U.S-regional relations will have been exposed in an unflattering light. Observers and analysts are also pointing to longer-term concerns over U.S. policy in the region, including decreased U.S. influence and interest; growing regional ties with China; the failure to check Ortega’s Nicaragua, Maduro’s Venezuela and Cuba; and the “ambivalence toward democracy” and the “pink tide” trend in Latin American elections. The administration is responding. Secretary of State Antony Blinken presented an ambitious set of objectives in a May 3 speech to the Council of the Americas focused on “growth with equity.” The assistant secretary for the region, Brian Nichols, has mentioned reaching agreements on “clean energy transition, a green future, and digital transformation.” First lady Jill Biden visited Ecuador on May 19 and spoke about “achieving an equitable and sustainable future, building health and pandemic resilience, and strengthening democratic government” in the region. The importance of like-minded nations working with Washington should not be discounted. The summit could yet be salvaged. Despite promises of a wider agenda, however, issues like irregular migration, nearshoring and the state of regional democracy may dominate at the summit and will likely be perceived as Washington setting priorities. Most Latin American and Caribbean governments are concentrating instead on post-COVID pandemic measures to restart their economies and address the problems created by slow growth, inequality and political fragmentation. The summit in Los Angeles is unlikely to resolve these differences. The uncertainties surrounding the summit, however, are a wake-up call for the United States. Like the last period of serious redefinition of our hemispheric relations at the end of the Cold War in 1989, when Washington forged closer ties with a newly democratic hemisphere, the U.S.-Latin American relationship going forward must evolve.

### 2nc - US relationship with Latin America low

#### America’s attempt to re-establish leadership in Latin America is failing now – too many hurdles

Liptak 6/8 (Kevin, news reporter at CNN that covers the White House, and he previously covered Trump’s foreign and domestic policy, campaign politics, and the internal dynamics of the administration, “Snubs from key leaders at Summit of the Americas reveal Biden’s struggle to assert US leadership in its neighborhood,” CNN, Wednesday, June 8, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/07/politics/summit-of-the-americas-joe-biden/index.html)-AT

Biden, who arrives in Los Angeles on Wednesday, is expected announce a new partnership with countries in the Western Hemisphere during the gathering as part of a broader effort to stabilize the region, according to the officials. He and his administration have been working since last year to organize the summit, which was formally announced last August. The city of Los Angeles was selected as the venue in January. Biden named former Sen. Chris Dodd, his friend and former colleague on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as the special adviser for the event. Dodd traveled in the region to muster support, one of a number of administration envoys to Central and South America that included Vice President Kamala Harris and even first lady Jill Biden. Yet as the summit approached, it became evident an event designed to reassert American leadership in the region was facing serious hurdles. For weeks before the summit began, López Obrador hinted that he would boycott unless all leaders from the region were invited – including those from Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, each of whom has faced US opposition because of their human rights records. Other, mostly leftist leaders signaled they, too, may not attend if invitations did not go to everyone. Administration officials privately cast doubt those leaders would follow through on their threats, suggesting they were instead attempts to play to domestic audiences that are often skeptical of the United States. During an April telephone call between Biden and López Obrador, the subject of the summit arose. In a readout, the White House said the men “looked forward to meeting again at the June Summit of the Americas,” a sign the administration believed then the Mexican president would attend. Over the past weeks, Dodd spent lengthy virtual sessions lobbying López Obrador to reconsider his threat of a boycott. Members of Congress – including Sen. Bob Menendez, Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee – began to publicly agitate against inviting any leaders from Cuba, Venezuela or Nicaragua. And frustration mounted among administration officials that questions over the invitations and attendees were clouding out the summit’s intended goals. “The biggest problem is that the focus on attendance takes us away from the focus on substance, but that is the logical thing that happens ahead of a summit. It’s like the sausage-making period. We don’t talk much about the substance because the summit hasn’t started yet, we talk only about who might be there,” said Roberta Jacobson, the former US ambassador to Mexico who also served as an adviser to Biden on southern border policy. Ultimately, the weeks of speculation were put to rest — but not in the way the White House had hoped. “There cannot be a Summit of the Americas if all countries of the Americas cannot attend,” López Obrador said at a news conference in Mexico City. “This is to continue the old interventionist policies, of lack of respect for nations and their people.”

### 1nc – no Russia influence

#### Russia won’t be able to form relations with South America - too distracted now

Runde 3/22 (Daniel F. Runde - Senior Vice President; William A. Schreyer Chair; Director, Project on Prosperity and Development; and Director, Americas Program. “Russian Invasion of Ukraine Should Force a Rethink about Russian Presence in the Americas.” Center for Strategicc & International Studies. 3/3/22. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-invasion-ukraine-should-force-rethink-about-russian-presence-americas https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-invasion-ukraine-should-force-rethink-about-russian-presence-americas)

First, the United States needs to raise the price of engaging with Russia in the region. The longer this crisis lasts, the more Russia will look for friends wherever it can find them, both for diplomatic support and for assistance in dodging the sanctions. A full-court diplomatic press will be required to ensure Moscow doesn’t find any new supporters. It is possible that harsh Western sanctions on Russia might help some Latin American countries (e.g., Venezuela) in terms of commodity prices like oil, but it is more likely that the crisis will drive inflationary pressures and economic disruptions in the region. The United States, Europe, Canada, and others should seek to bolster the region with economic assistance to countries particularly hard hit by sanctions backlash. The United States should also increase its engagement in the OAS and consider a capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank. The crisis will also impact how the United States uses the Summit of the Americas that it is hosting in June in Los Angeles. Second, Putin may be bluffing, but he could deploy forces to the region. Russia has threatened to send military assets to the Western Hemisphere during this crisis. With oil at $100 a barrel, Putin will have resources at his disposal, but sanctions may also curb his ability to spend this money. If the crisis in Ukraine drags on and Russia sees U.S.-led sanctions as tantamount to “acts of war,” Putin might try anything. Strong statements to the Kremlin from the United States and its allies that they will oppose such deployments will be required. On the other hand, the invasion of Ukraine may leave Russia too distracted, too economically weak, or too overstretched to effectively assist client states such as Nicaragua, Cuba, or Venezuela. Third, the United States should be prepared for a change in leadership in Moscow or a Kyiv quagmire scenario that causes Russia to disengage with the Western Hemisphere. The United States should be ready to fill a void left by a weakened Russia so that China does not fill that void instead.

### 2nc – no Russia influence

#### Growing opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in Latin America

Ostos 4/22 (Claudia Gago Ostos - Research Intern, State Resilience and Fragility Program. “How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Affects Latin America.” Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy. April 7, 2022. https://newlinesinstitute.org/russia/how-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-affects-latin-america/)

Until Russia invaded Ukraine, Washington seemed to pay little attention to Russian influence in Latin America. However, with growing international opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the decline in Moscow’s reliability as an ally for the Latin American countries, the U.S. appears more interested in regaining diplomatic terrain in the region. In recent weeks, Washington approached the Venezuelan government about restarting the oil trade, a highly controversial decision within the U.S. government, and met with Colombian President Iván Duque over giving Colombia a non-NATO ally status – a status only Argentina and Brazil currently hold in the region. On March 2, 141 countries voted in favor of the non-binding resolution by the U.N. General Assembly to condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and demand a withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory. Out of the remaining 52 member states, 35 abstained and five voted against the resolution. These five were: Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, Russia, and Syria. Out of the 35 that abstained, we find longstanding Russian allies like Cuba, Nicaragua, and China. More interestingly, Bolivia and El Salvador were also among the Latin American countries that abstained. Other member countries were unable to vote on the matter; Venezuela could not vote because it had not paid its membership dues. Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine left Latin American countries in a difficult position. Most followed Mexico and Brazil’s course: The two countries declined to impose economic sanctions on Russia or condemn the Russian invasion. They also have no concrete plans to cut diplomatic ties, even though their representatives voted in favor of the U.N. Resolution. Brazil and Mexico have expressed their concerns over how sanctions could affect their own economies. Brazil imports more fertilizers from Russia than any other country; 69 percent of Brazil’s fertilizers are imported from Russia. After Brazil, Mexico is the second most important partner for Russia in Latin America. According to Mexico’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, Russia was Mexico’s 35th largest trading partner in 2020, with two-way trade worth just under $1.3 billion. Russian products accounted for two-thirds of that amount. Even if these countries will not sanction Russia themselves, sanctions from companies and trading partners mean they will need to find other trading partners to substitute the goods they import from Russia in order to satisfy their internal demands. On the other side, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela supported Russia’s actions in Ukraine and blamed the crisis on the U.S. and NATO, as was expected. After all, Russia shares more than military and trade deals with these countries; Russia’s financial system has been an essential enabler in Venezuela and Nicaragua’s sanctions evasion efforts in recent years. With Russian financial institutions now cut off, these countries could face additional economic challenges in the coming months. Furthermore, for Russia, these Latin American allies represent critical components in its efforts to establish a long-term security threat for the U.S. by continuously stating that depending on how the U.S. and NATO to act near its border, Russia will engage its allies in the region via unspecified “military-technical measures.” Despite Moscow’s influence in Latin America, the U.S. and China have far more significant ties to the region. In 2019, for example, South American exports to Russia amounted to $5 billion, but exports to the U.S. and China were $66 billion and $119 billion, respectively, according to data compiled by Harvard University. Russia’s specialty in the region has been political support for countries becoming isolated on the global stage and defense assistance, but that support may soon lose its value with Russia’s diplomatic isolation and economic decline. Likewise, if Moscow’s key allies in the region decide to abandon their relationship with Russia, Cuba and Nicaragua are likely to suffer the worst because of sanctions, but they would still have close economic ties with China to rely on. For now, they act as proxies that Russia can leverage against the U.S. because of their geostrategic proximity to the U.S. and military alliances with Russia. Although Venezuela plays a similar role, Maduro is uniquely positioned to exploit the current situation. With the U.S. banning Russian oil imports, it has turned to Venezuela after almost three years without any diplomatic relations, and Maduro’s administration seems eager to begin talks. Nonetheless, it is up to the United States to take Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an opportunity to enhance its alliances with Latin American (and European) partners. Washington will also have to navigate the challenge of incoming leaders, as Colombia, Costa Rica, and Brazil face elections this year. With the Summit of the Americas taking place in Los Angeles in June this year, Washington has a unique opportunity to further push this goal, guide Latin American countries in this changing economic landscape, and use new opportunities to spread democracy and development in the region.

#### Latin American countries are resistant to Russia’s efforts to gain influence in the region – the invasion of Ukraine was a wake-up call

Runde 3/22 (Daniel F. Runde - Senior Vice President; William A. Schreyer Chair; Director, Project on Prosperity and Development; and Director, Americas Program. “Russian Invasion of Ukraine Should Force a Rethink about Russian Presence in the Americas.” Center for Strategicc & International Studies. 3/3/22. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-invasion-ukraine-should-force-rethink-about-russian-presence-americas https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-invasion-ukraine-should-force-rethink-about-russian-presence-americas)

Given the global revulsion toward Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, governments in Latin America and the Caribbean should rethink their relationship with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. There should be a price to pay electorally, diplomatically, and commercially for being too close to Putin. It is likely that the significant sanctions on Russia will have spillover effects on Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua—the three countries closest to Russia in the region. The brutality of this invasion should make Argentina and Brazil, two countries flirting with Putin, think twice about a deeper partnership with the Kremlin. The rest of the region should see Russia’s invasion as a wake-up call and reduce their ties in the coming weeks and months. In recent years, Russia brought its “Kremlin playbook” to the Western Hemisphere, interfering in elections not only in the United States but also in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. Russia, through overt and covert means, has sought to undermine democratic processes by subverting, delegitimizing, or otherwise frustrating the political opposition in much the same way that Russia attempted to influence the United States’ 2016 and 2020 elections. Russia Today (known as RT) has a major presence in Latin America in Spanish, not only on television, which remains a major source of information in the region, but also via digital platforms. If RT is not providing disinformation, it is at the very least providing Kremlin propaganda. Russia seeks to project military power in the region in an attempt to “balance” NATO’s own eastward movement into Russia’s “near abroad.” Russia has a consistent presence in the region in the form of listening posts, special forces deployments, and military and intelligence training and support. Russia has periodically deployed strategic bombers and naval forces in the hemisphere to remind the United States and its allies in the region that it too can project power in the hemisphere. Russia has offered its Sputnik V vaccine in a number of countries on the continent. The vaccine is not as effective as Western vaccines or even those offered by China. However, if Guatemala, led by a friend of the United States, must wait at the back of the line for the “top-shelf” vaccines made in the United States or Europe, then Guatemala is going to buy the Sputnik V vaccine or remain unvaccinated. The leftist governments in Peru, Chile, and Bolivia (and possibly incoming governments in Colombia and Brazil) would have been tempted to be more “Putin curious” in the past. Working with Putin should now become untenable, especially for those governments that lead with a human rights platform. Russia will likely seek diplomatic or material support from the region and will likely work with actors in the region to try to work around sanctions. Russia has sought to build a collective resistance to sanctions. For example, with the help of China, as well as Russia and Iran, Venezuela’s oil company, PDVSA, has successfully sold millions of barrels of “sanctioned” oil via tankers primarily destined for China and with financial support from Russia. Countries under sanctions in the Western Hemisphere know that they can count on help from their allies when sanctions are imposed. For example, Maduro routinely ships sanctioned oil and diesel (and even food) to Cuba while his own people remain undernourished. Russia has spent years trying to create an alternative to SWIFT that Russia’s partners in the region could adopt to erode the West’s ability to influence behavior through financial sector sanctions. As the SWIFT sanctions bite in Russia, expect to see Russia’s allies join a Russia-led alternative to SWIFT.

### 1nc – sanctions fail

#### Sanctions won’t solve - Ukraine proves

Jones 22 (Lee Jones is Professor of Political Economy and International Relations at Queen Mary University of London., “Sanctions won’t save Ukraine”, UnHerd, February 28, 2022, https://unherd.com/2022/02/sanctions-wont-save-ukraine/)

Unsurprisingly, the West has decided it won’t send its sons and daughters to die for Ukraine. Instead, it hopes to cripple Russia with economic sanctions. Will such measures bring about the end of the Russian invasion? Will Vladimir Putin scuttle back to the Kremlin with his tail between his legs? It seems unlikely. As the record of international conflict shows, sanctions rarely (if ever) work. To succeed, sanctions must not only impose economic costs — they must also change the political behaviour of target governments. Neither is at all straightforward. As the past week has shown, designing sanctions that will harm Russia but not other European economies is fiendishly difficult. So far, only modest measures have been imposed: primarily asset freezes and exclusion from the Swift payments system for some banks; asset seizures and travel bans for some elites and oligarchs; and limits on Aeroflot flights. None of these will cripple Russia’s economy, despite fanciful claims by Western leaders. The proposed sanctions on Russia’s central bank [may cut much deeper](https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/592272-to-prevent-an-invasion-of-ukraine-threaten-to-sanction-russias). Exactly how far these will go is not yet clear. But freezing Russia’s overseas currency reserves will make it harder for the central bank to defend the value of the rouble, and to supply foreign exchange for commercial banks. This is unlikely to collapse the economy, as some advocates [suggest](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/02/how-russian-sanctions-work/622940/), but it could have significant and far-reaching consequences, including runs on Russian banks and impediments to foreign trade. However, it’s precisely the threat to trade that will probably lead Western governments to avoid a total freeze — limiting Russia’s access to foreign exchange, but not severing it entirely. The reason is simple: Russia is not a minor economy. Western countries, firms and banks do a lot of business with Russia. Wide-ranging sanctions will naturally have blowback. This is why tougher measures will be difficult, if not impossible, to impose. The real “nuclear” option would be to embargo Russia’s energy exports, which comprise over half of Russia’s total exports. This would inflict serious damage. But, given that Europe relies on Russia for about a quarter of its oil and over a third of its gas, it would also spur massive inflation and induce economic recession in the West. Prices have [already spiked](https://www.ft.com/content/c6303127-5edf-4256-9c25-effa75766002) due to the conflict, which will further harm households reeling from record-high energy prices. It’s telling, for example, that Germany has “de-certified” the Nordstream-2 pipeline, but not the pipelines through which it receives existing supplies. Likewise, Western governments appear [unable to agree](https://www.ft.com/content/69f72de5-d727-496d-9f9d-316db7bdaf03) on completely blocking Russia from Swift, because this would create difficulties for Russian and Western banks alike. Without Swift, how would Germany pay for Russian gas? And, if it cannot pay, would the gas keep flowing? How would the many other Western businesses working in or dealing with Russia make payments? For the same reason, although some sectors of the Russian economy, such as chemicals and automobiles, rely on imported hi-tech Western components, so far, export restrictions remain limited, for fear of damaging Western firms. Despite their belligerent rhetoric, Western leaders are wary of creating more problems for economies already struggling to recover from the deep recessions caused by their Covid-19 lockdowns. They are quietly carving out even non-critical economic sectors, such as [luxury goods and diamond exports](https://fashionunited.com/news/business/italy-s-luxury-sector-and-belgium-s-diamond-leaders-say-no-to-russian-sanctions/2022022546111), from the sanction regime. It is hard to avoid the impression that, having blundered into confrontation with Russia, Western governments are now realising they have very limited options, and remain reluctant to put their money where their mouths are. However, even if the West can find ways to inflict serious economic damage on Russia, that still does not mean sanctions will “work”. To be truly effective, they must also change the Russian government’s behaviour. And this is where the logic of sanctions [often breaks down](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198749325.001.0001/acprof-9780198749325). It is remarkably rare for Western policymakers to explain — or even consider — exactly how “economic pain” is supposed to translate into “political gain”. And the prospects in this particular case do not look promising. The fundamental problem is that sanctions are based on a dubious understanding of human behaviour. They are a quintessentially liberal instrument, resting on the assumption that every man has his price: if I impose economic costs on you, you will revise the cost-benefit analysis of your course of action, and change your behaviour accordingly. In the real world, however, many regimes and their supporters are willing to endure colossal economic costs to pursue their political and security goals. Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party regime [preferred](https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/Societies_Under_Siege/DcOPCgAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0) to see Iraq’s economy and society destroyed rather than relinquish power. Fidel Castro’s regime withstood a punishing US embargo for decades. Iran has suffered serious economic harm under Western sanctions without relinquishing its nuclear programme. What are Putin’s goals in Ukraine? The Russian government has made it clear since the early Noughties that it cannot tolerate the eastward expansion of Nato, considering it a serious threat to Russian security. Its invasion of Georgia in 2008, and its attacks on [Ukraine in 2014](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault), long ago demonstrated the Kremlin’s determination to prevent neighbouring countries falling into the Western orbit, even at the cost of international isolation and punitive sanctions. One does not need to sympathise with Putin at all to recognise that Russia’s bank balance is not his primary consideration. If Putin will not put economic costs ahead of his security goals, how else might sanctions work? Classically, comprehensive embargoes seemed to be guided by a “[naïve theory](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009785)” of sanctions, whereby economic suffering is expected to compel the population to rise up against their wicked leaders. But this rarely, if ever, happens. If anything, economic immiseration tends to fragment and weaken the population, who become absorbed by the struggle to subsist and more reliant on government help — [as seen in Iraq](https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/Societies_Under_Siege/DcOPCgAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0). Targeted sanctions work on an equally naïve basis, assuming that political leaders and their business cronies are completely autonomous from the people, such that manipulating their personal wealth will convince them to change course. In truth, political leaders always represent some broader set of forces in their regime and wider society. Their policies reflect that underlying coalition. If they change course, they will have to answer to their supporters. Vladimir Putin is a powerful and quasi-authoritarian leader, but he is not autonomous from Russian society. His rise reflects a broadly-based nationalist backlash against the consequences of neoliberal “shock therapy” practised on Russia by the International Monetary Fund after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Under the pro-Western President Yeltsin, the public wealth built up under communism was pillaged by oligarchs, while the Russian people suffered astonishing levels of deprivation. In the [decade to 1998](https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v29/n02/perry-anderson/russia-s-managed-democracy), GDP fell by 45%, mortality increased by 50%, government revenues had nearly halved, and crime had doubled. Putin rose to power by promising to halt and reverse Russia’s national decline. In his first seven years in office, real wages [doubled](https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v29/n02/perry-anderson/russia-s-managed-democracy) (albeit from a low base). Using soaring oil revenues, Putin stabilised the economy and paid off foreign debt, reasserting Russia’s sovereignty. He brought the oligarchs to heel, jailing or exiling anyone who would not recognise the state’s supremacy. And he restored stability and a measure of national pride to an exhausted and demoralised people. His regime, centred on a network of *siloviki* (security and military officials) and managers of state-owned enterprises, has proven politically robust and durable — a state within the state. This is important not to praise or exonerate Putin, but to understand why his popularity has remained high, even under sanctions. [Experimental research](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343319866879) suggests that Russia’s economic decline since 2014 — mostly caused by declining oil prices, though compounded by sanctions — has cost Putin some support. But it has been more than compensated for by an upsurge in nationalist backing. Putin’s [approval rating](https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/) increased from 65% in January 2014 to 86% in April 2014, following the annexation of Crimea. It remained above 80% for the next two years before returning to the high 60s. Today, a [large majority](https://www.levada.ru/2021/12/14/obostrenie-v-donbasse/) of Russians blame the West for the crisis in Ukraine, while [two-thirds](https://www.levada.ru/en/2022/01/28/anti-russian-sanctions/) have little or no concern about sanctions. Putin’s regime may have persecuted opposition figures, curbed dissent, and restricted electoral competition — but, despite such authoritarian measures, he retains widespread support. Western leaders could only dream of his approval ratings: support for Biden stands at [42%](https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/biden-approval-rating/), for Macron, [40%](https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/france/), and, for Boris Johnson, just [25%](https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/trackers/boris-johnson-approval-rating). Nor is there much sign of political fracture within the regime that sanctions could exploit. Putin’s ability to [publicly humiliate](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ucEs0nBuowE) his spy chief, who bodged his lines at the televised, stage-managed security council meeting prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, suggests he feels secure and confident. The overwhelming vote in the Duma of [400 to zero](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/15/duma-manouevre-points-to-kremlin-impatience-in-ukraine-standoff) in favour of recognising the breakaway “republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk suggests either broad elite consensus or an unwillingness to openly defy the Kremlin. Exactly how the (modest) economic pain caused by sanctions is meant to generate political gain is therefore hard to discern. All too often, sanctions are a comforting but dangerous illusion: they are alluring because they seem to provide an effective option between war and words. When diplomacy seems to fail, and states are unwilling to risk war, something else is needed — and that something is sanctions. But just because something must be done does not mean that this “something” is going to work. Moreover, it is all too easy to forget that embargoes are a weapon of war, often devastating target populations and escalating conflicts, rather than peacefully resolving them. In response to the latest sanctions, Putin [has put Russia’s nuclear forces on high alert](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/27/vladimir-putin-puts-russia-nuclear-deterrence-forces-on-high-alert-ukraine). It seems unlikely that he would deploy them in response to banking sanctions. But this is a reminder of that the stakes are incredibly high. Ultimately, even if sanctions do bite, we need to ask: what is the endgame? Sanctions are at best a means to an end, and surely the desired end is lasting peace in Eastern Europe. And one does not need to have any sympathy whatsoever with the Putin regime to believe that this can only be achieved by reckoning with core Russian interests. Like it or not, powerful states have the capacity to inflict serious harm on weaker ones — just ask the Serbs, Libyans, Afghans, Iraqis and Syrians on the receiving end of the Nato powers’ tender mercies. If Russia is dissatisfied, it clearly has the power to upset the existing order by force. The only way to prevent this is to compromise with Russia’s concerns, or deploy overwhelming force to deter it from using its military power. The West has done neither, dismissing Putin’s demands to establish a neutral buffer zone between Russia and Nato, while failing to deter him from using force to achieve his objectives. The only way out of this disaster is a negotiated settlement, which will require Nato to reckon with Russian interests, and preserve Ukrainian democracy and sovereignty within a framework of international neutrality. For the brutal reality is this: sanctions are unlikely to force Russia out of Ukraine, and the West is unwilling to be drawn directly into battle with a nuclear-armed state. Unless a diplomatic solution can be found, sanctions are likely to be merely part of a grinding proxy war along the lines of the brutal and horrific conflict in Syria. The people of Ukraine have already suffered too much. Sanctions won’t save them — they may only make their misery worse.

### 2nc – sanctions fail

#### **US sanctions don’t solve – they are flawed and Russian foreign policy won’t change**

Constable 2/22. (Simon Constable – freelance economics and markets commentator for U.S. News & World Report. “Why Sanctions on Russia Won’t Work.” Time. Febuary 23, 2022. https://time.com/6150607/why-sanctions-on-russia-wont-work/)

As the U.S. and Europe roll out an arsenal of economic sanctions to combat Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there is scant understanding that the financial interdependence of the crisis’s significant players means quick and easy solutions are unlikely to work. Worse still, imposing sanctions on Russia’s elite will do little if anything to bring order to what has fast-become chaotic. Putin in the Sanctions Crosshairs Nevertheless, news earlier this week that Russia ordered its military to take a “peacekeeping” role in disputed regions of eastern Ukraine, prompted the western democracies to impose sanctions on Russia. Specifically, the U.S., U.K., and other countries slapped penalties on specific Russian companies and people. In the U.S., the sanctions list included some Russian banks and wealthy individuals and oligarchs. Plus, there’s a ban on purchasing the country’s debt. In short, these actions are aimed at hurting the rich and powerful in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. The problem is that few experts think these actions will make much difference. “So far, we’ve seen timid sanctions,” says Peter Tchir, head of global macro strategy at New York-based financial firm Academy Securities. “Sanctions only work when they force behavior change, but in Putin’s case they won’t.” As it was under the Czars, the issue in Russia now is that the population is mainly poor – with average annual per capita income around one fifth of that in the U.S. Just a few ultra-wealthy individuals sit at the top of the economic pyramid. Ultimately, the poverty-stricken will feel the bite of sanctions far more than the elite. “Russia has always treated the poor as peasants,” Tchir says. Poor History of Sanctions Success Other experts see more significant flaws in imposing sanctions. “The record of those actions is that they fail,” says Steve Hanke, professor of applied economics at Johns Hopkins University. “There are always workarounds,” meaning sanctions won’t stop the rich from getting money in or out of the country. Indeed, Russia has been subject to sanctions for years dating back at least as far as the 2014 annexation of Crimea—and the behavior of the country has not changed in a positive way since then. As with the recently introduced penalties, the past sanctions were surgically applied to hit the elites. Other countries have also weathered severe sanctions without improving their behavior. Hanke notes that U.S. sanctions on Venezuela haven’t pushed out the country’s authoritarian President Nicolas Maduro. Similar actions against Cuba didn’t get rid of dictator Fidel Castro. Likewise, Iran’s theocratic mullahs remain in charge despite more than four decades of harsh U.S. measures against the regime. The issue is that sanctions often prompt a country’s population to rally around the flag. “Whoever is imposing the sanctions are viewed as the enemy,” Hanke says. Put another way, a siege mentality takes over with people banding together to weather the economic storm.

#### The US should have learned from Iran – sanctions fail to end the war and cause staggering HR violations

Ziabari 22 (Kourosh Ziabari; journalist and Asia Times correspondent and a former Chevening scholarship recipient. He is an alumnus of the Senior Journalists Seminar Fellowship by the East-West Center, a 2021 Dag Hammarskjold Fund for Journalists fellow, and a 2022 World Press Institute fellow; “Sanctioning Russia Won’t Stop Putin. Just Look at Iran.”; April 21, 2022; DOA: 6/5/22; <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/21/russia-sanctions-ukraine-war-iran/>) // bh

Culminating in former U.S. President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, these [Iran] sanctions, in short, have been a failure. The humanitarian costs of the sanctions have been staggering, and Iran’s civil society and middle class have had to pay a dear price, be it in the form of disenfranchisement from medicine, safe aviation, international mobility, educational opportunities, and COVID-19 vaccines, or their shrinking purchasing power, mushrooming poverty, and a currency that lost 70 percent of its value since Trump walked away from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018. It is difficult to gauge the total damage Iran has incurred from the sanctions, because the oil-dependent economy is diminishing over time, and there are various components that should be factored into the country’s economic freefall, including corruption, mismanagement, nepotism, lack of transparency, and bureaucratic labyrinths, in addition to sanctions. However, last year, then-Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif acknowledged U.S. sanctions have imposed damages on the national economy adding up to $1 trillion. Yet although Iranian citizens have been at the end of their tether with a strained economy and lives that are becoming increasingly untenable, occasionally prompting them to storm the streets and stage anti-government protests, the formidable sanctions have done little to change the government’s overall behavior and policies, and there are those who suggest they even have produced a counterforce by radicalizing Tehran’s regional conduct and nuclear priorities. In particular, in the aftermath of Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal, Iran accelerated its race to new nuclear thresholds and reneged on its commitments under the deal by enriching uranium to 20 percent and 60 percent, and even going the extra mile to produce metal uranium. These are some basic indications that the economic pressure has backfired and, instead of having a bearing on the government or coaxing it into diplomacy, has merely decimated a vulnerable middle class that is admittedly the sacrificial lamb in an ongoing vendetta involving Iran and the world powers. Further evidence of this assumption is Iran’s risky escalations in the Persian Gulf, targeting of Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities through its Houthi proxies, and nearly going to war with the United States after showering the Ain al-Asad air base in Iraq’s Anbar province with missiles in retaliation for the assassination of its top commander Qassem Suleimani in January 2020. These developments can be read as the failure of the sanctions regime: The government in Tehran has learned how to survive—to find workarounds to dodge the sanctions, sneak into the black market, empower the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to keep the national economy afloat—and has emerged resilient while the United States exhausts its options. In 2016, then-U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew warned that the overuse of sanctions against adversaries will water down their effectiveness and chip away at the United States’ leadership role. Russia bears many hallmarks of Iran’s authoritarian governance model. Its democratic credentials are scant, there is little willingness to open up to the world and show transparency and accountability, and civil liberties and social rights are not guaranteed. Russia is also a major world power, and with an annual defense expenditure of $61.7 billion as of 2020, and it boasts the world’s second-largest military. It produces its own arms and exports a massive quantity, including fighter jets, to traditional customers. Draconian sanctions, divestment, and embargoes, however inclusive and pungent, will not bring such a militarized juggernaut as Russia to its knees or deter it from further aggression in Ukraine, nor will they stave off its hypothetical prospective adventures in Europe, if there are indeed any (including the idea of invading Poland, raised by Andrii Deshchytsia, Ukraine’s ambassador to Poland).

#### Putin tolerates sanctions

Mathieson 22 (Rosalind Mathieson; Executive Editor for International Govt at Bloomberg; “Weapons, Not Sanctions, May Stop Putin in Ukraine”; April 11, 2022; DOA: 6/5/22; <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2022-04-11/weapons-not-sanctions-may-stop-putin-in-ukraine>)

Putin seems willing to tolerate the economic and financial squeeze, and as long as the president can force his people to do the same, sanctions won’t lead him to pull back in Ukraine. Indeed, Russian troops are pressing forward in the eastern Donbas region, having largely given up their campaign in the north after weeks without progress. Putin would no doubt like to claim at least a partial win by May 9, when Russia marks its victory day in World War II. Moscow has also streamlined its military leadership in Ukraine under one commander. So far the only thing that has slowed Putin down has been his military’s fumbles in northern Ukraine. Weapons sent by Europe and the U.S., especially anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, have proven a boon for the Ukrainian forces mounting fierce resistance on the ground. As Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said last week, Ukraine needs three things: “weapons, weapons and weapons.” Allies are responding. They are agreeing to send more offensive arms including tanks, though fighter jets may still be off the table. NATO members are talking about training Ukrainian forces on more modern equipment rather than just sending them Soviet-made kit.

#### Sanctions fail to end war – Russian oligarchs can’t speak out

O’Connor 3/2022 (Eileen O’Connor - former journalist and attorney who worked in Russia and Ukraine. “Putin Cares About Only One Thing, and It’s Not Oligarchs.” The New York Times. March 25, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/25/opinion/russia-ukraine-putin-sanctions-oligarchs.html)

As President Vladimir Putin faces the biggest test of his now-22-year reign, squeezed between a passionate Ukrainian resistance and tightening sanctions on oligarchs, oil and technology transfers, the answer remains the same, as it has throughout Russian history. Many in the West are hoping for Mr. Putin’s overthrow. They do not understand Russia or the attitudes that people there have toward power. Russian scholars have long noted that the absence of private property rights and impartial legal authority lead to state actors holding the power that determines the lives of Russians in every way. Beyond its borders, Russia has since the 15th century exerted its power through military aggression. In a country where power is nearly everything, sanctions and lost fortunes alone will not change that fundamental dynamic. Mr. Putin’s speech earlier this month proves the point and illustrates what he and many in Russia see as the objective of the war: to defend Russian territory and sovereignty against Western dominance. To him, the West has ignored Russia for too long, and denied it superpower status. In Western capitalist democracies, wealth often equates to access and influence. So it’s not surprising that many believe that sanctioning oligarchs can move them to pressure Mr. Putin to change course. That is a miscalculation. These oligarchs may hold wealth that connects them to power and that can be used by Mr. Putin, but in Russia, that does not mean that they wield any power over him or those in the Kremlin. It all goes back to the 1990s, when I witnessed mostly former Communist Party officials amassing wealth through a privatization of state assets overseen by Mr. Chubais. Those who then vowed fealty and lent money to Mr. Yeltsin’s political campaign became even wealthier, granted ownership of the largest state-owned enterprises in oil, gas and raw materials like nickel and aluminum. Today they remain the richest men in Russia. But the lack of properly defined property rights and a legal and institutional framework to protect them meant these oligarchs still depended on the Kremlin, occupied since 2000 by Mr. Putin. Court decisions for or against oligarchs could easily be reversed depending on the favor of the Kremlin. In the 2000s, after I had transitioned to working as an attorney representing Western investors in the region, I saw this dynamic myself. And the source of oligarchs’ wealth is not the only thing Mr. Putin can control. He has made clear the dangers of challenging his hold on power. Take the case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who was once the wealthiest man in Russia. Rising from the ranks of the Communist Youth, Khodorkovsky obtained several formerly state-owned oil fields in Siberia and formed the corporation Yukos. In a televised meeting at the Kremlin in 2003, he dared to criticize the government as corrupt. Mr. Putin responded by stripping Mr. Khodorkovsky of his assets and putting him in prison for 10 years, until he was allowed to leave to live in exile. Experiences like Mr. Khodorkovsky’s may explain why so few oligarchs are speaking out now. The only ones who have said anything about the war have done so from the comfort of places like London, where Mikhail Fridman, the founder of Alfa-Bank, put out a statement saying that “war can never be the answer” — but not criticizing the president. Even with that, Mr. Putin, in his recent speech, lumped those oligarchs in with his adversary, the West, saying “they can’t get by without oysters or foie gras” and that they do not mentally exist “here, with our people, with Russia.” He vowed to spit them out “like a midge that flew into our mouths.” That might have been why Mr. Chubais — who, in addition to overseeing the privatization push, became an oligarch in his own right, and has remained in Mr. Putin’s good graces — resigned his symbolic position as climate czar and left the country. The only people who can truly sway Mr. Putin are ideologues who share his views, the so-called siloviki. The word literally means people with force — the power that comes from being in the security forces or military. These insiders have been with Mr. Putin since his days in the K.G.B. or in the St. Petersburg municipal government, and they see themselves as protectors of Russia’s power and prestige. They have kept their money mostly inside Russia and out of reach of sanctions. And like Mr. Putin, they see the dissolution of the Soviet Union as the greatest catastrophe of the 20th century, and believe this fight is for Russia’s “sovereignty and the future of our children.” To influence them, the West must prioritize the things that they believe give Russia its superpower status: its oil and its military. Russia’s oil and gas sector provides as much as 40 percent of the country’s federal budget revenues and accounts for 60 percent of the country’s exports. That is why President Biden’s focus on sanctions banning oil imports is important, though somewhat symbolic, given how little the United States imports from Russia. While Germany has halted development of a major gas pipeline, the European Union has not cut off Russian supplies, which represent around 40 percent of its needs, arguing it will take time to find alternative sources. If European countries were serious about affecting Mr. Putin’s thinking, they would spend less time seizing oligarchs’ yachts and more lessening their dependence on Russian energy. Likewise, the West must push for India and China to join these sanctions as well. Meanwhile, the best way to undermine Russia’s military is by limiting access to technology. As has become clear on the ground in Ukraine, the Russian military lacks the vital hardware and software used by other modern forces to gather real-time field intelligence, along with the communication systems necessary to use that intelligence effectively. And the dayslong stalling of a tank convoy indicates that the Russians lack a sophisticated supply-chain system to bring food and gas to troops. Sanctions cutting off access to the tools that keep Russia’s military operating — the overt exertion of power — can make a difference to those advisers around Mr. Putin. The United States and Europe imposed sanctions to do just that, but they must encourage India and China to do the same. It may not be easy, but doing so will depend on whether the United States can make the case that the principles of sovereign nations and the world order they rely on are under an existential threat. In an interview with Bloomberg, Mr. Fridman, the London-based oligarch who has since been put under British sanctions, said that if the European Union thought he could tell Mr. Putin “to stop the war and it will work, then I’m afraid we’re all in big trouble,” because that means Western leaders “understand nothing about how Russia works.”

#### Sanctions legitimize Putin’s power – he is proud of withstanding economic hardships from the West

Alexeev 22 (Sergey Alexeev; Journalist at EuroPP; “Western sanctions are only strengthening Putin’s grip on power”; May 11th, 2022; DOA: 6/25/22; <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/05/11/western-sanctions-are-only-strengthening-putins-grip-on-power/>) // bh

For Russians, the recession of the 1990s, when the economy underwent an unprecedented structural transformation, is an important benchmark. At the beginning of that transformation, the economy lost 52% of its output. By comparison, during the Great Depression, a textbook example of economic collapse, the American economy declined by only 34%. Many of Russia’s ruling class have been in power since that period. Thus, their tolerance for economic calamities is unimaginably high. The inconsequential sanctions of 2014 only reinforced their confidence that recovery will inevitably follow once the economy adjusts. Soon after the first 2022 sanctions were implemented, Putin’s government stated that he expected the economy to recover after a temporary increase in inflation and unemployment. But sanctions are not only an inadequate deterrence for Putin – they are actively tightening his grip on power. Putin legitimises his rule by claiming Russia is heroically withstanding economic hardships caused by the West. This message is compatible with the Kremlin’s framing of the Ukraine conflict as a ‘denazification’ project and with its broader obsession with the Second World War. Many Russians view the atrocities perpetrated by Nazi Germany on the Eastern Front, the painful economic transformation of the 1990s, and the current economic sanctions as a single narrative, with Putin continuing the fight against Russia’s enemies both within and outside the country. All of this underlines the futility of applying criminological principles such as incapacitation and deterrence to a country. While these principles may be effective at preventing crimes carried out by individuals, they are entirely inadequate for preventing aggression by states, even thoroughly personified dictatorships like Putin’s Russia. They are also undermined by assigning collective blame to all Russians, who are in many respects also victims of the country’s unjust institutions and political leadership.

#### Sanctions will not sway Putin – and they threaten world economic stability

Wadhams 22 (Nick Wadhams, National Security Reporter at Bloomberg, “US Officials Are Split Over the Next Round of Russia Sanctions”, Bloomberg, June 1, 2022 at 11:01 AM PDT, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-01/us-wavers-over-next-russia-sanctions-as-fears-of-divide-grow#xj4y7vzkg)

Biden administration officials are divided over how much further the US can push sanctions against Russia without sparking global economic instability and fracturing transatlantic unity. While President Joe Biden’s team rallied behind behind a sanctions plan it rolled out just after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the debate is more heated now that President Vladimir Putin has shrugged off the early economic penalties and is forging ahead with his war, according to officials familiar with the discussions. The people, who asked not to be identified discussing internal deliberations, said factions have emerged over how hard to push. One group, which includes many officials at the State Department and White House, advocates even stricter measures known as secondary sanctions in response to Russian atrocities, arguing opposition from allies can be overcome. Another group of officials, many based at Janet Yellen’s Treasury Department, worry about further strains on a global economy already suffering from supply-chain woes, inflation, volatile oil prices and a potential food crisis. Some fret about the looming midterm elections and Democrats’ chances if prices at the pump stay high. They argue for a different, untested approach: a cap on oil prices that would allow countries to buy Russian energy while limiting Moscow’s income. [What Secondary Sanctions Mean, for Russia and World: QuickTake](https://archive.ph/o/xcvwC/https:/www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-05/what-secondary-sanctions-mean-for-russia-and-world-quicktake) “We’re now just coming up to the limit of how severely you can impose sanctions against a major economy without it having such bad spillover effects that you are creating a ton of bushfires elsewhere,” said Nicholas Mulder, a Cornell University professor and author of “The Economic Weapon,” a history of sanctions policy. The challenges have been exacerbated by the [departure](https://archive.ph/o/xcvwC/https:/www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-26/biden-s-russia-sanctions-coordinator-to-take-leave-of-absence) of Daleep Singh, the deputy national security adviser who was managing the administration’s sanctions rollout, according to one person familiar with the internal dynamics. Singh had also [visited India](https://archive.ph/o/xcvwC/https:/www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-06/india-to-face-significant-cost-if-aligned-with-russia-u-s-says) as part of US efforts to push the government further out of Russia’s orbit. His absence will fan concerns that the US lacks an influential voice to play that role at an even more perilous time. Officials from the State Department, Treasury Department and National Security Council all declined to comment. But other people familiar with the dynamic characterized it as a healthy internal debate and denied any suggestion that agencies were pitted against each other. One said that it’s Treasury’s normal role to scrutinize decisions that could disrupt economic flows. [Russia’s $285 Billion Oil and Gas Bonanza Is Funding Putin’s War](https://archive.ph/o/xcvwC/https:/www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-06-01/has-sanctioning-russia-worked-oil-gas-sales-put-285b-in-putin-s-pocket) The debate mirrors broader tensions in the trans-Atlantic alliance, with agreement harder to find on how much more pain to inflict on Putin. A harbinger of the challenges to come emerged in recent days, when the European Union agreed to pursue a ban on oil imports -- but only after granting [carve-outs](https://archive.ph/o/xcvwC/https:/www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-30/eu-leaders-back-push-to-ban-some-russian-oil-over-putin-s-war) to Hungary -- and then were unable to decide on what to do next or how aggressively to go after gas imports. Until now, unity had been a defining characteristic of the US and European response to the war. “We continue to look at what other sanctions we can impose,” Jose Fernandez, the undersecretary of state for economic growth, energy and the environment, said in an interview. He stressed the importance of Western unity, saying Putin faces a “solid group of countries that are dead set against the invasion.” “You’ve got countries applying for NATO membership,” Fernandez said. “That kind of unity -- and sanctions are part of that -- is something I don’t think he was expecting.” One person familiar with the matter said the US focus on unity had been so all-encompassing that the Americans had even asked the UK in recent weeks not to pursue a trade battle with Ireland over Northern Ireland for fear it would give Putin a weak spot to exploit. [Russian Wins in Eastern Ukraine Spark Debate Over Course of War](https://archive.ph/o/xcvwC/https:/www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-27/russian-wins-in-eastern-ukraine-spark-debate-over-course-of-war) Yet with Putin undaunted by the economic chokehold and pressing ahead with his war, there are growing calls within the administration to test that unity by taking action against other countries and companies that help Russia evade sanctions or provide what the US calls “material support” to sanctioned entities. They argue that such moves would be narrowly targeted, nothing like the broad sanctions campaign that sought to stifle Iran over its nuclear program by targeting almost any country or company that did business with Tehran. Many US allies and humanitarian groups argued that approach was counterproductive. But supporters of the harder line say that, with the war in its fourth month, its time has come. “There’s a time and a place for considered US unilateral action,” said Edward Fishman, a former State Department official who is now an adjunct professor at Columbia University. “There’s no good argument against maximizing sanctions on Russia. And the sooner you do it, the better because time isn’t really on our side.” But that’s testing the limits of what sanctions can do in the face of a evidence that even crippling penalties fail to force stubborn regimes to capitulate. Skeptics point to sanctions programs against nations such as North Korea, Venezuela, Syria and Cuba that have only entrenched adversarial leaders determined to hunker down and pass the suffering onto their own populations. If the US goes forward with more sanctions, it might find itself largely alone in such efforts, in effect inserting the wedge between it and allies that Putin has a history of exploiting. It could also further roil energy markets, possibly causing new pain at US gas pumps. [Putin Needs Help From China and India on Oil Europe Doesn’t Want](https://archive.ph/o/xcvwC/https:/www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-31/putin-needs-help-from-china-and-india-on-oil-europe-doesn-t-want) Some in the Biden administration seeking a more cautious approach have floated the idea of a price cap -- not restricting the flow of oil, but merely the price that would be paid for it. That idea faces considerable skepticism given that it’s never been tried before. Two people familiar with the matter said there was also a belief internally that the price cap idea was part of an effort to redirect clamor in Congress and among outside groups away from imposing secondary sanctions on Russian energy exports, which they fear would spur even stronger macroeconomic shocks. The debate is also forcing a wider reassessment of the sanctions campaign. Officials are confronting the fact that the oligarchs who have been targeted by sanctions may not wield the influence with Putin they once had. And the administration has shifted away from its argument that sanctions could hasten the end of the war to the claim that sanctions, export controls and other restrictions will take a long time -- perhaps years -- to weaken Putin. “I wouldn’t say the system is broken, but over-reliance on these tools to direct your foreign policy is a problem,” said Julia Friedlander, a former Treasury Department official. “It’s an asymmetry between trying to stop a government from invading a country and doing so by following money around the world. I still say do it, but there are hitches in the concept itself.”

#### Sanctions alone will not end the war in Ukraine, but sanctions do risk stronger ties between China and Russia

Dempsey 22, (JUDY DEMPSEY, NONRESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW CARNEGIE EUROPE EDITOR IN CHIEF, March 10, 2022, “Judy Asks: Can Sanctions End Russia’s War in Ukraine?”, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/86606)

The threat of sanctions did not prevent President Vladimir Putin’s war, but the reality of them may help to end it. While hopeful voices have wondered if sanctions might produce enough popular discontent inside Russia to cause Putin to reverse course, this is unlikely. Instead, while no one can say definitively when the war will end, we can expect that it will end with a settlement. No matter how poorly his military seems to be doing—and it appears they are performing quite poorly indeed—Putin retains capacity to draw out the conflict into a bloody, rolling horror in the months to come. The strength and severity of the sanctions and their palpable effect on the Russian economy are likely to incentivize Putin to seek a settlement sooner than he otherwise would and could offer bargaining chips to counter some of Russia’s most egregious demands. To be clear, the sanctions won’t lead to a good deal soon; the deal will still be bad and too late, but not as bad and as late as it might have been. And even if they don’t help end this war, they are important both as an immediate step toward accountability and as a potential deterrent to other actors in the future. KRZYSZTOF BLEDOWSKICOUNCIL DIRECTOR AND SENIOR ECONOMIST AT THE MANUFACTURERS ALLIANCE FOR PRODUCTIVITY AND INNOVATION It depends on whose sanctions. Russia had factored in the sanctions cost of the war before triggering it. The actual breadth and depth of sanctions alongside private capital flight, trade restrictions, and diplomatic ostracism probably surprised the Kremlin. But there also exists in Russia a cost-benefit calculation when it comes to stopping the war short of its goal. And here, the cost of failure—not overthrowing the Kyiv government and subjugating the population—must also be set against the burden of the West’s sanctions. Aside from the West, there’s one other global power whose economic and strategic capacity makes a difference in the Kremlin’s calculations, and that’s China. When Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela suffocated under the West’s sanctions, these countries could count on Russia and China to evade some of them. So long as Beijing straddles the fence, Russia’s economy won’t implode. It will experience hyperinflation, its living standards will erode, and its long-term growth will decline. But it will muddle through. However, should China signal it is prepared to shadow the West’s sanctions, the calculations in Moscow would change. Alas, it is not clear whether for Beijing, the advantages of China’s lining up with the West would make up for the costs of a rupture with Russia. ROBERT COOPERCOUNCIL MEMBER AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS Yes. But sanctions are only one element. The story begins with the horror of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, its neighbor and cousin; then the courageous, inspiring resistance of a united Ukrainian people. Add to that the crushing economic penalties, cutting Russia off from the global system and, in a world where we are all joined together, anything is possible. In war, wrote Napoleon, the moral stands to the material in a ratio of three to one. These sanctions are different from past cases such as Cuba or South Africa. Those aimed at regime change. With Ukraine, the plan is simpler: empty the war chest and stop the war. If President Vladimir Putin falls too, that would be a bonus. MARTIN EHLCHIEF ANALYST AT HOSPODÁŘSKÉ NOVINY These are the most comprehensive sanctions any superpower or major developed country has had to face since 1945. So one would expect them to work. But even experts warn that sanctions per se are not the instrument for winning wars—as history teaches us. At this moment in time, these sanctions are an irreplaceable tool the international community can use against the Russian regime. I am not naive to think that Russians will rise up against Vladimir Putin immediately due to the impossibility to use Apple Pay. And I also do not believe the unprecedented unity of the democratic West would survive a longer period. But for the here and now, these sanctions could significantly contribute to persuading the Russian government to stop fighting because they show the unity of the West, a unity which nobody—neither us nor Putin—imagined possible about three weeks ago. THERESA FALLONDIRECTOR OF THE CENTRE FOR RUSSIA, EUROPE, ASIA STUDIES (CREAS) Sanctions as such cannot end the war. They can create hardship for the Russian population, but historically Russians are used to suffering and the official Russian propaganda will put the blame for the sanctions squarely on the West. Propaganda will paint the sanctions as unjust persecution of Russia by its enemies and will try to use them to rally the people around the regime. Only a minority have access to outside information and are ready to protest against the government. Sanctions will make Russia more dependent on trade with China, increasingly making Russia the junior partner in the China-Russia de facto alliance, which I call “Chinusia.” This will give China access to Russia’s vast natural resources, feeding China’s economic growth and military buildup. On the other hand, sanctions will hurt the economic interests of Russia’s economic, security, and political elites (oligarchs). It is still possible for a small elite to thrive, even under sanctions and in conditions of economic isolation, as in North Korea. However, is Russia comparable to North Korea? If the sanctions against Russia are sustained, there is a hope that Russia’s elites may act to put pressure on Putin to change course, or they may try to replace Putin with a new leader altogether. GEOFF KITNEYWRITER AND COMMENTATOR ON AUSTRALIAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS When Vladimir Putin visited Australia the one and only time in September 2007 for an APEC meeting, a journalist asked him what he thought of Australia, to which he replied: “I never think about Australia.” Despite its remoteness from Russia, Australia has vigorously joined the global action to sanction Russia—not just to hurt Russia but also to warn China. Australian leaders believe that widely enforced sanctions are setting the Russian economy back decades. Australia wants Beijing to see how united global action to cripple Russia is the price to be paid for military adventurism of a kind it is contemplating toward Taiwan. Australia sees its biggest long-term security threat coming from what it calls “an arc of autocracy” formed by a strategic alliance between Russia and China. Australia believes the free world’s response to Russia’s Ukraine war must be so strong that it will force China to pause for thought about the likely cost of a military takeover of Taiwan: that it may not be necessary for the West to go to war to make China an economically damaged, pariah nation. From Australia’s point of view, even if sanctions don’t end the war in Ukraine quickly, their success will also be measured by the strength of the message it sends to China. JOHN C. KORNBLUMFORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO GERMANY No. Sanctions alone cannot do the job. They are a limited tool substituted for more difficult alternatives. The same was the case in 2014, after the Russian takeover of Crimea, and in 1968 and 1979 after Prague and Kabul. I managed a sanctions package against Serbia in 1996 and 1997. In the end, it was the NATO bombing which forced then president Slobodan Milošević to pull back. But NATO cooperation on sanctions was essential to agreeing the military option. Sanctions may help stop the Russian attack, but they will not change Russian behavior overnight. Sanctions will help us maintain the moral high ground, especially with the Russian people. Thirty years ago, our Russian partners wanted a fresh start. Today, we may be forced to deal with Vladimir Putin as we did with Milošević in Serbia. We probably can’t expect a return to the Charter of Paris, but at the same time cannot modify it to meet Russian demands. Fifty years ago, German Social Democrat Willy Brandt and then U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger defined Western principles in a way that both Russia and China found acceptable. Thirty years have passed since current arrangements were agreed upon. Even without Russian attacks, it would be time to bring some of the agreements up to date, just as we did with the Charter of Paris and the Helsinki Summit in 1992. The active application of sanctions will be essential in helping to define future goals. STEFAN MEISTERHEAD OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND DEMOCRACY PROGRAM AT THE GERMAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (DGAP) The most comprehensive sanctions Western countries have ever enacted against Russia seriously hit the Russian state, society, and economy. After these sanctions, Russia will not be like it was before. It is about changing the way of life for the Russian people and decoupling the country from the global economy. At the same time, even if they are important, sanctions will not stop Russian President Vladimir Putin in his war against Ukraine. Putin is on an historical mission to get Ukraine back at any cost. He has prepared this war over the years while he built a repressive apparat for any internal opposition and securitized all parts of the Russian state where the economy has to serve as an instrument to resist any kind of sanctions. Russian oligarchs depend more on the Russian state than they are able to resist Putin’s policy. Even if people in the system are shocked by what Putin is doing, for the time being, they fall into patriotism or apathy. Sanctions will work in the medium term, but then there might be no Ukrainian state anymore and Russia may be so isolated that the West lacks any impact. Ukraine is fighting for European security and needs any means to resist the Russian attack. Sanctions alone will not stop Putin. MARIANN ŐRYHEAD OF THE FOREIGN DESK AT MAGYAR HÍRLAP Western sanctions alone will most likely not end the war in Ukraine. They were never enough to change the fundamental geopolitical stance of Russia. Putin has a certain goal to reach and Russia has probably prepared to deal with most of these sanctions. Of course, it’s also possible that the sanctions will change the course of events. Even though Putin underestimated the EU’s and the United States’ willingness to make sacrifices, these sanctions will hurt the West too. Some of sanctions and the decisions made by big companies are aimed at making the Russian people put pressure on their government. It is very hard to estimate by Western logic and experience how the Russian people will react. Sanctions can also have far-reaching consequences. Pushing Russia toward China and India can create a new geopolitical reality. MARC PIERINIVISITING SCHOLAR AT CARNEGIE EUROPE Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is unfolding in the most brutal fashion imaginable and there is little clarity about the endgame. But, if Grozny and Aleppo are any meaningful yardsticks of Russian military operations, it is doubtful that, at this very moment, Western sanctions have any effect on the Kremlin. There are two reasons for this. The first one is that, by virtue of the current pattern of Western European imports of gas, oil, and coal, Russia is still earning some $600-700 million per day—enough to fuel a massive war for a long period of time. The second reason is that the Kremlin’s political motivations for such a massive invasion are solidly cast in ideology and history. They are packaged in fabricated narratives and the media are all but suppressed. Over the medium term, though, incremental sanctions will have two effects. They will vastly increase the cost of war for Russia and will cut it off from the West, its main source of income. They will also make the consequences of the invasion visible to each citizen of Russia, each policymaker, and each general. Even in Russia, that may matter.

### 1nc – sanctions fuel HR violations

#### The US’s overuse of sanctions has various unintended consequences - destabilization and humanitarian issues

Guyer ’22 (Jonathan Guyer, Jonathan Guyer covers foreign policy, national security, and the world for Vox. From 2019 to 2021, he worked at The American Prospect, where as managing editor he reported on Biden’s foreign-policy team. He has written for The New Yorker, The New York Times, The Paris Review, and Rolling Stone. Previously, he spent five years as a correspondent in Egypt and researched Arab political cartoons as a Harvard Radcliffe fellow., “The Biden experts waging war without weapons,” Vox News, May 9, 2022, <https://www.vox.com/23041830/technocrats-waging-bidens-war-sanctions-russia>)

Most sanctions ramp up over weeks, months, or years, but the Russia sanctions came together days after Russia’s assault on Ukraine and were initially harsh — part of the administration’s “start high and stay high” approach. “We know where Russia’s pressure points are,” Singh told NPR, reflecting on what he had learned since 2014. “So that’s why instead of taking a gradualist approach, we’re prepared to start with sanctions at the top of our escalation ladder and stay there.” Just two days after Russia’s invasion, the US, the European Commission, and major European countries imposed sanctions on Russia’s central bank. The next day, Japan joined. The central banks of petro-states like Venezuela and Iran have been sanctioned before, but a country the size of Russia took it to a whole new level. And since then, new sanctions are being rolled out almost every week against individuals, companies, and banks. Russia’s energy sector is perhaps the last arena that the US has yet to comprehensively sanction with its partners and allies. All told, 30 countries that consist of more than half of the global economy have joined the coalition. The Biden administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity emphasized that major Russian financial and banking institutions have been sanctioned without causing major global disruptions. “We’ve really carefully kicked the tires on these measures before we’ve done them,” the official said. “We’ve managed this in a way that has been remarkably effective at minimizing collateral costs.” The central bank sanctions had to have been prepared methodically and well in advance, says Daniel Fried, a former ambassador to Poland who coordinated sanctions on Russia in Obama’s State Department. “And I thought, ‘Damn, they’re good,’” he told me. In 2014, Fried traveled Europe with Singh, then a senior Treasury official, in advancing sanctions against Russia during its initial invasion of Ukraine. “Jack Lew, the Treasury secretary, basically sent Daleep [Singh] on my delegation to make sure that ‘Wild Man’ Fried wouldn’t trash the world financial system with my sanctions on Russia,” said Fried, who then quickly realized that Singh was a huge asset and supported his work. Lew told me the Treasury Department had studied “how Russia was interconnected to the European global economy” to ensure that sanctions didn’t kick off a recession. “State was pushing to do more, and Treasury was making the case to do it in a surgically targeted way, to have the maximum impact you’re looking for with the minimum unintended consequences that could undermine the whole effort,” Lew said. The combined effort put pressure on Putin that, according to Lew, brought Russia to the negotiating table and culminated in the 2014 Minsk agreement. “If State and Treasury are knit up, who’s gonna stop us?” Fried added. Now, the stakes are higher. The sanctions against Russia aren’t just about Ukraine, but may impact the future of sanctions — a coercive tool that policymakers think might be the route of first resort in a potential conflict against China. Julia Friedlander, a former career Treasury official, said that if sanctions fail to achieve Biden’s goals in Europe, new questions will be raised about the tool. “Can we really pretend to have faith in this kind of maximum pressure and financial sanctions again?” she said. “Maybe we have to realize that we’ve been barking up the wrong tree.” It’s also not been articulated yet what lifting sanctions would look like. Singh said last month that “we’re not at the point at which we’re talking about sanctions relief.” And an administration official declined to speculate about what circumstances might lead to sanctions being lifted. Limited congressional oversight means the president is not required to spell out goals, say how the administration is tracking them, or describe humanitarian fallout from sanctions. **Critics worry that the administration is overselling how effective sanctions will be**. In March, for example, Rosenberg spoke to anti-money laundering (AML) specialists. She went so far as to say, “The fate of Ukrainian democracy and the strength of democracies to push back against autocracy writ large depends on whether we do our jobs — and whether you do AML and Russian sanctions compliance work well.” Those who praise the Biden administration’s coordination of sanctions also express concern about their **unintended consequences**. “I do think that no one has really had the time to plan out what the longer-term implications are going to be of essentially annihilating the Russian economy,” Friedlander, now a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, told me. The truth is that **Russia will adapt — it already has**, and the ruble has begun to bounce back. Research indicates that sanctions aren’t a very effective tool unless formulated within a broader foreign policy strategy. A 2019 report from the Government Accountability Office found that government agencies aren’t great at assessing whether sanctions are working. “We need more accountability around sanctions policy — when and how they’re successful,” said Michael Wahid Hanna of the International Crisis Group. “**US and European policymakers have never clearly defined how weakening or diminishing the economic welfare of ordinary people creates** the conditions for a **possible political or diplomatic resolution to something as significant as a military conflict**,” said Esfandyar Batmanghelidj of the economic research institution Bourse and Bazaar Foundation. The intensive sanctions on Russia will also change the way countries think about the free movement of capital. Adam Posen of the Peterson Institute for International Economics has argued that **these sanctions on Russia will have a corrosive effect on the world economy that might result in the “end of globalization.**” Above all, the **humanitarian effects may be staggering and could elevate international food prices by up to 22 percent, with vulnerable people bearing most of the war’s costs**. As a result of US sanctions, **Iranians suffered from limited access to medicine, especially early in the pandemic. In Venezuela, sanctions contributed to the collapse of the health care system**. Humanitarian exemptions are built into sanctions for foods, agricultural items, and medicines, as well as licenses for some international organizations and nonprofit groups to operate in Russia. “Even so, they don’t always work to mitigate those unintended impacts in the way that the designers and implementers of sanctions law or executive orders intend,” a Democratic congressional aide told me. Lew explained that sanctions at this level will inevitably hurt Russians. “When you’re in a war, like the war that Russia has created here, it’s impossible to protect all the quote-unquote innocent people, and there’s a question of what innocent means when your country is doing things like that,” he told me. Since OFAC is so understaffed, former Treasury officials explained, it can be difficult to create enough licenses and waivers for humanitarian reasons. The **humanitarian consequences “can never be a secondary issue,”** said Adeyemo, who says he and his team are “thinking about how we can get more consistency around our humanitarian carve-outs.” **Banks tend to overcomply with sanctions: they want to avoid potential hits to their reputations, and are generally overcautious.** More than 250 companies have already left Russia, including airlines, banks, consulting firms, and retailers. One bank executive told me that they had been working 15-hour days since December to understand the overlapping layers of Biden’s sanctions. There are **concerns the humanitarian fallout could become collateral or peripheral to the immediate crisis.** “If you really want to amp the pressure up as much as possible, you’re obviously going to affect the population,” Friedlander said. So when the Biden administration announces that they’ve taken the humanitarian dynamic into account, as the White House often does in press releases, it’s only part of the story. “You’ve taken it into account but then you bagged it,” she explained. “And then you try to mitigate it afterward.” Narges Bajoghli, an anthropologist at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies who is writing a book on sanctions, says the fact that the sanctions team uses military terminology suggests that the humanitarian consequences are, to some extent, intentional. “It’s similar to the way in which the humanitarian aspect is thought about in some ways in a hot war situation,” she said, “where, yes, it’s unfortunate, but it’s a necessary byproduct of going up against the state.”

# Ukraine-Russia Adv Answers

### 1nc – disinformation failing

#### Russian disinformation campaigns about Ukraine are failing now – Europe and North America shoot down false narratives

Woolf ’22 (Marie Woolf – Writer for the Canadian Press. “Russia's misinformation campaign failing, say Canadian general, EU and NATO officials.” National Post. 5/21/22. https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/canada-news-pmn/russias-misinformation-campaign-failing-say-canadian-general-eu-and-nato-officials)

Russian attempts to sell false narratives in the West about the invasion of Ukraine are failing, say a Canadian general and senior NATO and European officials. At a security conference in Ottawa, they said misinformation campaigns by the Kremlin are being successfully thwarted and countered in both Europe and North America. But they warn Russian President Vladimir Putin is stirring up dissent in Africa and the developing world by blaming Western sanctions for food shortages resulting from the Russian invasion and the blockade of Ukraine’s ports. Putin’s strategy is trying to increase Russia’s sphere of influence not just in Ukraine but in Africa and the developing world by sowing dissent and “weaponizing everything” including food, the conference heard. Lt.-Gen. Giovanni Manione, deputy director general of the EU Military Staff, said on top of the four riders of the apocalypse — conquest, war, famine and death — there was a fifth rider in this conflict: disinformation. “How many countries will fall to Russia without shooting a single shot in Africa and Asia?” he asked, adding that disinformation was difficult to counter. The conference heard that in Russia a majority believe Putin’s spin about its action in Ukraine, but that the same narratives were not penetrating in the West. Outside Russia, the EU, Canada, NATO and Ukraine are successfully shooting down false Kremlin narratives, including that food shortages are caused by the West, the conference heard. “The Russians are so cocooned by the propaganda, they will never listen to us,” Manione warned. The European Security and Defence Symposium in Ottawa was attended by Canadian military leaders and defence officials, as well as senior figures from NATO, the EU and Ukraine and European ambassadors to Canada. Jay Janzen, communications director for NATO’s Allied Command Operations, said Russia has experienced “catastrophic failure” since the invasion of Ukraine, including with its misinformation campaigns and was not “10 feet tall.” Maj.-Gen. Michael Wright, commander of the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command, said the U.K., U.S. and Canada have successfully countered disinformation from Russia since the beginning of the war. Early on, the U.K. and U.S. had declassified intelligence to show what Russia’s intentions really were. Canada has also taken action to counter false narratives from the Kremlin. Charles Fries, EU deputy secretary-general for common security and defence policy, said the EU is fighting “a huge battle of narratives” and pushing back Russian propaganda, including “totally untrue” Kremlin claims that food shortages stem from sanctions. He said the invasion is now “far larger than a European war” and Russia is “now using food products as a weapon and is using the food security concerns as a kind of blackmail to put pressure on poor countries and some African countries.” The EU and allies’ sanctions had never targeted food supplies for the world, or even fertilizer exports from Russia, and the Russian claims were untrue, he said. Putin’s belief that the invasion would divide the EU and sap its resolve has backfired, he said. “Putin wants to divide us and he achieved exactly the opposite,” Fries said. “So it is a total failure.” Yegor Chernev, a Ukrainian MP and head of Ukraine’s delegation at NATO, warned that “the Russians will continue their false narratives, their fake news” and will try to spread these falsehoods in Canada and Europe. He also said the allies had to be prepared to deal with Russian “blackmail” with gas and oil.

### 1nc – Poland support high

#### Disinformation fails in Poland – favorable views of NATO and Ukraine are only increasing

**Poushter et al. ‘22** (Jacob Poushter, associate director at Pew Research Center, Christine Huang, research analyst focusing on global attitudes at Pew Research Center, Laura Clancy, research assistant focusing on global attitudes research at Pew Research Center, “Spotlight on Poland: Negative Views of Russia Surge, but Ratings for U.S., NATO, EU Improve,” Pew Research Center. 6/22/22. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/06/22/spotlight-on-poland-negative-views-of-russia-surge-but-ratings-for-u-s-nato-eu-improve/)

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has led to a dramatic shift in attitudes in Poland, a key European partner and one which only three decades ago was part of the former Soviet Union’s Eastern Bloc. Negative attitudes among Poles towards Russia are at all-time highs since Pew Research Center began tracking opinion on this question in 2007, with virtually unanimous negative opinions of the Russian state. Currently, 94% see Russia as a major threat, up from 65% who said this in 2018, and 94% have no confidence at all in Russian President Vladimir Putin – also an all-time high. The sharp decline in positive attitudes toward Russia has benefited Poland’s western allies, specifically the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (Poland is a member of both NATO and the EU). Around nine-in-ten Poles have a favorable view of the U.S., NATO and the EU, all of which represent the highest shares since 2007. In terms of Poland’s relationship with the U.S., the increase in favorable attitudes toward America coincides with a strong 82% confidence rating for U.S. President Joe Biden, a marked increase from the 51% who had confidence in former President Donald Trump in 2019. In addition, roughly two-thirds in Poland see having a close relationship with the U.S. as more important than having one with Russia. Only 1% want a closer relationship with Russia, while 28% volunteer that both are equally important. Just three years ago, more than half of Poles (53%) offered that both relationships are equally important. The shift in attitudes also benefits Polish views of the NATO alliance. Roughly nine-in-ten Poles have a favorable view of NATO, including 34% with very favorable opinions of the military alliance. Currently, 84% of Poles support arming Ukraine through NATO and 75% want Ukraine to become a NATO member, a substantial increase in support since 2015. In addition, roughly two-thirds in Poland say they would support their country using military force to defend a NATO ally from a hypothetical Russian military action, and about the same share say the U.S. would defend that NATO ally. This support for military action in the event of a Russian attack on a NATO ally is up a considerable amount since the question was last asked in 2019. Another clear beneficiary of the decline in ratings for Russia is the EU: It has received its highest rating in Poland (89%) since Pew Research Center began asking the question in 2007. And Poles are now much more likely than they were in 2018 to say that the EU understands the needs of Polish citizens and promotes democratic values, prosperity and peace. Fewer now also say that the EU is intrusive or inefficient. A majority (57%) says that the economic integration of Europe has strengthened the Polish economy. Most Poles say EU promotes peace, democratic values and prosperity More than three million Ukrainians have fled to Poland since Russia’s invasion, and eight-in-ten Poles now support taking refugees from countries where people are fleeing violence and war, up from 49% who held that view in 2018.

### 2nc – Poland support high

#### Poland is the country that supports Ukraine the most in the Russia-Ukraine war

TFN 22 (The First News (TFN). “Forbes names Poland as leader in aiding Ukraine.” TFN. June 01, 2022. https://www.thefirstnews.com/article/forbes-names-poland-as-leader-in-aiding-ukraine-30752)

Poland has come first in a ranking countries giving aid to Ukraine, the Polish edition of Forbes magazine has reported. The magazine analysed the activities of many countries based on 11 criteria to create an index showing which states were most engaged in helping Ukraine. It took into account voting at the UN General Assembly on demanding a Russian withdrawal, recognising Russian acts in Ukraine as genocide, expulsion of Russian diplomats, including Russia on a list of "hostile countries," taking part in a conference at the Ramstein base in Germany on support for Ukraine, the extent of financial aid granted both in absolute terms and as a proportion of GDP, visits of high-ranking officials to Ukraine between February 24 and May 30, and opposition to imposing sanctions on Moscow. The highest possible score was 100 with countries scoring more than 40 points recognised as being friendly towards Ukraine. Poland came first with 97 points with the USA second on 96 and Estonia third on 95. Also in the top 10 were Latvia (94), Canada (88), Lithuania (88), Great Britain (88), Slovakia (82), the Czech Republic (81) and Portugal (78). The ranking's authors highlighted visits by Polish government officials to Ukraine, actions on the international political arena and financial aid granted to Kyiv. Poland has given Ukraine USD 3.1 billion, or 0.46 percent of its GDP.

#### Poland supports Ukraine – welcoming refugees and rallying Europe

Higgins 2022 (Andrew Higgins - Moscow Bureau Chief for the New York Times. “Long on Europe’s Fringe, Poland Takes Center Stage as War Rages in Ukraine.” The New York Times. March 25, 2022. https://archive.ph/bEU8a)

On Wednesday, Poland said it had identified 45 Russian diplomats as spies, all of whom had been ordered to leave the country. The deputy foreign minister, Pawel Jablonski, said Poland could not tolerate Russia’s abuse of its embassy in Warsaw when Moscow “is waging a barbaric war against Ukraine.” Spies disguised as diplomats, he added, not only “pose a threat to Poland’s security, but also to the security of Ukrainian citizens staying in Poland. Hence this decision.” Previously scolded by Brussels for its hostility to migrants, Poland has over the past month welcomed more than two million refugees fleeing the war next door in Ukraine, far more than any other country. It has also become a vital staging post for the supply of weapons, ammunition, fuel and other assistance to Kyiv and put itself at the center of deliberations shaping the West’s response to the crisis. Warsaw has become the capital through which all diplomatic, military and humanitarian roads to Ukraine now pass. And the Polish government, which earlier infuriated Washington by pushing through legislation, later vetoed by the president, that threatened an American-owned television network, is basking in the glow of appreciative attention. In recent weeks, it has received visits and praise from Vice President Kamala Harris; the head of the C.I.A., William Burns; Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III; the president of the European Council, Charles Michel; and a host of other senior U.S. and European officials. Jake Sullivan, President Biden’s national security adviser, on Tuesday described Poland as a “frontline and very vulnerable ally” that “has taken the brunt of the humanitarian impact outside of Ukraine.” Poland’s sudden prominence as NATO’s most exposed frontline state has stirred alarm that it could be sucked into the conflict, particularly after Russian missiles last week obliterated a Ukrainian military base near the border. Among those most worried are some of the Ukrainians who fled to escape fighting at home. “Poland is too close. I want to get out of here,” said Yevgeny Pyskuko, a music teacher who fled to Poland after Russian forces attacked a huge nuclear power station near his home in southeastern Ukraine. “I want to go across the ocean. It is not safe here,” he added. Despite the possible risks, Poland has been in the forefront of rallying Europe to take tough measures to punish President Vladimir V. Putin for his aggression. When Germany, stunned by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, weighed whether to preserve the longstanding pillars of its security and foreign policy toward Russia, Poland’s prime minister, Mateusz Morawiecki — who just a few weeks earlier had attended a conclave of Putin-friendly populists in Madrid — flew to Berlin to personally “shake Germany’s conscience” and stiffen its resolve against Moscow. Soon after Mr. Morawiecki’s trip to Berlin, the German government dropped its earlier resistance to sending weapons to Ukraine and to ejecting key Russian banks from a money transfer network known as SWIFT. Poland’s deputy culture minister, Jaroslaw Sellin, a conservative firebrand who previously relished his country’s role as Europe’s great disrupter, has found a new cause celebrating Poland’s favor at the center of attention. “Everyone watches us with admiration,” he told Radio Gdansk on Tuesday. Long-running squabbles with the European bloc over the rule of law, L.G.B.T.Q. rights, coal mining and various other issues still rumble in the background and the government’s critics worry that instead of curbing what they see as a steady demolition of democratic norms by the governing party, Law and Justice, Poland’s newfound favor will only embolden the government. “We are in this respect another victim of the war,” lamented Roman Kuzniar, a professor at Warsaw University who advised the country’s previous pro-European governments before Law and Justice took power in 2015. “War always helps those who are ruling a country. It would be too bad if both the European Union and the United States forget about all the wrong things that this government has done and is doing,” he added. For the moment, however, security issues have trumped the governing party’s image as a disruptive force obsessed with stoking culture wars and hostility to foreigners, particularly migrants, bureaucrats in Brussels and Germans. “The government focused too much on stupid things instead of more important things like security,” Mr. Bartosiak said. “But now everybody in Poland sees what matters.” Supported in Parliament by even its fiercest political enemies, Law and Justice last week enacted a new Homeland Defense Act that will increase military spending to 3 percent of gross domestic product, from around 2.2 percent. Poland was already one of only 10 countries in the 30-member NATO alliance that met a minimum spending target of 2 percent. Polish foreign policy, preoccupied until the war in Ukraine with efforts to form a bloc of like-minded conservative and often pro-Kremlin European populists who share its hostility to Brussels, is now working to cement a new bloc of European countries pushing for tougher sanctions against Russia, including the Baltic states and the Czech Republic. At a meeting of European foreign ministers this week in Brussels, Poland joined Lithuania and other countries on Europe’s eastern fringe that have a long and painful experience of Russian aggression in lobbying hard for a ban on oil imports from Russia. The effort failed in face of strong opposition from Germany, the Netherlands and others, but it put Warsaw at the center of an emerging bloc of nations determined to punish Mr. Putin for invading Ukraine. It has also sundered Poland’s close partnership with Hungary, which opposes further sanctions and whose proudly illiberal prime minister, Viktor Orban, shares the Polish governing party’s view on Brussels but has a long record of cozying up to the Kremlin.

#### Poland supports Ukraine now and has been a powerful advocate of NATO

Tyler 22 (Melissa Conley Tyler is Program Lead with the Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy & Defence Dialogue. For 13 years she served as National Executive Director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, an independent international policy institute established as a branchof Chatham House in 1924, with close links to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Under her leadership, the AIIA was recognised for three years running as the top think tank in Southeast Asia/Pacific and one of the top 50 think tanks worldwide in the University of Pennsylvania’s Global Go To Think Tanks Index, the only comprehensive ranking exercise. In 2017, she co-authored Think Tank Diplomacy, the first book-length discussion of the role of policy institutes in the international sphere. She joined the University of Melbourne in 2019 as Director of Diplomacy at Asialink and then as a Research Fellow/Associate in the Asia Institute. Most recently she was a visiting fellow in Taiwan at the Ministry of Defense’s think tank – the Institute of Defense and National Security Research – funded by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan Fellowship. Melissa has extensive experience establishing and sustaining Australia-Asia engagement through Track II dialogues involving government officials, academics, media and business. She is a lawyer and specialist in conflict resolution, including negotiation, mediation and peace education, who worked as program manager of the University of Melbourne’s International Conflict Resolution Centre and Senior Fellow of Melbourne Law School. Melissa is a prolific commentator with expertise in Australian foreign policy, Australia’s key relationships across Asia and the practice of diplomacy, “Ukraine: The view from Warsaw”, The Interpreter, Published 27 May 2022 05:00 , https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ukraine-view-warsaw)

This week I was in Warsaw listening to experts on regional strategy and security. It was clear that Poland sees itself as Ukraine’s champion. Beyond the immediate emergency response following Russia’s invasion, Poland is acting as Ukraine’s advocate in building support both across NATO and EU member states and, crucially, through its relationship with the United States. Many would be aware that Poland been an important first responder, estimated to have taken in close to [3.5 million refugees](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60555472) and acting as a hub for humanitarian assistance. It’s important to see this in human terms: for example, the person I sat next to on my flight was hosting five Ukrainian refugees while his sister-in-law was hosting eight. As well as welcoming Polish-speaking Ukrainians, who are figuratively (and sometimes literally) family, there is huge sympathy for all Ukrainians as victims of Russian aggression. There is a visceral sense among Poles that “last time this was us”. This support isn’t costless, with [Poland’s economy being hit by the war](https://www.reuters.com/article/poland-forecasts-idUSL5N2WO4WP). Yet there is still a strong political consensus to continue to provide support. Beyond this humanitarian response, Poland has been playing a key role in advocating for Ukraine – perhaps most importantly to the United States. Polish and American experts alike admit that the United States needed some convincing. The US saw the invasion coming and sounded the alarm. But the belief that Ukraine would lose affected the sort of support that the Biden administration considered providing – such as a reluctance to provide high-end weapons in case they fell into Russian hands. Poland sees the Biden administration as having adapted over time, for example in its definition of offensive and defensive weapons. Poland continues to apply pressure on the United States to expand its support. **It may have been an optimistic view, but multiple experts talked of Ukraine potentially pushing Russia back.** This is vital because the view from Warsaw is that the result of the war is still very much to be decided. Russia has not yet been able to defeat the Ukrainian army, occupy its terrain and break Ukraine’s will. The hot war is not over and is seen as moving into a middle phase where Russia recalibrates its strategy (and redefines victory). It may have been an optimistic view, but multiple experts talked of Ukraine potentially pushing Russia back. If so, it could be a long war and one that Poland wants Ukraine to win. Poland has also been a powerful advocate within NATO and the European Union. Poland sees it as its responsibility to motivate others to mobilise in support of Ukraine, building unity for a Russian strategic defeat. From NATO experts, I heard again and again that 24 February was a watershed moment that fundamentally upended the European security order by bringing a major land war to Europe. This framing was not preordained; in another sense it is the continuation of an eight-year war. Poland can take some credit for this view due to its consistent clarity of perspective. It sees Russia as a rogue state that flouts international law and advocates the need to impose strategic costs on Russia, including treating Russia as an international pariah. There is interest in the potential for Poland to prosecute war crimes through its national courts or establish an international special tribunal given that Russia is not a party to the International Criminal Court. This unequivocal framing of the conflict has had a lasting impact on threat perceptions and NATO unity. For example, the old paradigm used to be that NATO would mobilise in event of a crisis. The emerging one is to strengthen national armed forces to be prepared to defend every inch of NATO territory. There is increasing discussion of “multinationality”, of joint training and learning how to operate together. Poland has been working with the United States on a program to build readiness and interoperability on NATO’s Eastern flank (now Eastern front). As Chief of the Polish Armed Forces General Rajmund Andrzejczak stated, “the house of my neighbours is on fire”. This makes Poland a frontline country. Its job is to convince the rest of the European Union to express understanding, trust and solidarity on the basis that they could one day find themselves in a similar position. Those involved in European defence report a much greater sense of common security. Certainly, there was a greater sense of a unified “West” that is common in similar discussions in the Indo-Pacific. The conflict was expressed as “us vs them”, “liberal vs illiberal”, and there were irony-free references to the “free world”. (Along with the sense of the United States an indispensable power, it feels quite nostalgic to an Indo-Pacific observer.) The common cause can be seen in increased defence commitments and the announcement that Sweden and Finland have applied to join NATO. I heard Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki commit to come to their defence if needed during accession. What I heard in Warsaw underlines the scale of Russia’s strategic error. Russia clearly didn’t expect the extent of Ukrainian resistance – or the wider effects on European unity and US support. A more unified NATO with greater defence spending and an expanded vision of collective security was not one of Russia’s ambitions. Neither was improved trans-Atlantic relations and US sense of efficacy. Poland will continue to be an important part of building this common commitment. What I took from Warsaw is how strongly Poland believes that it is its duty to do everything possible to support Ukraine to achieve what Ukraine defines as victory – and the energy it is willing to expend to achieve this. As the Polish Institute of International Affairs Director SŁawomir Debski put it, “we know who we are, we know what we’re fighting for, and we are not lacking in determination.”

### 1nc – soft power in decline

#### **US soft power low under Biden**

Korybko 5/5 (Andrew, a Moscow-based American political analyst. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily those of CGTN, “Biden's literal weaponization of democracy discredits US soft power,” China Daily, May 5, 2022, https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202205/05/WS62732e80a310fd2b29e5ab21.html)-AT

US President Joe Biden gave one of the most important speeches of his presidency thus far on May 3 at the Lockheed Martin Pike County Operations in Troy, Alabama that's responsible for building its anti-tank Javelin missiles. During his remarks, he boasted about how his country is literally weaponizing democracy through its military-industrial complex, which represents formal acknowledgement of a process that's already been underway for decades. From the president's perspective, the production and export of these arms to Ukraine in its fight against Russia represents "the arsenal of democracy," which he compared to its unprecedented effort during World War II to fight Nazi Germany and the Japan Empire. According to Biden, this is a hybrid civilizational-political struggle between Western democracy and supposedly non-Western autocracies that only comes around once every six or eight generations. Biden's warmongering words should concern the entire world. His World War II-era rhetoric about the American military-industrial complex supposedly being an "arsenal of democracy" amounts to an unofficial declaration of global hybrid war considering the context in which he made this ridiculous description. The US plans to continue ramping up its military production as it wages regional proxy wars against countries like Russia under the pretext of supposedly saving Western civilization. The real reason why the US is doubling down on its military-industrial complex is because it's desperate to revitalize its shrinking economy which fell 1.4 percent in the last quarter. The American economic model has failed to reap the successes that were expected of it by its leaders, hence the need to return to massively producing weapons in an expensive attempt to stimulate it ahead of the upcoming midterm elections. The ruling Democrats are worried that their Republican rivals might win back control of Congress so Biden is doing everything that he can to manipulate domestic perceptions in the run-up to the vote. This includes misportraying his country's unprovoked regional proxy war against Russia as a civilizational crusade comparable to World War II and artificially boosting the economy through a renewed focus on military-industrial production. The World War II-era imagery and rhetoric is also intended to imply that Americans shouldn't complain about their current economic suffering that might last for a number of years since it's supposedly for the sake of saving Western civilization. Biden is manipulating his compatriots' patriotic sentiments for self-interested political reasons related to reducing the Democrats' expected electoral losses during the fall midterms that'll be held in half a year's time. Awareness of these self-interested motives and the manipulative way in which the ruling party's political interests are being advanced discredits the US's soft power even more than it's already been in recent years. First, the American economic model clearly isn't producing the results that it's supposed to, hence the need to transition parts of the economy to a literal wartime footing. Second, the pretext for doing so is the false narrative that countries like Russia threaten Western civilization. Up until this point, it was taken for granted in the West that its political model was so appealing to the rest of the world that it wouldn't need to be exported by force, let alone upheld in such a way in its transatlantic cradle where it initially emerged centuries ago. That was never truly the case, and now none other than current American president himself is indirectly acknowledging that by hyping up the supposed "threat." This brings the analysis around to the third and most powerful point, and it's that Western democracies are more aggressive and globally destabilizing than the countries they are pointing fingers at. After all, it's not Russian President Vladimir Putin who is alluding to a third World War nowadays, but Biden and his transatlantic peers who are waging proxy war against Russia. It's for these reasons that Biden's latest speech was arguably among the most important of his presidency thus far, but not at all in a positive way. It can be interpreted as an unofficial declaration of hybrid war that disturbingly evokes World War II-era imagery and rhetoric, which has very dangerous implications if one reflects on what that could ultimately entail. The US is so desperate to slow the decline of its hegemony that it's destabilizing the whole world to this end.

### 2nc – soft power in decline

#### Trump already killed US soft power

**Drezner ’20** (Daniel W. Drezner, Professor of international politics at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, “U.S. soft power is only mostly dead,” The Washington Post. 1/9/20. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/01/09/us-soft-power-is-only-mostly-dead/)

Two years ago the hard-working staff here at Spoiler Alerts looked at the survey data out there from Pew and Gallup about how the rest of the world viewed President Trump and concluded, “The United States is losing its global standing because the world hates Donald Trump. Anyone who tells you differently is selling you something.” Twenty-four months is a lifetime in the Age of Trump. There has been no world war or financial crisis during that time. Low bar, I know, but perhaps this means the rest of the world has learned to like Donald Trump. Well, maybe “like” is not the right word. Maybe the rest of the world has exhibited some Stockholm syndrome and decided maybe Trump had his good moments when he wasn’t keeping everyone emotionally hostage? Last year’s Gallup data suggests the answer remains no, and now we have the just-released findings from the latest Pew surveys. They reveal not much has changed. Like, at all: “As has been the case throughout his presidency, U.S. President Donald Trump receives largely negative reviews from publics around the world. Across 32 countries surveyed by Pew Research Center, a median of 64% say they do not have confidence in Trump to do the right thing in world affairs, while just 29% express confidence in the American leader.” Also unsurprisingly, the depth of anti-Trump sentiment is especially strong where you would expect it: Western Europe, where approximately 75 percent of respondents lack confidence in Trump. The numbers from Mexico are even worse: 89 percent have no confidence in him. He has pockets of support in India, Poland, Israel, the Philippines and not much else. Obviously, these numbers are far worse than Barack Obama’s at the same stage of his presidency. They are also slightly worse than George W. Bush’s numbers at a similar stage in his presidency. Global distrust of Trump is further revealed in the survey results in which respondents are asked which foreign leader they trust to do the right thing in world affairs. Trump scores well below German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Emmanuel Macron and Russian President Vladimir Putin. About as many people trust Trump as they do Chinese President Xi Jinping, but more respondents have no confidence in Trump (Xi is less well-known). No doubt Trump’s supporters would argue it is better to be feared than loved, as Machiavelli so eloquently put it. As Trump himself told Bob Woodward and Robert Costa, “Real power is, I don’t even want to use the word, ‘Fear.’ “ There are two problems with that counterargument. First, feared leaders generally do not invite laughter from their peers. Trump has had to cope with U.N. General Assembly leaders laughing at his face and NATO leaders caught laughing behind his back. My Washington Post colleague Aaron Blake has collected other examples. Trump is not a president people fear, except for his witless incompetence. Second, Machiavelli also warned in the very next paragraph that “nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well being feared whilst he is not hated.” This quote seems particularly salient given the reaction of some U.S. allies to the targeted killing of Qasem Soleimani. As Politico’s Matthew Karnitschnig noted, “Behind the sober public pronouncements from Brussels and national capitals about the need for ‘de-escalation,’ officials are seething. … Within hours of Soleimani’s assassination, Europe’s shock over the Iranian general’s killing morphed into anger at Trump.” Trump has entered a new era of warfare by openly authorizing the assassination of another nation's military leader, using an armed drone, says David Ignatius. So this seems like a depressing state of affairs for those Americans who desire respect in the world. Yet Trump is not the same thing as the United States of America, and the latter’s standing in the world could best be described as only “mostly dead.” As Pew reports, overall attitudes toward the United States remain favorable. A small majority of respondents have favorable views of the United States, a full 25 percentage points above Trump’s individual standing. This will probably persist unless or until Donald Trump is reelected — it was after George W. Bush’s 2004 reelection that global public attitudes toward the United States started to converge to Bush’s low levels.

#### No sign of US soft power recovery post-Trump

**Tengjun ’21** (Zhang Tengjun, Deputy Director and associate research fellow at Department for Asia-Pacific Studies, China Institute of International Studies, “US soft power hard to return as its core rots,” The Global Times. 1/12/21. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1212546.shtml)

In an article entitled "American soft power will survive Donald Trump," Joseph Nye, who coined the term "soft power" in the late 1980s, argued that with Joe Biden in office, American resilience will once again lead to a recovery of the US soft power. Nye stressed the US has serious problems, but that "it also has a capacity for resilience and reform that has rescued us in the past." American soft power has been eroded badly under Trump's presidency. In 2019, Gallup polled 134 countries and regions and found that only 30 percent of the polled held a favorable view of the US, a drop of almost 20 points since Barack Obama's presidency. There are mainly two reasons for the decline of the US soft power. First, the Trump administration's governance has undermined the US democratic system, aggravated social conflicts and intensified political, economic and social crises in the US. Second, the US under Trump willfully withdrew from a string of international organizations and pacts, disregarded international rules and preached unilateralism and bullyism, which made other countries suffer a lot. The past four years have witnessed declining confidence in the US leadership and US soft power around the world. These brazen US acts have brought about fundamental changes: All other countries including US allies are becoming more independent. They are all considering how to better safeguard their own national interests in a world without US leadership. Even if the US soft power can recover somewhat, the perceptions of these countries have altered. Nye said the US has a capacity for resilience and reform which will help the US recover its attractiveness. But can the US capability for reform really lead to soft power recovery? Trump's four-year tenure has made us see the weakness of US reforms and governance. The US government has been unable to solve its domestic problems. In fact, various problems even have been intensified due to growing political polarization and partisan struggles. There have been some voices in the US calling for reform over the past four years. But reform is stagnant. It's in fact not merely the fault of the Trump administration. It's the US deep political and social divisions that obstruct the reform's advancement. Whether it is the turmoil in Capitol Hill, or the controversy surrounding the presidential elections, or Trump's highly controversial governance in the past four years, many observers believe that US democracy is already dead. It not only cannot avoid people like Trump to lead the country, it also has no way to fix the problems existing in the US society. This is an institutional crisis. Even if the Biden administration comes to power and the transition is completed, what we will see will be a deepened rift within the US. It will cause more difficulties for Biden to govern the country in the future. Nye wants those who mourn American democracy to understand that "the 2020 election saw an unprecedented turnout of voters who were able to unseat a demagogue." The problem is, the number of people who voted for Trump has also hit the record. The high level of political and social antagonism in the US is a systemic crisis. It is unrealistic to rely on a new administration to solve these problems. After the Capitol riots, some countries have expressed their regret and many other countries have been very disappointed. They believe the riots have ripped off the fake mask of US democracy. The attractiveness of US democracy to other countries has been severely weakened. The US democracy represented by these riots is very hypocritical. The US has a set of standards for itself, but when it turns to other countries' domestic problems, it has other standards. Therefore, many countries have recognized the true face of US democracy. Essentially, it serves the hegemony of the US. It's not a universal democratic system or standard that other countries need to admire. Therefore, the so-called beacon effect of US democracy is weakening and declining. But regrettably, Nye and some other US elites are still trapped in the myth of US democracy. They still have blind faith in their democratic system. But in fact, such a kind of impractical mentality will not likely help them find the light at the end of a tunnel. The mentality does not help resolve the problems of the US. At this time, it is more important to have profound reflections about the US democratic system's inherent problems. The US should have a humble and frank attitude and be more open to others' criticism. The US needs to seriously reflect on the root causes of its problems and propose some systematic reform plans.

#### **Trump caused US soft power to decline**

Kokas and Mastro 1/15 (Aynne Kokas and Oriana S. Mastro, Aynne Kokas is an associate professor of media studies at the University of Virginia and a senior faculty fellow at the Miller Center for Public Affairs, Oriana Skylar Mastro is a Center Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, where her research focuses on Chinese military and security policy, Asia-Pacific security issues, war termination, nuclear dynamics, and coercive diplomacy. She is also a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and continues to serve in the United States Air Force Reserve, for which she works as a strategic planner at INDOPACOM. She holds a B.A. in East Asian Studies from Stanford University and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University, “The Soft War That America Is Losing,” Stanford Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies,” January 15, 2022, https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/soft-war-america-losing)-AT

The images of bare-chested, flag-waving MAGA loyalists overtaking the US Capitol flooded US social media and news channels in the days following the January 6 siege against the electoral college count. Memed and amplified, the same images circulated widely on Chinese social media and state-owned news sites without even the need for critical commentary. The literal destruction of the US Capitol at the hands of President Donald Trump's followers required little imagination to characterize abroad as the downfall of American democracy. There are many reasons for pessimism. According to one of the most authoritative indexes, Polity, the United States is no longer the world’s oldest continuous democracy, dropping in status to a system that is part democracy, part dictatorship. Beyond the domestic concerns faced in the aftermath of the breach of one of America's most hallowed buildings, the Capitol siege was a win for China. US soft power, one of its comparative advantages in the great power competition, has taken a huge hit. Soft power is “the ability to get what you want through persuasion or attraction in the forms of culture, values, and policies”.⁠ The US has been the primary beneficiary of soft power, with its globally recognized brands, pop culture, fast-food chains, world-renowned universities, and political values. It is relatively low cost and high impact compared with other forms of power. The United States' relative attractiveness is one of the reasons America prevailed in the Cold War. The Chinese government is having a propaganda field day. More than ever, the US looks like a country in decline, discouraging to allies and potential partners. Chinese commentators have noted that America's days as the "city on the hill" have come to an end. This is karma, some say, payback for the US supporting opposition groups, as in Hong Kong. As one netizen commented on the popular microblog website Weibo: "So lucky to be born in China.” China has also been trying to increase its soft power through traditional mechanisms such as building its media, education, and tourism sectors. It has enjoyed only moderate success in these areas because of its censorship, pollution, and lack of independent civil society. But COVID-19 has led to the strengthening of other Chinese public diplomacy efforts, such as its landmark Belt and Road Initiative global trade and investment scheme. Related initiatives such as the Digital Silk Road, a program to build out global digital infrastructure using Chinese technology, and the Health Silk Road, a plan to export Chinese health expertise through things such as COVID-19 laboratories and vaccine diplomacy, draw on China's comparative advantage in a top-down soft power approach. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has undermined the historical sources of US soft power. It has shuttered visa lines, investigated international students on campus, and driven the rise of a culture of nationalism. The cancellation of the Fulbright US Student Program and the Peace Corps program in China are prime examples. And the COVID-19 decreased US media production, educational exchange and tourism, which shrank opportunities for promoting its democratic values on the global stage. A bird’s-eye view of America's relative soft power may seem to offer cause for optimism. Even after four years of Trump's buffoonery and "America First", the US is still far ahead of China, ranking fifth in overall soft power, while China ranks 24th. And isn’t this what matters in competition? Yes and no. The problem is two-fold. First, the US relies more on its political values as a soft power source than Beijing does. Ironically, this has especially been the case during the Trump administration. National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien has argued that democracies and authoritarian countries such as China “are offering a different approach to the world”. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has argued to international audiences that democracy is “what we’ve got right”. Second, Beijing has tried to leverage its comparative advantages to build soft power through pathways other than political values, especially where a top-down government approach is effective. China set up COVID-19 testing labs in Palestine in agreement with Israeli and Palestinian authorities. It extended its hand in Africa by building more than 70 percent of its 4G infrastructure. Depending on need, useful solutions can be as compelling as political principles.The future of the US as a world leader is at stake. American military base access worldwide depends on perceived political alignment between the US and its allies. In the tech sector, the widespread adoption of US platforms relies on other countries finding that benefits to allowing in foreign platforms outweigh the potential political risks. Successful multilateral treaty negotiations on issues such as global trade and climate change rely on the perception of a dependable US political system. Strengthening democracy at home and moving away from "America First" policies will go a long way in reconstructing the trust and relationships central to soft power. But the United States will always be seen as a country in which the election of Donald Trump to the presidency, and now the storming of the Capitol, were possible. President-elect Joe Biden will soon learn that soft power, once lost, may be difficult to revive.

### 1nc – war ending now

#### **Russia-Ukraine war slowing down – Russia is running out of resources.**

Teh 6/23/22 (Cheryl Teh - Senior Breaking News Reporter. “Boris Johnson says the Russian army might soon run out of soldiers and weapons and lose its 'forward momentum' in Ukraine.” Insider. Jun 23, 2022. <https://www.businessinsider.com/boris-johnson-russia-may-run-out-of-soldiers-and-weapons-2022-6>)

British Prime Minister Boris Johnson said this week that he believes Russia will soon lose momentum in its war with Ukraine. Speaking to the German newspaper Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Johnson said that he thought Russian President Vladimir Putin's army was suffering heavy losses of soldiers and equipment just to gain ground in Ukraine's Donbas region. Citing intelligence reports from the British defense forces, Johnson told the outlet that he believed the Russian onslaught in Ukraine would likely lose steam in the coming few months. "Our defense intelligence service believes, however, that in the next few months, Russia could come to a point at which there is no longer any forward momentum because it has exhausted its resources," he said, per Sueddeutsche Zeitung. "Then we must help the Ukrainians to reverse the dynamic. I will argue for this at the Group of Seven summit," he said, per the outlet. Johnson also told Sueddeutsche Zeitung that he thought it was important for the Ukrainian army to be supported in launching a counter-offensive if it is able to do so. "This is their crisis. They are the victims of Putin's aggression, they must decide what they want to do. But it is absolutely clear if you go to Ukraine, if you talk to the Ukrainians, and if you talk to [Ukrainian President Volodymr] Zelenskyy. you will come away with the overwhelming view that the Ukrainians will not concede their territory," he said, per the outlet. Johnson added that he thought a win for Ukraine would include Russian forces being repelled from the areas they invaded and for Ukraine to "regain the status quo" before the invasion on February 24, per Sueddeutsche Zeitung. "Ukraine must win, we agree on that. The unity of the West is far more conspicuous than the divisions," Johnson told the outlet. Intelligence from the UK has suggested that Russia may soon struggle to produce enough military equipment to fuel a prolonged conflict in Ukraine. Ukraine's forces are currently engaged in a critical fight in the Donbas. In June, Ukraine estimated that Russia had 10 to 15 times more artillery than its forces, appealing to the West to send more weapons. Reports have also cited a growing number of deserters among Ukrainian forces. Earlier this month, a senior US official also told The Washington Post that Russia would likely gain control of eastern Ukraine within weeks after doubling down on its military efforts in the Donbas.

### 2nc – war ending now

#### Russian forces are exhausted

Santora 6/25 (Marc, International News Editor based in London, focusing on breaking news events. He was previously the Bureau Chief for East and Central Europe based in Warsaw. He received separate bachelor’s degrees in journalism and art history from Washington and Lee University in Lexington, Va., “Ukraine News: More Brutal Fighting Expected in East,” The New York Times, June 25, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/06/22/world/russia-ukraine-war-news)-AT

The battle for the twin cities of Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk has left both the Russian and Ukrainian armies severely depleted, offering a window into the bloody struggle still to be fought for wider control of Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region. Russian forces are closing in on what would be their first significant territorial gain in weeks in Ukraine, as they advance on the two cities, the last major pieces of Luhansk province not to fall into Russian hands. Each side has suffered thousands of casualties and whole swaths of the cities have been reduced to rubble. But capturing all of Donbas would mean taking both Luhansk and neighboring Donetsk province, and the Russian advances in Donetsk in the past month have been small. The capture of the twin cities would eliminate an advantage the Ukrainians have in being able to use the Siversky Donets River as a natural defensive barrier that Russian forces have suffered heavy losses trying to cross. Even so, the Russians would face a difficult road to capturing towns and cities to the west in Donetsk, including Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. Russian attempts to advance on the region from the north remain stalled, with both sides trading a few miles of land each day in battles around the city of Izium. Military analysts have suggested that heavy losses by both sides already might necessitate an “operational pause” in fighting similar to the lull seen between late March and mid-April, as Russia regrouped from its early failures to capture Kyiv, the capital, and retreated from northern Ukraine. “There is evidence that both sides, due to high numbers of casualties and ammunition expenditure, are nearing exhaustion,” Mick Ryan, a retired Australian general and commander of the Australian Defence College, wrote in a recent analysis. “An operational pause in the next month or two is highly possible.” Some military analysts have questioned the wisdom of Ukraine investing so much blood and equipment to defend territory with marginal strategic value. However, much as the 86-day-long fight for Mariupol forced Russia to devote resources to the battle and gave Ukrainian forces in other parts of the country time to mount a defense, the fight in Luhansk has bought them time, allowing for more powerful weapons to flow into the country. The Ukrainians have sought to take advantage of stretched Russian forces to set the stage for counter offensives around Kherson in the south and Kharkiv in the northeast. Control over southern Ukraine is central to Moscow’s efforts to strangle Ukraine economically, while holding the Kharkiv area is critical to maintaining supply lines for its forces in the east. It remains to be seen how the flow of Western weapons to Ukraine might alter the strategic balance, but military analysts and the Ukrainians say they will make any new Russian offensives much more costly, and enable more counter offensives. For now, Russia continues to bombard Ukrainian positions along the entire Donbas front. The Ukrainians reported on Wednesday that 21 buildings in Donetsk were damaged in Russian shelling over the past day, including a school and several houses, leaving one person killed and 10 injured. “Massive air and artillery strikes,” had struck the region, President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine said in his address on Wednesday night. “The goal of the occupiers in this direction remains the same — they want to destroy the whole Donbas step by step,” he added. “They aim to turn any city into Mariupol. Completely ruined.”

#### The Russian general public wants the Ukraine and Russian conflicts to end

Dixon 22 (Robyn Dixon -- Moscow bureau chief and foreign correspondent for the Washington post. The Washington Post. 6/5/22, “As the war drags on, weary Russians yearn for a return to normal life” <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/05/russia-war-public-opinion/>) CL

RIGA, Latvia — For Russia’s urban middle class, the war on Ukraine has messed up plans, ruined longed-for vacations and stripped away joys like shopping for a favorite foreign clothing brand, turning the key in a new Japanese car, even biting into a Big Mac. **As** the **war drags on**, **many yearn for life to go back to normal**, before prices went crazy and foreign companies quit the country over Russia’s invasion. But these Russians are equally sure that President Vladimir Putin will keep on fighting until he wins, because that’s what he always does. After convincing the majority of the population that the war was necessary to “liberate” Ukrainians from “Nazis,” state television propagandists are now doggedly preparing Russians for a long war, ominously warning that it might end in nuclear war. In Ukraine, that means more civilian casualties, bombed houses and dozens of soldiers killed daily defending the country’s east. Russian hardships may be trivial by contrast, but the deadening **gloom of a long war worries the Kremlin**, according to analysts, **because of the challenge of dragging the population along as sanctions bite, businesses retrench, prices continue to surge, and it dawns on people that life may never go back to the way it was**. But the old Kremlin playbook, accusing the West of plans to gobble up Russia, is working so far. Denis Volkov of independent polling agency Levada-Center said the latest polling for April showed almost half of Russians unconditionally support the war and about 30 percent support it with reservations, with 19 percent opposed. Many in focus groups saw it as an existential confrontation with the West, not Ukraine. “People explain that a significant part of the world is against us and it’s only Putin who hopes to hold onto Russia, otherwise we would be eaten up completely. To them it is Russia that is defending itself,” he said. [Ominous rhetoric gains ground in Russia as its forces founder in Ukraine](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/13/russias-war-ukraine-founders-ominous-rhetoric-gains-ground/?itid=lk_interstitial_manual_13) **The conflict**, however, **is taking a toll** **on Russians** like Marina, 57, a language teacher, whose **friends are** so **weary of the war**, **they** **avoid the topic**. She succeeded in changing the minds of a few friends and relatives who supported the war. “But in general, it seems **everyone is sick and tired of the war** or special operation**. People have their own problems and the main problem is survival**, especially with the rising prices.” Marina acknowledged that few Russians are opposed to the war and most are finding a way to “get by somehow.” But she added: “This ‘somehow’ is becoming boring. Most people got tired of it. I want to travel. Others want to be able to plan. We want to get back to our ordinary lives.” People sitting at a bus station are reflected on a bus window adorned with the letter Z, which has become a symbol of support for Russian military action in Ukraine, in Moscow on June 2. (Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP/Getty Images) Marina can’t help dreaming wistfully of her old life — just a few months ago. “I want to be able to watch Western movies on Netflix and shop at Uniqlo. I want to travel to Europe on affordable and reliable airlines. I **want to be part of the world and not an outcast**,” she said. Many people, still in denial, are struggling to adapt, said Grigory Yudin, professor of political philosophy at the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences. “The natural question for Russians is not whether I support it or not — nobody asks you, actually — but how do I adapt to this?” [Russians face prospect of Soviet-style shortages as sanctions bite](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/26/russia-economy-aviation-sanctions-shortages/?itid=lk_interstitial_manual_21) People want certainty about their incomes, travel plans and mortgages. Part of the **Moscow elite**, including middle-ranking bureaucrats who feel they are Europeans, **are not happy about the war**, he said, but tend to believe Putin will fight until he wins. “I think the majority of Russians still honestly believe that this is going on with military success, or at least this is what people want to believe,” Yudin said. He added: “The more-educated people who are more informed and tend to consume information from different sources are not that certain about that. They have significant doubts.” Volkov said the latest polling showed interest in watching news about the war is beginning to wane, with people in focus groups wishing their lives could go back to the way they were. “The **best scenario is for this to end as soon as possible** **and** then we hope **things will go back to normal**,” said Ksenia, 50, a bookkeeper at a firm that sells foreign materials and has been hard hit by Western sanctions. Most of her work colleagues began strongly supporting the war, but lately they avoid the subject, except to complain that ordinary people in Russia always pay the price of government decisions. “My colleagues have finally started to realize that things are not great. In general, we try not to discuss it because we start to fight. They’re saying, ‘We didn’t start this war and now we have to pay.’” Her plan to vacation in the United States or Italy this summer is ruined because she cannot get a visa. “Now I feel as if there’s no future and it’s very depressing.” She ached when McDonalds’ golden arches were removed not for any love of the burgers or fries, but for the idea it represented. “I’m really upset about McDonald’s, and I really mean it. McDonald’s has always been a symbol of freedom for me. I remember when the first McDonald’s opened in Moscow,” she said recalling the queues in 1990s months before the Soviet Union collapsed. “It felt like the light at the end of the tunnel.” [Putin’s purge of ‘traitors’ scoops up pensioners, foodies and peaceniks](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/26/russia-media-putin-ukraine/?itid=lk_interstitial_manual_36) For Ksenia and friends opposed to the war, **the worst part is thinking of** the **Ukrainian** **civilians**, including **children**, **being** **killed and the women raped by Russian soldiers**. “I can survive without certain clothes. And I think I can survive without Western movies. But the **main problem** for me **is that now Russians are outcasts**, with **whom nobody will want to shake hands**. **Psychologically**, **it's** really **hard** for me **to feel** that I'm **unwanted** **everywhere.**” Viktor, a 35-year-old carpenter, says his **small business has lost most of its clients**, as they’ve been forced to economize. He cannot finish building his own house because he says **prices for building materials doubled** **while** his **income halved**. Viktor thought war would rage about two months. “Now it will take years, and it’s a disaster. It’s **not only losing lives**. In the years to come we will be **living in poverty and we will be hated again like the fascists in Germany in World War II** — like we are the new fascists.” But 43-year-old Andrei from Moscow sees the war as “God’s plan” and believes Russians are willing to make sacrifices to see it through. A yoga-loving, vegetarian computer programmer, he is not the typical elderly, conservative Putin supporter. He gets his news from one pro-Kremlin blogger and shares a common Russian conviction that Western news of Russian war crimes is “fake.” He declined to give his surname. “The idea is to remove fascism from Ukraine and to return the civilians who want to live in the U.S.S.R., like before the ’90s,” he said echoing the propaganda. “Right now we don’t feel any meaningful impact from sanctions,” he added, although many of his friends in IT have fled for Armenia and elsewhere, and he can no longer afford to buy a beloved MacBook computer. Nor can he purchase the new Mazda 6 he had his eyes on; he had been hoping pay about 2 million rubles — five months’ salary — but the price went up to 3 million. Andrei is convinced that Russia will win the war in a year or so, prices will fall and Apple products will find their way to Russia via the black market. Until then, he says he’ll make sacrifices (but not volunteer to fight.) “Western people like comfort, they need comfort,” he said. “Russian people may have comfort, or they may not. This is not a problem.” Political analyst and journalist Fyodor Krasheninnikov said many Russians hope that Ukraine would soon capitulate to Russian military power. “**The mood in Russia now** **is** that ‘**We want this to be over as soon as possible because we just can’t live like this any longer.** We want to get back to normal life,’” he said. “It’s not that people really like what Putin does,” he continued. “No, but they feel frustration and depression because they cannot change anything. It’s like bad weather. They realize that it’s going to rain every day. But what can they do about it?”

### 1nc – war won’t spread

#### NATO is strong and can resist Russian encroachment – EU response proves

Wunderlich 4/5 (Uwe, Lecturer in International Relations at the School of Social Sciences and Humanities and a member of the Aston Centre for Europe (ACE) at Aston University in Birmingham, “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: A Turning Point for European Integration?,” London School of Economics, April 5, 2022, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/04/05/russias-invasion-of-ukraine-a-turning-point-for-european-integration/)-AT

The EU’s response has been swift and unprecedented. The first package of sanctions was already agreed on 23 February, a day before the invasion began. Three more sanction packages have followed, including restrictive measures on individuals with close links to the Putin regime, severe economic sanctions, diplomatic measures, and restrictions on economic cooperation as well as on Russian media outlets. Indeed, the EU’s reaction has gone beyond sanctions. Under the European Peace Facility, the EU has agreed to support the Ukrainian resistance with a set of assistance measures ranging from personal protection equipment, first aid kits, fuel and military equipment to defensive platforms designed to deliver lethal force. Plans to eliminate the dependency on Russian fossil fuel imports have triggered discussions on how to secure stable energy supplies and on possible measures to mitigate against the impact of high energy prices. This is part of a wider set of responses among the members of the transatlantic alliance. NATO has long struggled to find a raison d’être following the fall of the Iron Curtain. Russia’s willingness to use military force has put NATO back in the spotlight, rejuvenating the alliance and catalysing a dramatic increase in European defence spending, most notably in Germany. Support for NATO membership is rising in hitherto neutral countries such as Sweden and Finland. Individual countries have also imposed their own sanctions on Russia while sending weapons, ammunition, medical supplies and financial assistance to Ukraine. The civic response to the humanitarian crisis has been spectacular. Ukraine’s European neighbours have kept their borders open to Ukrainian refugees, demonstrating compassion and solidarity. This has been reinforced at the EU level: financial support packages for EU countries sheltering Ukrainian refugees have been approved and assistance such as medical supplies, tents and generators has been made available via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. EU ministers have also agreed to offer people fleeing from the war in Ukraine temporary protection and to share equally the burden for receiving refugees arriving at the EU’s external borders. It is too early to say whether Russia’s invasion of Ukraine represents a historical turning point for European integration. During historical turning points, the demand for collective solutions to shared problems intensifies, paving the way for rapid institutional development. They create a stimulus for institutional adaptation and change. Decision-makers are more focused, established structures may be found wanting, new avenues may be explored. The Ukraine war has altered the political, strategic and economic framework conditions for European regional cooperation and transatlantic relations. Perhaps not without a sense of irony, Moscow’s aggression has reminded the European bloc of its Cold War origins. Indeed, long distrustful of Russia, some of the smaller states of Europe have been the most enthusiastic supporters of NATO in recent years. The war has highlighted the multidimensional nature of security issues and the highly integrated nature of the two main pillars of the Western alliance system: NATO (and the inbuilt transatlantic partnership) and the EU. The war will provide a renewed impetus for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and for enhanced EU-NATO cooperation. Russia’s invasion is also deeply symbolic, representing an assault at the very normative foundation of the European integration project – on its values of democracy, human rights, freedom and the rule of law. The war was, at least in part, triggered by the Ukrainian attempt to break free from Moscow’s shadow, seeking a democratic and European future. Moscow has been suspicious of the changes sweeping through Ukraine since the 2014 Maidan Revolution. There are some obvious parallels to the 1968 Prague Spring. Czechoslovakia’s removal of the Soviet-backed regime and the launching of political and economic reforms was regarded as a threat to Soviet influence. Soviet tanks and troops eventually crushed the reformers. Just over half a century later, Russian tanks have once again been sent towards a European capital. It is important to remember that European integration emerged out of the ashes of World War II and the ensuing Cold War in the form of a network of interconnected and criss-crossing institutions such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC), the forerunners of the EU, and including institutions with a membership beyond Europe such as NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation / Organisation for European Co-operation and Development (OEEC/OECD) and the Council of Europe. Similarly, the sudden end of the Cold War also represented a significant historical turning point for European integration. Almost overnight, the political order created by the Iron Curtain vanished. This left the future of the Western alliance system, including transatlantic relations, uncertain. This situation has now changed once again and it may well be that the Ukraine war has inadvertently provided the impetus for a refocusing of European integration and a rejuvenation of the transatlantic alliance.

### 2nc – war won’t spread

#### Ukraine spillover is unlikely

Ellyatt 22 (Holly Ellyatt – CNBC Correspondent focused on macro-economics and politics, studied European Social and Political Studies at University College London and completed a MA at City University. “Could there be war between Russia and the West? Strategists predict what could happen next” CNBC 4/29/22 <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/29/russia-ukraine-war-should-the-west-prepare-for-war-with-putin.html)> CL

Tensions between Russia and the West appear to have risen dramatically over the last week. In the last few days alone, Russia stopped gas supplies to two European countries and has warned the West several times that the risk of a nuclear war is very “real.” Russian President Vladimir Putin said that any foreign intervention in Ukraine would provoke what he called a “lightning fast” response from Moscow. The saber-rattling and rhetoric between Moscow and the West have become notably more aggressive this week, prompting concerns that a direct confrontation between the two power blocs could be more likely. In the last few days alone, for example, Russia stopped gas supplies to two European countries and has warned the West several times that the risk of a nuclear war is very “real.” In addition, [Russian President Vladimir **Putin**](https://www.cnbc.com/vladimir-putin/) has **said that** **any foreign intervention in Ukraine** **would** **provoke** what he called **a** “lightning **fast” response from Moscow**, while his Foreign Ministry warned NATO not to test its patience. For their part, Western officials have dismissed Russia’s “bravado” and “dangerous” nuclear war rhetoric, with the U.K. calling on Western allies to “double down” on their support for Ukraine. CNBC asked strategists about the likelihood of a direct confrontation between Russia and the West. Here’s what they said. Nuclear attack? At the start of the week, Russia’s foreign minister warned that the threat of a nuclear war “cannot be underestimated” and said NATO’s supply of weapons to Ukraine was tantamount to the military alliance engaging in a proxy war with Russia. Putin doubled down on the bellicose rhetoric Wednesday, threatening a “lightning fast” retaliation against any country intervening in [the Ukraine war](https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/29/russia-ukraine-live-updates.html) and creating what he called “strategic threats for Russia.” He then appeared to allude to Russia’s arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons when he warned that Russia has the “tools” for a retaliatory response “that no one else can boast of having now ... we will use them if necessary.” But strategists told CNBC that Putin is playing on risk aversion in the West and that the chances of a nuclear war are remote. “I think it’s outside the realm of possibility right now that there’s going to be a nuclear war or World War III that really spills over that far beyond Ukraine’s borders,” Samuel Ramani, a geopolitical analyst and associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, told CNBC. “If there’s a border spillover right now, we’re still probably most likely looking at something like Moldova being vulnerable to an invasion,” he said. He noted that Russia has a long history of using “nuclear brinkmanship” as a way of preventing the West from pursuing security policies that it doesn’t like, with the escalation in hostile rhetoric aimed at deterring NATO members from making heavy arms deliveries to Ukraine. Moment of danger Nonetheless, Ramani noted the threat posed by Russia could become more acute if it felt humiliated on the battlefield. In particular, military setbacks in Ukraine around May 9 could pose some danger. That’s Russia’s “Victory Day” — the anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat by the Soviet Union in World War II. “Putin has had a history of escalating unpredictability if he feels that Russia is being humiliated in some way ... and if there are major setbacks, especially on around the 9th [of May] then there’s a risk of unbreakable action,” he said. “But also there’s a logic of mutually assured destruction that hopefully will rein everybody in.” Threatening nuclear attacks is part of Putin’s “playbook,” said William Alberque, director of strategy, technology and arms control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank. “Putin enjoys using risks and he thinks he has a much more appetite for risk than the West does,” he told CNBC on Thursday. “He’s trying to use the old playbook of ‘if I terrify you enough, you’ll back down’,” he said. “Ultimately, if he uses nuclear weapons, even a demonstration strike, this would turn Russia into a global pariah,” Alberque said. He advised Western leaders, “We just need to be able to manage our risk and keep our nerve and not panic when he does something that we might not expect.” There’s no indication that there will be a direct confrontation, Liviu Horovitz, a nuclear policy researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, told CNBC. “Both the **United States and Western European** governments **have** repeatedly **said that they have no interest in escalating this conflict beyond Ukraine,** and I don’t see anything suggesting that NATO troops will be fighting in Ukraine anytime soon.” Still, if a wider war did break out, “NATO’s overall conventional capabilities outmatch Russia’s,” he noted. What’s important now is that “all sides should avoid any steps that could create misunderstandings,” he said — steps that could lead to an accidental and potentially catastrophic war. Economic war While NATO has shied away from providing any aid to Ukraine that could be misconstrued as a direct attack on Russia, Western allies continue to pile on the pressure on Moscow. Indeed, **the economic punishment on Russia has been increasing** by the day, in the form of more sanctions on its businesses, key sectors and officials close to or within Putin’s regime. **Russia’s** own **Economy Ministry** **expects the economy to contract** as a result, **by 8.8% in 2022** in its base-case scenario, **or by 12.4%** in a more conservative scenario, [Reuters reported.](https://www.reuters.com/business/russias-gdp-decline-could-hit-124-this-year-economy-ministry-document-shows-2022-04-27/) For its part, Russia has sought to inflict its own pain on European countries that are, awkwardly, heavily reliant on Russian natural gas imports. This week [it suspended supplies to Poland and Bulgaria because they refused to pay for the gas in rubles](https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/27/russias-gas-supplies-to-poland-bulgaria-uncertain-as-tensions-rise.html). Russia’s move was branded as “blackmail” by the EU but defended by Moscow. While a direct confrontation between Russia and the West remains unlikely, one close Russia watcher said Western governments need to imbue their populations with a “war mentality” to prepare them for the hardships they could face as the economic fallout from the war continues. Those include rising energy costs and disrupted supply chains and goods from Russia and Ukraine, among the world’s biggest “bread baskets.” “We’re likely to see a further escalation of the economic war, because in some ways, that’s a rational and logical move from both sides that have a very difficult time fighting one another in a direct way because of the nuclear escalation risks,” Maximilian Hess, a fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, told CNBC on Thursday. “**Russia will cut off gas to more countries,** **it will increase its ruble demands**, because it wants to ensure the ruble convertibility remains open, **and the West needs** **to** be **prepar**ing for this with a full war mentality, making the Western populations understand that this is going to have real economic costs and real impacts on the cost of goods, the cost of living and inflation over the coming years.” “If we don’t take this war mentality and apply it to the economic war, then it becomes a lot easier for Putin to win and have successes there,” Hess said. Other flashpoints to watch After more than two months of war, Russia has expanded its control of territories in eastern and southern Ukraine, trying to create a land bridge from Russia via the Donbas region to its annexed territory of Crimea. But **it has also sustained large losses in terms of manpower and** **arms**. In the meantime, [the West continues to pledge more and more support for Ukraine](https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/28/russia-ukraine-live-updates.html), and the country’s forces are mounting a strong resistance to Russian troops, signaling a protracted and bloody conflict ahead. NATO’s chief, Jens Stoltenberg, warned Thursday that the war in Ukraine could last for years. Andrius Tursa, Central and Eastern Europe advisor at Teneo Intelligence, said that against this backdrop, “there is no end in sight to Russia’s war in Ukraine, and relations with the West will likely continue to deteriorate.” “The rhetoric in Russia is already shifting from statements of fighting the ‘nationalists’ in Ukraine to an alleged (proxy) war with NATO. Multiple flashpoints could further escalate the tensions with the West,” he said. Those include recent explosions in the breakaway Moldovan region of Transnistria (which could serve as a pretext for an increased Russian presence in the region) which could bring the conflict “dangerously close to NATO’s borders,” Tursa said in a note Wednesday. “Moscow could also step up threats to NATO over weapons supplies to Ukraine, especially after multiple military and energy facilities in Russia have been allegedly hit by Ukraine. Finally, **decisions by Finland and Sweden to join NATO would be perceived by Moscow as another security threat to Russia and could increase military tensions in the Baltic region.”**

#### Article V checks– NATO will defend Western Europe

White 22 (Kenton White; Lecturer in Strategic Studies and International Relations at the University of Reading, historian and researcher focusing on British defence policy from the Napoleonic Wars to the present; “Ukraine: what might happen if the war spreads to a Nato country”; March 18, 2022; DOA: 6/25/22; <https://theconversation.com/ukraine-what-might-happen-if-the-war-spreads-to-a-nato-country-179434>) // bh

Zelensky has repeatedly called for a Nato-enforced “no-fly zone” over Ukraine. But Nato leaders have concluded, understandably, that this risks direct military confrontation between Russia and Nato forces, potentially leading to rapid escalation. The same seems to apply to another of Zelensky’s requests – the supply of aircraft to help the Ukrainian air force. But if Nato were to directly provide aircraft to Ukraine, Russia may very well conclude that this is offensive, rather than defensive, weaponry, and take action to stop the supply of planes. This may involve strikes on airfields where the planes are based – for example, in Poland – before they are moved to Ukraine. There’s a chance that Zelensky has called for a Nato-sponsored no-fly zone precisely because he knows it would be impossible, allowing him to begin distancing himself from the idea of Nato membership for Ukraine. This might give him the negotiating room to conclude an agreement with Russia. But at the same time, he reminded America in his speech to the US Congress of the Pearl Harbour and 9/11 attacks. Zelensky is warning of the consequences of continued Nato inaction. Article 5 Nato membership allows a nation to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to call for support from the other members fof the alliance. This article has only been used once in Nato’s history – by the US, following the attacks on New York and Washington DC on September 11, 2001 But Article 5 does not guarantee that all the other Nato states would send armed forces to repel an attack, only that military action is an option which can be included as part of the alliance’s principle of “collective defence”. Given public statements from Westminster, the UK would be expected to honour its obligation to fight a Russian attack. As the UK’s health secretary, Sajid Javid, said only a few days ago in an interview on LBC: “If a single Russian toecap steps into Nato territory there will be war with Nato.” On February 25, one day after Russian forces invaded Ukraine, Nato heads of government met in Brussels. They produced a statement deploring the invasion and pledging aid for Ukraine. The alliance pledged to “continue to take all measures and decisions required to ensure the security and defence of all allies”. Accordingly, Nato has deployed both land and maritime assets across its eastern regions and “activated NATO’s defence plans to prepare ourselves to respond to a range of contingencies and secure alliance territory”. My research on Nato has involved informal discussions with several officers from various member nations. This has led me to believe that some Nato countries further from the conflict zone might be reluctant to send combat forces – even in the event that Article 5 is triggered. There is also the question of whether Nato’s political leaders would be willing to carry out attacks on Russian soil, which would represent a significant intensification of the conflict and would carry the additional risk that Russia might respond by escalating to nuclear or chemical weapons. Deterrence – whether conventional or nuclear – requires rational calculation by both sides. As I have written before, Putin’s rationality is different to that of western leaders, which is part of the reason why this crisis and conflict happened in the first place. So far, Putin has not been deterred by Nato. Instead, he has threatened the alliance with “consequences you have never seen in history”.

#### Article V checks war – no spill up

Hubbard 22 (Kaia Hubbard; general news reporter at U.S. News & World Report, joined the company in 2020 as an intern, after previously writing for Willamette Week, Kaia is a graduate of the University of San Diego, where she led her college paper as editor-in-chief; “EXPLAINER: What Is Article 5 and How Does it Shape NATO’s Ukraine Response?”; March 8th, 2022; DOA: 6/25/22, <https://www.usnews.com/news/world-report/articles/2022-03-08/explainer-what-is-article-5-and-how-does-it-shape-natos-response-to-russias-ukraine-invasion>) // bh

Article 5 specifies that any attack on any of the member countries is effectively an attack against them all. Through the Cold War, when the alliance sought to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union, it served as a deterrent. But in the current conflict, its violation is a guarantee of escalation on a nightmarish scale. Even NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has said that NATO allies have a responsibility “to prevent this war from escalating beyond Ukraine.” “The alliance doesn't want to invoke Article 5 because it doesn’t want to have a war with Russia,” says Stanley Sloan, a visiting scholar in political science at Vermont’s Middlebury College and author of Defense of the West: NATO, the European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain. “The best protection against having to do that is Ukrainian success,” Sloan says. “So that’s one reason why the United States and the allies are trying to do everything possible without getting directly involved in the conflict that they can do to help the Ukrainians succeed.” What is Article 5 and How Does it Operate? The alliance calls Article 5 the “principle of collective defense at the very heart of NATO’s founding treaty.” Since it was signed in 1949, the alliance has been so powerful and so effective that Article 5 has only needed to be invoked once – after the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. The charter stipulates that member countries will assist the attacked party “by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” Importantly, each nation gets to determine how they will respond, Sloan says. It’s not an automatic commitment to do anything specific in terms of an attack.

### 1nc – no WW3 !

#### No risk of WW3 – the conflict won’t go nuclear

Simhony 22 (Limor Simhony-- a policy advisor and researcher based in London, “NATO Intervention in Ukraine Won’t Spark World War III” Foreign Policy 4/1/22 https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/01/nato-intervention-in-ukraine-wont-spark-world-war-iii/)

Liberal democracies have war fatigue. It has been demonstrated by disengagement and withdrawal from conflicts (like in Afghanistan) and limited interventions (like in Syria, Libya, and Yemen), where Western forces reduced dependence on ground forces and concentrated on airstrikes and assistance to other fighting forces, such as the Saudis in Yemen and rebels in Syria. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 passed with few consequences for Russia, and as Russia prepared to invade the rest of Ukraine on Feb. 24, it was clear that Western nations would stick to a policy of nonengagement.

Sanctions against Russia have been severe, and Ukrainian forces have been receiving weapons, equipment, and valuable intelligence from Western nations, which have allowed them to deploy unexpected force against Russian troops—fiercely contesting their invasion and causing thousands of casualties, loss of tanks, and other armored vehicles, rocket launchers, aircraft, and ships. Diplomatic efforts to keep Russia isolated have also been crucial. However, Russia’s indiscriminate attacks against Ukrainian civilians—including bombing hospitals and schools as well as the use of horrific weapons, such as cluster bombs and white phosphorus—should drive the West to reevaluate its war engagement policy and take a more active role by implementing a no-fly zone or securing evacuation corridors—perhaps even actively fighting Russian forces. **The** main **concern** **is** any such **escalation could lead to World War III.** There are **two reasons that this is unlikely**. The first is that **Russia’s military capabilities are poor** relative to those of Western armies. **Their forces are not** sufficiently **trained**; their **equipment and weapons are dated and inferior; they experience major logistical, operational, and tactical difficulties; and their soldiers have low morale**. The expectation that Moscow could escalate the war into other theaters in an effective way, especially by conventional means, is unrealistic. **Damaging economic sanctions also mean that Russia may not be able to fund a wider war**. The expectation that Moscow will be able **to escalate the war** into other theaters in an effective way, especially by conventional means**, is unrealistic.** It is possible that if the Russian military continues to struggle, Russian President Vladimir Putin will deploy chemical or even nuclear weapons to increase gains and deter the West from interfering—but that is unlikely. The second is that Russia has become isolated. To fight a world war, **Russia needs powerful allies, which it does not have. Its strongest ally, China, has largely remained on the sidelines since the war started**. It abstained from voting against the [U.N. resolution](https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152) demanding that Russia ends its offensive, and it is worried about secondary sanctions if it aids Russia. **The only countries besides Russia** that voted to reject the resolution **were Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, and Syria—hardly a winning alliance.** Both world wars saw blocks of powerful allies fight one another. Currently, such a bloc does not exist on Russia’s side. These factors mean that there is not a high risk of substantial escalation into total global war. This should be enough to convince Western nations to change their engagement policy and help Ukraine win the war by repulsing an opponent that is considerably inferior militarily to their own forces. It is unlikely to happen for two main reasons: fear of Russian nukes and the West’s aversion to casualties. The most widely discussed reason is the concern that Russia will use nuclear weapons if NATO intervenes militarily. Putin has reasserted Russia’s right to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, making this a legitimate concern. However, it is more likely that nuclear deterrence—albeit different to Cold War deterrence—will hold. Russia’s deployment of nuclear weapons, either against Ukraine or against a NATO member state, could incur devastating consequences for Russia. As then-U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis said in 2018, dismissing the notion that tactical nuclear weapons are somehow a lesser threat, “Any nuclear weapon used … is a strategic game-changer.” Therefore, if NATO retaliates with a powerful response, either nuclear or conventional, it may target strategic Russian military positions and perhaps even sites of political power, aiming at wiping out Russian military capabilities and targeting those in positions of authority—a move that could threaten Putin’s leadership. A NATO retaliation should therefore be considered a major threat to Putin, especially because rivals include numerous nations with considerable nuclear capabilities, such as the United States, United Kingdom, and France. Sensitivity to casualties—specifically deaths among troops—has become a major element affecting liberal democracies’ war preparedness, use of force, and decision-making. In addition, at the heart of this conflict stands national identity. Putin has little motivation to devastate a county that he wishes to annex and has not knowingly made any preparations for using nuclear weapons. Fear of the bomb accounts for one reason behind the West’s decision to leave Ukraine to fight on its own. Another consideration is fundamental to the West: casualty sensitivity. Sensitivity to casualties—specifically deaths among troops—has become a major element affecting liberal democracies’ war preparedness, use of force, and decision-making regarding participation in wars. The trauma of Britain’s so-called lost generation followed the loss of 750,000 troops in World War I. It overwhelmed the public and affected interwar foreign policy and military preparedness in a misguided attempt to avoid another war. The same happened in other liberal democracies scarred by the war, such as France, whereas countries with shallower liberal and democratic traditions—such as Germany, which suffered heavier losses than France and Britain—consequently gravitated toward fascism and reverted to militarism. Conflict behavior and public attitudes toward wars have undergone deep changes during the 20th and 21st centuries as a result of extensive liberalization and democratization processes. Liberal concepts of individualism, personal freedoms, a reduction in internal violence, and a comfortable lifestyle that includes longer life expectancy brought about changes in attitudes about war—primarily, that it is an undesirable way to resolve conflicts. Rejecting the violence and suffering that comes with it has made it difficult for leaders of liberal democracies to justify to the public participation in wars, especially wars of choice, in which the nation is not under direct threat. The United States’ interventions in Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia, and Iraq, for example, were shaped by the casualties incurred. The 1983 bombing of the Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon that killed 241 U.S. service members and the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, where 18 U.S. soldiers died, provoked powerful reactions against the missions, bringing them to an abrupt end despite them initially enjoying wide public support. A similar reaction came after the Tet Offensive in Vietnam in January 1968, which resulted in 1,500 American fatalities. It was a watershed moment that changed the debate about the war and led to the shelving of plans for escalation. Support for the second war in Iraq also fell dramatically as deaths mounted, causing the American public to question the necessity of the war or its conduct and chances of success. Alliance leaders stressed none of its forces would be deployed into Ukraine to prevent the conflict’s spread. Firefighters sit amid debris in the area of a research institute, part of Ukraine's National Academy of Sciences, after a strike by drones, in northwestern Kyiv. Powerful threats could too easily become real disasters. Israel’s use of force against Hezbollah in Lebanon has been heavily influenced by casualty aversion. This included an overreliance on air power in an attempt to limit fatalities among ground forces during the 2006 Lebanon War at the price of undermining military effectiveness. Then-Israeli Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz famously commented: “We didn’t send ground troops into Lebanon because the public couldn’t stomach any more deaths.” Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon, where forces had been deployed between 1985 and 2000, was also heavily influenced by the public’s dissatisfaction with the casualties incurred, particularly after several costly incidents during the 1990s undermined support for a continued military presence and enhanced criticism of the government. Nondemocracies and guerrilla and terrorist organizations do not exhibit the West’s aversion to casualties. Nondemocracies and guerrilla and terrorist organizations do not exhibit such an aversion to casualties. During the Iran-Iraq War, both sides callously scarified children by using them as human minesweepers and shields. Similarly, both the Viet Cong in Vietnam and Hezbollah in Lebanon showed considerable willingness to sacrifice lives despite suffering more losses than their liberal enemies. Then-Egyptian President Anwar Sadat famously said, “Egypt would sacrifice a million Egyptian soldiers” during the October 1973 war against Israel despite not facing an existential threat or serious strategic concerns. There has been little evidence to suggest there is heightened sensitivity to losses among troops in Russia, a nation with a history of mass deaths in both the world wars, its own civil war, and from the brutal suppression and killing of its own people. The continued use of force in Ukraine, which has resulted in as many as 15,000 Russian military deaths so far according to the [Washington Post](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/24/russia-troops-casualties-nato-ukraine/), indicates that casualties are of no concern to Russia’s top brass. This stands in contrast to Ukraine, which accepts its causalities because it is fighting an existential war for independence and national survival. Casualty sensitivity has been one of the factors shaping democracies’ behavior, with Western politicians preferring to avoid direct engagement in wars or to limit the use of ground forces, even at the price of compromising objectives and deterrence. It is one of the reasons that a policy of nonengagement was adopted, without question or hesitation, regarding Ukraine, long before Putin raised the alert status of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Fear of casualties among soldiers meant that a policy of nonengagement has existed prior to Russia’s invasion—and therefore separately to a concern about escalating into a broader war. This has been understood by Putin, who bet—correctly—that Western nations will not take an active role in the war by using direct force against Russian troops, not only out of fear of escalation but as a result of a preexisting doctrine that seeks to minimize casualties. Had the West exhibited less casualty aversion, this could have acted as a greater deterrent against Russian aggression. For the war in Ukraine, unlike the risk of escalation and use of nuclear weapons, the risk of incurring casualties is high. Considering how formative aversion to casualties has been, committing troops to fight Russia will require liberal democracies to undergo a major paradigm shift. But there are ways to mitigate the effect of casualty sensitivity on public opinion. Adjusting the public’s expectations regarding the length of the war and the casualties that will result as well as displaying internal political unity could help. Employing force that relies primarily on air power, which limits casualties, can be used; during Israel’s 2006 war in Lebanon and other wars, this has proved to have only limited effectiveness. However, if done in collaboration with Ukrainian ground forces, this could have better chances of success. This war brought a shift in attitudes toward wars in Europe. The Germans, famously pacifist since 1945, have undergone the largest shift and now support military aid to Ukraine and a considerable increase in funds to rebuild Germany’s military power. But a bigger shift is needed considering Russia’s aggression. Russia is no stranger to targeting civilians, as it has done in the carpet-bombing of Grozny in Chechnya, in 1994 to 1995 and 1999 to 2000. It is doing this again now. It is time for the West to stop being afraid of limited threats that are not likely to materialize and to use its military superiority to help Ukraine defend its independence. Intervention will not turn this local conflict into World War III. It runs the risk of causing a tactical nuclear attack on Ukraine, but this risk is limited given what any retaliation could mean for Russia. The West must therefore decide how long it will refrain from engagement and allow Russia to sow devastation in pursuing expansionist ambitions for fear of casualties or the bomb.

### 2nc – no WW3 !

#### Ukraine-Russia war won’t go nuclear

Stein 22 (Aaron Stein -- Director of Research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) “Ukraine and a Guide To Avoiding World War III” Texas National Security Review 3/3/22 <https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/ukraine-and-a-guide-to-avoiding-world-war-iii/>) CL

After a few days, **the Russian invasion of Ukraine has stumbled amid** reports **of low troop morale and poor logistics**. The bungled Russian invasion has given space for different European countries t[o increase lethal assistance](https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-ukraine-russia-funding-weapons-budget-military-aid/) to the Ukrainian government, but this raises the risk of escalation beyond Ukraine. Such overt assistance has prompted Moscow [to warn](https://twitter.com/m_suchkov/status/1497961761554710531) that it would strike any arms convoys inside Ukrainian territory, presumably with airstrikes near the Ukrainian-Polish border. There is a non-trivial risk of conventional escalation that could turn a contained, regional conflict into a much larger regional war. The United States and Europe ought to take action to reduce these risks even as they supply Ukraine with lethal and non-lethal supplies. The West cannot afford to be sanguine about the increased risk of direct conflict with Russia. The United States and its NATO allies are also flying in close, daily contact with the Russian and Belarusian air forces while NATO troops are deployed in [Poland and Romania](https://www.airforcemag.com/u-s-jets-deployed-to-poland-romania-prepared-to-scramble-in-support-of-nato-baltic-air-policing/). Additionally, the primary route for Western weapons to reach Ukraine is via Poland. Western policymakers would be wise to consider that Russian aerospace forces may bomb convoys entering Ukraine from Poland, raising the possibility that they or their munitions could strike targets just outside the border, or even cross into Polish airspace. And as the war moves west, Russian fighters could pursue Ukrainian aircraft fleeing the conflict and, perhaps, violate Polish air space. Hot pursuit of aircraft over international borders invites retaliation, potentially bringing NATO and Russian forces into combat. As such, policymakers ought to be clear and deliberate about how to manage potential escalation spirals. While both sides have professional militaries that are governed by rules managing these interactions, NATO air forces will almost certainly be operating in ever-closer proximity to Russian aircraft, at the very least. The airspace surrounding Romania and Poland is [already congested](https://breakingdefense.com/2022/02/us-russia-should-establish-deconfliction-line-for-air-operations-over-the-black-sea-now/), with different NATO forces patrolling over the Black and Baltic Seas, as well as in the tri-border area between Belarus, Ukraine, and Poland. To complicate matters further, Ukrainian air assets have fled to [Poland and Romania](https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/one-of-ukraine-s-top-fighters-fled-to-romania-as-russia-dominates-skies-what-will-happen-to-the-runaway-su-27). This means that Soviet-designed aircraft are flying at NATO members’ borders, which requires NATO air forces to identify them and escort them to an appropriate air base. As of now, Russian fighters are not pursuing these aircrafts, perhaps because they have not gained air superiority over Ukraine and are not patrolling in the far west of the country. If the conflict was to escalate or were NATO to decide to reassess its aims and rules of engagement — perhaps in response to Russian forces pushing westward after taking or encircling Kyiv, driving a tide of fleeing refugees before them — things could get much more dangerous. **The risk of spillover from the conflict is an urgent topic for discussion precisely because it could lead to a war involving up to four nuclear-armed powers: Russia, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom**. President Vladimir Putin has already put his nuclear forces on [“a special mode of combat duty”](https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/02/27/with-his-war-going-slowly-vladimir-putin-raises-the-nuclear-stakes) in an attempt to coerce the Western powers. This order has puzzled observers of Russian nuclear forces, but the signaling appears to be designed to warn NATO to stay out of the conflict, something Biden has pledged to do, rather than signal Moscow’s willingness to use nuclear force first. **While the threat of a nuclear exchange is low**, the United States and Europe must grapple with the secondary challenges of military support for Ukraine. Russian warnings have suggested that it intends to limit actions to Ukraine, **while the Biden administration** [**has insisted**](https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/caitlinhernandez/biden-us-troops-russia-ukraine) **it will not send troops into the conflict**. The line, however, is becoming increasingly blurred with the increasing pledges to support the Ukrainian armed forces. Foreign supplied man-portable weapons are already tearing into Russian supply lines and [killing Russians](https://www.nbcnews.com/investigations/frustrated-putin-may-order-escalation-violence-ukraine-us-officials-sa-rcna18026) in numbers larger than what the Kremlin may have accepted before the invasion, and the networks being set up to supply these weapons could easily be used to support a Ukrainian insurgency indefinitely. How will Moscow react once these arms flows from Poland turn from trickles to torrents, or kill Russian soldiers tasked with patrolling conquered urban areas? NATO aerial patrols over Poland are well within the engagement zone of Belarusian surface-to-air missiles. In the event of increased tensions, Belarus, under instructions from the Kremlin, could use its surface-to-air missiles to harass NATO fighters, or consider trying to interfere by jamming aircraft. The other, and perhaps most likely, pressure point will be on the supply convoys from Poland into Ukraine. In Syria, Russia used tactical bombers [to strike weapons and food supplies](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/how-russia-beat-turkey-in-syria/) from Turkey, as part of its siege campaign of Aleppo. This tactic led to Russian bombing directly on the border. In the air, Russian fighters would also [use aggressive tactics](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/us-war-against-isis-9780755634828/) to warn away coalition fighters during times of tension (often with little effect), as well as Turkish Air Force fighters patrolling near the border. If the war drags on, and Western supplies do start to make it into the country in larger numbers, NATO should expect Ukrainian-driven convoys with Western aid to be bombed. Russia has pledged to do this, and it would be wise to take Putin seriously. The Russian strategy now, it seems, is to mass forces to besiege Ukrainian cities. As part of this strategy, one should assume Moscow will attempt to cut weapons supplies to Ukraine, even if those supplies come from Poland. The Russian military has performed poorly in Ukraine, but there is little reason to doubt that Moscow can use mass to overcome challenges and take terrain from the Ukrainian military. If this were to happen, Russian military forces could soon [link](https://warontherocks.com/2022/02/interpreting-the-first-few-days-of-the-russo-ukrainian-war/) different fronts in the south and east, besiege Kyiv, and be in a position to expand the war in the western part of the country. This reality, while unsettling, requires that the United States and NATO think through the risks of increased Russian activity on the Ukrainian-Polish border. To manage this risk, the United States and NATO should announce that no member-state’s territory will be used to launch attacks against the Russian armed forces. The two sides should also continue to push for increased transparency about air operations on the border with Belarus, decreasing the risk of miscalculation on the border. Finally, the United States and Europe should decide how to respond if convoys are bombed. The easiest answer is [to do nothing](https://warontherocks.com/2017/12/in-defense-of-nothing/). However, the pressure to do “something” to protect these convoys is likely to grow, leading to pressures on leaders to extend some sort of protection to aid and weapons convoys that enter Ukraine, even when any such action could be escalatory. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has gone poorly thus far, but the correlation of forces still slants heavily in Moscow’s favor. And Putin will likely increase the brutality of his campaign, substituting mass for operational cleverness in his effort to subdue Ukraine. The West needs to be prepared for this fact, and the potential that the war will move westward. If Putin chooses this course of action, bringing the two sides into far closer contact, it will be important to manage force-on-force friction to keep the conflict limited and to ensure that it does not spill over into Europe. The United States and NATO can manage escalatory risks, but it is important to think clearly about what is at stake, proactively increase transparency with Moscow about certain NATO actions in Poland, and [explore a clear deconfliction mechanism](http://www.apple.com/) to manage flights in certain air corridors. **The West has stood remarkably united** in the face of Russian aggression, but all parties involved should be thinking about how to manage spillover from what may turn out to be a longer and bloodier war than Moscow planned for.

# Solvency Answers

## Inherency

### 1nc – Squo solves

#### NATO already has multiple means of countering disinformation, including set processes and widescale strategies to ensure response

Robbins ’20 (Joseph Robbins (PhD, Texas Tech University) is the political science department head at Valdosta State University. His research examines Post-Communist party system development and, more recently, the consequences of terrorist attacks; his research has been published in journals such as Armed Forces & Society; Comparative Politics; Comparative Political Studies; Conflict, Security, and Development; Electoral Studies; Global Policy; the Journal of East European and Asian Studies; the Journal of Peace Research; Legislative Studies Quarterly; Party Politics; and Terrorism & Political Violence), “Countering Russian Disinformation”, from “The Diversity of Russia’s Military Power,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2020) , [resrep26533.8.pdf (jstor.org)](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep26533.8.pdf)

Recognizing this threat, in 2018 the European Council endorsed a plan to counter Russian cyber threats, which included the creation of the Rapid Alert System.139 It serves as a clearinghouse of sorts for member states to share information and concerns regarding suspected disinformation campaigns and to discuss “best practices” in responding to these malicious campaigns. The RAS then shares authoritative accounts in response to false or misleading messaging that can be disseminated by the EU member states, civil society groups, and social media companies. This mechanism has been used against Covid-19 disinformation campaigns that have spread harmful information regarding the pandemic and dangerous or unproven remedies to the disease.140 As a multilateral, multilevel organization, the RAS has great potential to help counter Russian disinformation campaigns but it has been hampered by inconsistent participation by members, uneven real-time responses to threats, and concerns over ideologically motivated responses.141 NATO has also been targeted by Russian disinformation, as the Kremlin looks to sow discord and fuel animus toward the organization amid the Covid-19 pandemic.142 False stories were spread regarding NATO’s intent to withdraw troops from Lithuania, Canadian troops allegedly exposing Latvia to the virus, and a Polish military official reportedly criticizing U.S. military forces. These stories aim to undermine NATO’s legitimacy and support as well as weaken individual member states. Back in 2008, Estonia led a NATO effort to create the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE) following Russia’s 2007 massive cyberattack on the Baltic nation. The CCDCOE consists of 28 member states, including the Czech Republic and Estonia, and supports a comprehensive strategy to counter cyber threats. The CCDCOE supports its mission through interdisciplinary methods to study, train, and organize exercises to fortify cyber defense. Its Locked Shields exercise is one such example of how it promotes cyber defense across teams to ensure that experts and decisionmakers are working together on these threats.143 These efforts extend beyond disinformation alone but can contribute to ongoing efforts to curtail this influence. NATO has employed other efforts to counter disinformation. In addition to CCDCOE’s work, STRATCOM aims to raise awareness of information operations and refute misleading or false claims. Its analytical reports summarize tactics, messaging, and targets of Russian disinformation.144 The organization mobilized in earnest in the wake of the Crimean annexation and since 2014 has expanded its efforts to help NATO members identify false or misleading narratives, recognize networked or coordinated Russian media activity, and increase audience resilience when targeted by the Kremlin.145 STRATCOM’s coordinated efforts are vitally important to enhance the collective security of its member states and to counter disinformation efforts levied against NATO as a whole Conclusion This article underscores a few effective methods to counter disinformation operations at both the national and international levels. Estonia’s use of real-time volunteer forces along with the Czech Republic’s BIS and think tanks are useful in naming and shaming Russia’s digital active measures. Meanwhile, Estonia’s use of government-sanctioned programming can help shape the broadcast conversation, thus countering channels like RT, which further harmful narratives. The NATO and EU responses to Russia’s ongoing efforts to sow discord offer some useful suggestions for moving forward. These organizations have created task forces and organizations that, collectively, reveal a holistic framework that can help uncover subversive efforts, coordinate a cogent response, and promote multilateral collaboration. With additional buy-in from EU and NATO members, these efforts will evolve and strengthen the response to disinformation operations.

### 2nc – Squo solves

**NATO checks cyber disinformation now**

**NATO 20** (NATO; 17 Jul. 2020, “NATO’s approach to countering disinformation: a focus on COVID-19,” <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/177273.htm>)

NATO has demonstrated that it can sustain its operations, missions and activities, and maintain readiness despite the pandemic. The Alliance is now preparing for a possible second wave of COVID-19 with an operation plan, a stockpile of medical supplies and funding, while also strengthening the resilience of our societies. That is because international organisations such as NATO, as well as NATO Allies and partners, have faced a proliferation of disinformation, propaganda and misinformation during the pandemic. NATO views disinformation as the deliberate creation and dissemination of false and/or manipulated information with the intent to deceive and/or mislead. Disinformation seeks to deepen divisions within and between Allied nations, and to undermine people’s confidence in elected governments. The Alliance has been dealing with these challenges since its inception and has been actively countering a significant increase in disinformation and propaganda since Russia illegally annexed Crimea, Ukraine, in 2014. NATO has intensified efforts to counter disinformation, following clear direction from Allied Heads of State and Government in the 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration, which stated: “We face hybrid challenges, including disinformation campaigns and malicious cyber activities.” In 2019, in their London Declaration, Allied Heads of State and Government said that NATO is “strengthening [its] ability to prepare for, deter, and defend against hybrid tactics that seek to undermine our security and societies.” NATO is responding in a unified manner, working in close cooperation with Allies and partners. NATO acts in a measured and responsible way, countering disinformation with fact-based, credible public communications. NATO publicly refutes false claims, debunks the main disinformation narratives aimed at the Alliance and coordinates to share information, insight and best practice. NATO also works with the European Union, the United Nations, the G7 and civil society to counter disinformation. A free and independent media is the best response to disinformation and propaganda, with journalists free to ask tough questions and check their sources. COVID-19 has focused the attention of many to the ongoing challenge of disinformation, propaganda and misinformation and the potential harm it can inflict. In a pandemic, facts and clear communications can save lives. They are essential to maintain public safety and uphold NATO’s shared values of freedom, democracy and the rule of law. By working together, NATO Allies and partners are making our societies more resilient and our people safer. NATO’s approach to countering disinformation involves a twin-track model, focused on the ‘Understand’ and ‘Engage’ functions. The Understand function encompasses Information Environment Assessments, which regularly track, monitor and analyse information relevant to NATO’s mission. This enables NATO to evaluate the effectiveness of its communications. The Engage function embeds these insights, enabling NATO to tailor its strategic communications where it will most effectively counter disinformation. NATO’s communications are fact-based, timely, transparent and coordinated. This allows NATO to have an impact in a contested information space. Coordination with Allies and partners is the cornerstone of all NATO’s work both to understand the information environment and to engage audiences. This is particularly important when dealing with a fast-moving crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic. It is crucial for NATO that nations, other international organisations, such as the EU, as well as civil society and the private sector, work together to build resilience in our societies.

#### NATO utilizes a strategy of communication and clarity to counter misinformation now

NATO, 20 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization informational website, “NATO’s approach to countering disinformation: a focus on COVID-19”, NATO, Last updated: 17 Jul. 2020 14:12, <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/177273.htm#top>)

**NATO Engages** NATO’s communications are based on real actions and facts. NATO and Allied armed forces have played a key role in supporting civilian efforts to fight COVID-19, with some 350 flights delivering hundreds of tons of critical supplies, the construction of almost 100 field hospitals, and almost half a million troops across the Alliance securing borders, transporting patients and helping with testing. To ensure NATO is prepared for a possible second wave of COVID-19, Allies have agreed a new plan, a new stockpile of medical equipment, and a new fund for the quick acquisition of medical supplies. Many Allies have already offered to donate to the stockpile and contribute to the fund. This is a clear sign of Alliance unity and solidarity. The practical support provided by NATO Allies to other Allies, as well as partners, has underpinned NATO’s communications on COVID-19. NATO views fact-based, credible communications as the best way of countering disinformation. This is based on the Alliance’s core values of democracy, freedom of speech and the rule of law. Engaging the public and building resilience over the medium to long term is the most effective way to inoculate people against disinformation. NATO will continue to expose disinformation through a wide range of media engagements including statements, rebuttals and corrections, and briefings to inform a wide variety of audiences about disinformation and propaganda, as it has since before the pandemic. To meet the challenges of the current crisis, NATO has: Intensified digital communications on the pandemic response across all platforms. Ongoing COVID-19 related information and news stories can be found at [www.nato.int/covid19](https://www.nato.int/covid19). To shape the policy debate, NATO has turned public diplomacy face to face events into online engagements. Communications in Russian have been enhanced. This include articles, translations of factsheets, such as Russia’s 5 myths about NATO and COVID-19 [36](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/177273.htm#fn34), and videos on our Russian language YouTube channel. To reach a broader audience, NATO routinely translates content into a range of languages. NATO supports the work of independent NGOs, think tanks, academics, fact-checking organisations and other civil society initiatives to promote debate and to build resilience. A pluralistic, independent media sector also plays an important role in countering disinformation and conveying factual information to the public. NATO engages with media to provide timely information on its response to COVID-19 to a potential audience of hundreds of millions of people. NATO has conducted briefings to media in multiple countries, including Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine and the Western Balkans region, focusing on disinformation and NATO’s contribution to the fight against COVID-19. **Coordination: Working with partners** Coordination with partners and international institutions underpins both the Understand and Engage strands of NATO’s response to disinformation. It is particularly important when dealing with a rapidly evolving crisis such as COVID-19. To identify, analyse and counter disinformation, NATO works with the European Union through the European External Action Service [37](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/177273.htm#fn35) and the European Commission, the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, the United Nations and its Verified campaign and the US State Department’s Global Engagement Center. NATO’s active public diplomacy outreach and cooperation with partners globally strengthens our collective ability to address the challenge of disinformation.

#### The Rapid Alert System is currently in effect, progress reports are promising

Rankovic, ’19 (Didi Rankovic is an experienced online journalist, editor, and translator, with a career spanning over ten years writing for major a English-language website in Serbia, and previously working as translator for international organizations and peacekeepers in the Balkans. Rankovic is passionate about free and open source tech and is a head contributor for Reclaim The Net, focusing on lead stories., “The EU’s Rapid Alert System that shares info about “fake news” between member states is now in action”, Reclaim The Net, March 30, 2019, [The EU's Rapid Alert System that shares info about "fake news" between member states is now in action (reclaimthenet.org)](https://reclaimthenet.org/the-eus-rapid-alert-system-fake-news/) https://reclaimthenet.org/the-eus-rapid-alert-system-fake-news/)

The European Union (EU) is scrambling to establish tighter control of online information ahead of the elections in May for the European Parliament (EP). This effort requires cooperation from Big Tech and advertisers – who must keep “fake news” at bay, or risk EU regulation – and cooperation with partners such as NATO and G7. The Rapid Alert System, [announced](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-6648_en.htm) late last year, whose declared goal is to allow EU member-states to “share information on ongoing foreign disinformation campaigns with one another, and coordinate responses,” has now come into effect. Specifically, the foreign information threat the EU is looking to shield itself from is Russia, and “pro-Kremlin” disinformation. After the 2016 US presidential elections, Hillary Clinton’s campaign and supporters never accepted her defeat as the choice of American voters – but rather the result of American voters being manipulated by Russia. Russia continues to deny these accusations, but ever since the big US election upset that saw Donald Trump become president, there have been attempts, to various degrees successful, to pin the outcome of every election and referendum in the western world that didn’t quite go the establishment’s way on Russia’s malign influence. This includes Brexit, the UK’s vote to leave the EU. Addressing the European Data Protection and Privacy Conference, EU Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society Mariya Gabriel has now offered some [insight](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-19-1789_en.htm) into the way the new system is set up and meant to function. Gabriel mentioned that US tech and social media giants and advertisers have signed up to the [Code of Practice](https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation). Under the code, these companies are expected to cut off revenue streams to suspected offenders, remove their accounts, promote news from sources viewed favorably, and ensure more transparency when it comes to political advertising. “In view of the European Parliament elections, Google and Facebook are providing training to candidates, political parties and campaigners on how to manage their online presence and on how to protect their campaigns,” Gabriel revealed during her keynote speech. But that’s not all – since late 2018, Twitter, Facebook, and Google have been reporting to the EU on a monthly basis on the progress they made in implementing this voluntary, and self-regulatory, code. The last such “progress report” showed promise, the EU official said – but warned that “we are not yet there.” And while these companies have all implemented “a tool to monitor political ads” – not everyone is moving fast enough to remove unwanted accounts. YouTube, for example, reported removing 600,000 in February alone – but the commissioner admitted the EU is not sure if their offense was of political or commercial nature. Facebook is yet to report its latest figures – while Twitter reported “nothing” – said Gabriel. The European Commission has also enlisted help from “independent [fact-checkers](https://reclaimthenet.org/newsguards-trusted-sources-fake-news/) and researchers to detect and expose disinformation campaigns across social networks,” Gabriel said. On the member-states’ side, “election cooperation networks” have been put in place to swiftly detect “potential threats,” she explained. In the context of the initiative, the commissioner made special emphasis on data protection and privacy, linking the issue with political disinformation campaigns. Advertisers, ISPs, insurers and others collecting and misusing personal data in order to sell “shoes and cars” is one thing – but what if the same techniques are used by (bad) governments and those with vested political interest? Gabriel differentiated between “legitimate” political processing of online users’ data, and that which brings with it “serious risks” to privacy and trust in the democratic process. According to Gabriel, EU citizens are given protection in both scenarios by the GDPR and the e-Privacy Regulation. The GDPR stands for “General Data Protection Regulation” – a piece of legislation in place since 2018 that is seen as having good intent to give users more protection and control over their own data, but has also [found its critics in being difficult to implement](https://reclaimthenet.org/google-gdpr-fine/). However, Gabriel praised it as having become a global standard in just under a year, and spoke strongly in favor of a “transparent, fair and lawful” manner of data collection and processing. It’s hard to assess how effective the EU’s move to introduce these measures can and will be, but it seems unlikely to backfire as a political initiative. If the EP elections produce a status-quo, the EU could blame Russia for trying, while giving itself a pat on the back for a job well done in blocking Moscow’s interference. In the reverse scenario, the EU could blame Russia for succeeding – and push for even more regulation, more self-regulation from tech companies, and more money paid by EU member-states towards the budget of the European External Action Service (EEAS) – the implementer of the Rapid Alert System.

## Solvency

### 1nc – AI can’t solve

#### The aff can’t solve - AI solutions cannot quickly identify disinformation attacks

**Villasenor 20** (John Villasenor; November 23, 2020; a nonresident senior fellow in Governance Studies and the Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings. He is also a professor of electrical engineering, law, public policy, and management at UCLA, as well as co-director of the UCLA Institute for Technology, Law, and Policy. Villasenor’s work considers the technology, policy, and legal issues arising from key technology trends including the growth of artificial intelligence, the increasing complexity and interdependence of today’s networks and systems, and continued advances in computing and communications., “How to deal with AI-enabled disinformation,” <https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-deal-with-ai-enabled-disinformation/>)

One hurdle to any learning algorithm, whether supervised or unsupervised, is access to a sufficiently large set of training data. Information suitable for use as training data regarding a particular issue or question can take significant time to accumulate on social media. To be useful in AI systems for detecting disinformation, the data would in many (though not all) instances require at least some degree of manual coding at the outset. Such an approach works if the topic at issue is one—such as false claims regarding medical cures—for which the time over which it is important to continue to combat the disinformation is much longer than the time it would take to build and use a large set of training data. But it is far less effective for situations when disinformation defenses need to be deployed very quickly, and in which there will typically be a smaller amount of data that can be used as a basis for the algorithm to learn. Another issue, both in rapid and in less time-constrained attempts to identify disinformation, is the accuracy of the data labels on which an AI algorithm is relying during the learning process. “Noisy” data—data in which the labels are not necessarily accurate—is a well-known problem in machine learning. To take a simple example unrelated to disinformation attacks, consider a machine learning algorithm that is attempting to learn to automatically distinguish images of cars from images of bicycles. To do this, the algorithm might scour the internet and find millions of images that are labeled “car” and millions of other images labeled “bicycle.” In most cases, those labels will be correct. But in some instances, the labels will be incorrect; an image labeled “car” might show a truck, a bicycle, or content completely unrelated to vehicles. The higher the fraction of incorrect labels, the more difficult and slower it will be for the algorithm to learn to accurately distinguish between cars and bicycles. Working with noisy data is an active area of research, and there are emerging approaches that can help mitigate—though not completely eliminate—the loss in accuracy that results when a machine learning algorithm learns based data in which there a is substantive fraction of labeling inaccuracies.[8] Attempts to use AI to identify disinformation will likely need to confront noisy data for the simple reason that intentional deception is involved. Most people who post an image of a car to the internet wouldn’t choose to label it “bicycle” just to throw off machine learning algorithms. But disinformation attacks will be associated with a set of conflicting claims about whether online statements are true. Returning to the Election Day example from above, in response to a tweet falsely stating that a polling location is closed, someone who has actually just voted at that location might reply with a tweet stating that the initial tweet is false and that the polling location was in fact open. That reply is, in effect, a label. An account controlled by the attackers might also reply to the initial tweet by asserting that it is true. That reply is also a label, though one that directly contradicts the reply from the real voter. Over short time scales, it would be exceedingly difficult for an algorithm—or a human—to know which label to trust. Responding quickly to disinformation thus requires addressing the twin hurdles of limited data and unreliable—and in some cases, intentionally wrong—labels of that data. Responding quickly to disinformation thus requires addressing the twin hurdles of limited data and unreliable—and in some cases, intentionally wrong—labels of that data.” Researchers have recognized these issues and are developing new approaches that do not rely on a large set of pre-existing training data. In April 2020, a team of researchers from Microsoft and Arizona State University posted a pre-publication version of a paper[9] describing new results on techniques for quickly detecting fake news.[10] In the paper the authors note that traditional approaches to detecting fake news “rely on large amounts of labeled instances to train supervised models. Such large labeled training data is difficult to obtain in the early phase of fake news detection.”[11] To address this, the authors introduce a method that requires only a “small amount of manually-annotated clean data,”[12] which can be used to rapidly and automatically label a larger set of data based on posts and comments on news articles by social media users. User credibility is one of the factors considered in forming the labels. According to the authors, this approach “outperforms state-of-the-art baselines for early detection of fake news.”[13] Frameworks like this can not only help solve the problem of limited data, but could potentially also help mitigate labeling accuracy issues. As the above examples help to convey, one common theme in research addressing disinformation is the importance of measuring the credibility of online sources. Approaches to establish and then leverage credibility will be critical to quickly identifying truth in the presence of a well-constructed rapid disinformation attack. For instance, in the Election Day scenario, it would be advantageous to give high credibility weight to the social media accounts of local television and news stations and the reporters who work at those stations. That way, as soon as those stations are able to identify that the claims of closed polling places are false and disseminate that fact on social media, the AI system can calibrate truth and falsity and move to the next step of addressing the posts known to contain disinformation.[14] It is also important to recognize the limits of what AI can be expected to accomplish. Earlier this year, Samuel Woolley of UT Austin published an excerpt of his book “The Reality Game” in MIT Technology Review. In it, Woolley noted that “There simply is no easy fix to the problem of computational propaganda on social media.”[15] It would be unreasonable to expect any AI solution that will be available in the near future would be able to quickly and unambiguously identify a rapid disinformation attack. However, AI will certainly be able to provide insight into the dynamics of emerging disinformation attacks, pinpoint at least some of the social media accounts at the source, and compute confidence levels regarding the likely truth or falsity of a claim making the rounds on social media. After that, the response will need to be overseen by humans making decisions based on a combination of the AI outputs and guidance from policy frameworks.

### 2nc – AI can’t solve

#### AI systems fail to accurately identify disinformation attacks – conflicting algorithm labels are too complicated

Wooley 20 (Samuel Wooley; January 8, 2020; an assistant professor at Moody School of Communication at the University of Texas-Austin, “We’re fighting fake news AI bots by using more AI. That’s a mistake,” <https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/01/08/130983/were-fighting-fake-news-ai-bots-by-using-more-ai-thats-a-mistake/>)

When I was at the Oxford Internet Institute, meanwhile, we looked into how and whether Twitter bots were used during the Brexit debate. We found that while many were used to spread messages about the Leave campaign, the vast majority of the automated accounts were very simple. They were made to alter online conversation with bots that had been built simply to boost likes and follows, to spread links, to game trends, or to troll opposition. It was gamed by small groups of human users who understood the magic of memes and virality, of seeding conspiracies online and watching them grow. Conversations were blocked by basic bot-generated spam and noise, purposefully attached to particular hashtags in order to demobilize online conversations. Links to news articles that showed a politician in a particular light were hyped by fake or proxy accounts made to post and repost the same junk over and over and over. These campaigns were wielded quite bluntly: these bots were not designed to be functionally conversational. They did not harness AI. There will also need to be policies for handling situations in which an AI system makes exactly the wrong decision. Because of the limited data available in the early stages of a rapid disinformation attack, the need to quickly make a determination might lead an algorithm to invert truth and falsity and conclude that the disinformation is accurate and that the attempts to debunk it are themselves a disinformation attack. This is a less far-fetched outcome than it might initially appear to be. Algorithms, like the people who design them, can be influenced by a confirmation bias effect, leading to a boost in confidence in a wrong conclusion by selectively giving greater weight to inputs bolstering that conclusion. Particularly given the short time scales of rapid disinformation attacks, this could lead an algorithm to quickly converge on an incorrect conclusion that would need human intervention to identify and invert. For most topics and events, there simply won’t be the resources to supply staffing dedicated to individually monitoring each of the essentially limitless list of situations in which disinformation might arise. Attempts to use AI to identify disinformation will likely need to confront noisy data for the simple reason that intentional deception is involved. Most people who post an image of a car to the internet wouldn’t choose to label it “bicycle” just to throw off machine learning algorithms. But disinformation attacks will be associated with a set of conflicting claims about whether online statements are true. Returning to the Election Day example from above, in response to a tweet falsely stating that a polling location is closed, someone who has actually just voted at that location might reply with a tweet stating that the initial tweet is false and that the polling location was in fact open. That reply is, in effect, a label. An account controlled by the attackers might also reply to the initial tweet by asserting that it is true. That reply is also a label, though one that directly contradicts the reply from the real voter. Over short time scales, it would be exceedingly difficult for an algorithm—or a human—to know which label to trust. Responding quickly to disinformation thus requires addressing the twin hurdles of limited data and unreliable—and in some cases, intentionally wrong—labels of that data. This is especially true given that companies such as Facebook and Twitter operate globally; there are literally billions of accounts in nearly two hundred countries that could potentially be employed to disseminate disinformation. As a result, for the vast majority of instances of disinformation, human intervention at the social media companies will of necessity occur only after a problem is flagged either algorithmically or through manual reporting channels. Public policy will play a central role in both the human and technological aspects of the response to rapid disinformation attacks. At the technology level, policies will need to be embedded into the algorithms in relation to questions such as: What confidence level that a rapid disinformation attack is occurring should trigger notification to human managers that an activity of concern has been identified? Over what time scales should the AI system make that evaluation, and should that time scale depend on the nature and/or extent of the disinformation? For example, suspected disinformation regarding violence should clearly receive a higher priority for immediate resolution than disinformation associated with conflicting online characterizations of what a politician said at a recent campaign speech. Other questions that can drive policies to be embedded in AI disinformation detection systems include: Under what circumstances should an AI system preemptively shut down accounts suspected of originating a rapid disinformation attack? What types of autonomous actions, if any, should be taken to address posts from legitimate accounts that unwittingly contribute to propagating disinformation? Policy considerations will be an important driver for the human response as well. When an AI system identifies a potential rapid disinformation attack, managers at social media companies will need a set of guidelines for how to proceed. Policies can also guide the extent to which people at social media companies should arrange in advance to be “on call” to watch for rapid disinformation attacks. It is clear that for a short duration, high stakes events like a national election, social media companies will need to have people standing by ready to step in and address disinformation. For events in that category, the question is not whether disinformation will be present, but rather how much of it there will be, and how sophisticated the attacks will be.

#### AI technology isn’t neutral – makes it unreliable to identify harmful information

**Kelley 22** (Alexandra Kelley; JUNE 17, 2022; Alexandra Kelley reports on emerging technology for Nextgov. Her most recent post was covering breaking news for The Hill where she focused on a variety of quantitative subjects, including Big Tech and the economy, in addition to covering the coronavirus pandemic since late 2019. She graduated from Kenyon College in 2017, “The Federal Trade Commission sent a report to Congress detailing limitations artificial intelligence has in regulating disinformation and harmful online content.” <https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2022/06/ai-no-magical-shortcut-ftc-says-fighting-disinformation-online/368341/>)

The Federal Trade Commission issued a warning regarding the government’s use of artificial intelligence technology to fight disinformation, deepfakes, crime and other online concerns, citing the technology’s inherent limitations with bias and discrimination.Detailed in a report sent to Congress, officials at the FTC said that AI technology cannot play a neutral role in mitigating social problems online, specifically noting that using it in this capacity could give way to illegal data extraction from online users and conduct improper surveillance. “Our report emphasizes that nobody should treat AI as the solution to the spread of harmful online content,” said Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection Samuel Levine. “Combatting online harm requires a broad societal effort, not an overly optimistic belief that new technology—which can be both helpful and dangerous—will take these problems off our hands.”The report specifically highlights the broadly rudimentary level this technology is at, mainly with the datasets AI algorithms run on not being representative enough to successfully identify harmful content. AI software developers’ biases are also likely to influence the technology’s decision-making, a longstanding issue within the AI industry. FTC authors also added that most AI programs cannot gauge context, further rendering it unreliable in distinguishing harmful content. “The key conclusion of this report is thus that governments, platforms and others must exercise great caution in either mandating the use of, or over-relying on, these tools even for the important purpose of reducing harms,” the report reads. “Although outside of our scope, this conclusion implies that, if AI is not the answer and if the scale makes meaningful human oversight infeasible, we must look at other ways, regulatory or otherwise, to address the spread of these harms. Another critical observation the FTC arrived at is that human intervention is still needed to regulate the AI features that may inadvertently target and censor the wrong content. Transparency surrounding how the technology is built, mainly within its algorithmic development, is also highly recommended. The report also noted that platforms and websites which host the circulation of harmful content should work to slow the spread of illegal topics or misinformation on their end. The FTC recommends instilling tools like downvoting, labeling or other targeting operations that aren’t necessarily AI-run censorship. “Dealing effectively with online harms requires substantial changes in business models and practices, along with cultural shifts in how people use or abuse online services,” the report concluded. “These changes involve significant time and effort across society and can include, among other things, technological innovation, transparent and accountable use of that technology, meaningful human oversight, global collaboration, digital literacy and appropriate regulation. AI is no magical shortcut.” The report stems from a 2021 law that asked the FTC to review how AI might be used to fight disinformation and digital crime. FTC Commissioners voted to send the report to Congress upon finalization in a 4-1 decision.

# Offense

## Sweden/Finland Turn

### 1nc - turn

#### Russia is pushing disinformation campaigns in Finland and Sweden – prevents them from joining NATO

Dragonfly 22, (Dragonfly's Security Intelligence & Analysis Service, 12 Apr 2022 “Finland / Sweden | Russian disinformation and cyber campaigns very likely”, <https://www.dragonflyintelligence.com/news/finland-sweden-russian-disinformation-and-cyber-campaigns-very-likely/>)

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine seems to have prompted a near total shift in their foreign policies; we now assess that both are likely to apply to join NATO in the coming months. Disinformation campaigns in particular would fit with what is a tried-and-tested but rarely successful approach by Russia to divide society and polarise debates over contentious issues that threaten its national security. To reflect this, we have raised our cyber threat exposure levels for Finland and Sweden from high to severe. This does not mean that we anticipate the likelihood of a disruptive cyber incident on critical infrastructure in either country is elevated at present. But that in our assessment, the three indicators below are likely to increasingly play out in the coming months: Finland and Sweden have a high degree of diplomatic or military tensions with another country that has advanced offensive cyber capabilities (Russia). The Finnish and Swedish authorities have warned of the potential for offensive cyber and information operations in the coming months. There are early signs that Russia is engaged in active disinformation campaigns in Finland and Sweden. Accelerated accession plans Russia has repeatedly warned Finland and Sweden against joining NATO, threatening retaliation if they do. Russia already seems to be engaging in hostile activity against Finland. The Finnish government said that while the Ukrainian president was giving an online speech to its MPs on 8 April, DDoS attacks forced several government websites and services offline. The Finnish authorities have not attributed this to Russia or the groups it co-opts, but it did say that a Russian state aircraft was ‘suspected’ to have breached its airspace at the same time. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has incentivised Finland and Sweden to pursue NATO membership. Finland tabled a white paper on its ‘security environment’ in parliament yesterday, 13 April. And more than half of MPs would support a proposal to join NATO, according to local press reports. The Finnish prime minister yesterday said that a decision would be made ‘in weeks’. And the former prime minister has said the government could apply to NATO in May, ahead of the bloc’s summit in Madrid on 29-30 June. More surprising has been Sweden’s openness to NATO accession. According to sources in the governing party cited in the usually-reliable Svenska Dagbladet this week, the Swedish government plans to submit an application to join NATO in June, and accession appears to now have cross-party support. The Swedish prime minister had said on 8 March that a NATO bid ‘would further destabilise the security of this particular region of Europe’. While it is not clear what has prompted this apparent turn-around, the invasion of Ukraine has probably made Finland and Sweden now see being inside NATO as safer than outside of it. Divisive campaigns As part of attempts to influence and polarise debates on NATO accession, Russia is very likely to push disinformation campaigns and divisive messaging in Finland and Sweden in the coming months. The Swedish security police said last month that Russia’s goal is to keep it out of NATO, and that it tries to ‘influence decisions…and behaviours…in Sweden through misleading information’. Supo, the Finnish intelligence service, has assessed that Russian disinformation tactics could include the following: Claims of abuse or harassment of people with a ‘Russian background’ in Finland Blackmail of politicians Deep fake videos of ‘real people’ All of the above are tried-and-tested tactics by Russia, particularly in the Baltics. And there is clear precedent of Russia pursuing disinformation tactics in Finland and Sweden related to NATO. The Swedish Institute of International Affairs in 2017 said that the circulation of fake news, false documents and disinformation by Russia around that time was intended to influence public opinion and decision making in Sweden and to hinder the Swedish government’s ability to gain public support for its policies. The institute added that Russia’s goal was to ‘preserve the geo-strategic status quo’ by minimising NATO’s role in the Baltics and keeping Sweden out of the alliance. Pro-Russia media outlets and social media bots are highly likely to be the main source of divisive messaging and disinformation in Finland and Sweden in the coming months. Based on Russia’s past disinformation campaigns, probable narratives include the killing or raping of civilians by NATO member-state troops, corruption within the alliance and that NATO expansion is a threat to Russia. For the Kremlin, it seemingly views disinformation campaigns as a way to exacerbate societal divisions and destabilise its adversaries. Such campaigns are likely to be evident ahead of a general election in Sweden in September. Disinformation campaigns by Russia are unlikely to destabilise Finland or Sweden, such as by prompting unrest due to divisive messaging, let alone derail any NATO accession. Alleged Russian disinformation campaigns in the Baltics for example have failed at distorting public opinion on issues such as Russian language rights. And Russia seems to be losing the battle to reverse public support for NATO membership in Finland and Sweden; opinion polls cited in the press have suggested that 68% of Finns now support NATO membership, more than double the proportion prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Cyber campaigns Despite increasing Russian hostility towards Finland and Sweden, we doubt that Russian state-sponsored cyber groups are currently intent on disrupting critical systems in either country. Instead, they are likely to increase the scale of cyber activity in Finland and Sweden for intelligence collection, particularly around NATO accession, and launch technically unsophisticated attacks such as barrages of DDoS (as occurred on 8 April). The Finnish authorities have said Russia is ‘likely’ to expand its cyber and information ‘from Ukraine to the West’ and increase such operations against Finland in the coming months. There is a reasonable chance that hacktivist and criminal cyber groups supporting Russia will increasingly seek to target businesses in Finland and Sweden in the coming months. Several prominent malware and ransomware groups have intensified their attacks, mainly on Ukrainian networks, since the invasion of the country on 24 February. And while we have not seen such groups explicitly threaten Finnish or Swedish firms, some have expressed outright hostility towards the West. The potentially-high financial rewards for targeting firms in Finland and Sweden probably make them attractive for cyber extortion groups.

#### The aff solves Russian disinformation – results in Sweden and Finland joining NATO

#### Russia will use hypersonic missiles if Sweden and Finland join NATO

Faulconbridge 22, (Guy Faulconbridge, Author for Reuters, April 14, 2022, “Russia warns of nuclear, hypersonic deployment if Sweden and Finland join NATO”, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-warns-baltic-nuclear-deployment-if-nato-admits-sweden-finland-2022-04-14/>)

One of Russian President Vladimir Putin's closest allies warned NATO on Thursday that if Sweden and Finland joined the U.S.-led military alliance then Russia would deploy nuclear weapons and hypersonic missiles in a European exclave. Finland, which shares a 1,300-km (810-mile) border with Russia, and Sweden are considering joining the NATO alliance. Finland will decide in the next few weeks, Prime Minister Sanna Marin said on Wednesday. Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council, said that should Sweden and Finland join NATO then Russia would have to strengthen its land, naval and air forces in the Baltic Sea. Medvedev also explicitly raised the nuclear threat by saying that there could be no more talk of a "nuclear free" Baltic - where Russia has its Kaliningrad exclave sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania. "There can be no more talk of any nuclear–free status for the Baltic - the balance must be restored," said Medvedev, who was Russian president from 2008 to 2012. Medvedev said he hoped Finland and Sweden would see sense. If not, he said, they would have to live with nuclear weapons and hypersonic missiles close to home.

#### Hypersonic missiles trigger arms race

Schwartz 21, (Mattathias Schwartz, senior correspondent at Insider, 6 Dec 2021 “Hypersonic missiles could start World War III — but that’s not the biggest threat they pose”, https://www.businessinsider.com/china-and-russia-have-deployed-hypersonic-missiles-2021-12)

It's April 2023. China is massing troops at the Taiwan Strait. Party leaders claim they're conducting a peaceful military exercise. But the National Security Agency has intercepted phone calls and texts from President Xi Jinping's inner circle that indicate an invasion is imminent. As a show of US resolve, President Joe Biden orders the USS Ronald Reagan, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier based in Japan, to a position just off Taiwan. It's a tense standoff. But neither Biden nor Xi wants a war. The two leaders schedule a virtual summit, in the hope that they can negotiate a peaceful resolution. Then, an hour before their call, Donald Trump — who's been named speaker of the House by the newly elected GOP majority — logs on to @SpeakerTrump and tweets: "I hereby declare WAR on China under Article One of the Constitution! Sorry, Xi! This is what happens when you don't return calls from America's REAL PRESIDENT. You have 24 hours to PERSONALLY guarantee Taiwan's freedom. -DJT" Almost immediately, Beijing's secure phone lines light up with reassurances from officials at the White House. Trump's declaration, they say, is nothing but political grandstanding. But Xi decides to treat the insult as an act of war. Two hours after Trump's tweet, the predawn sky above the Strait is broken open by a flash, followed by a series of sonic booms. In a fraction of a second, 20 dart-shaped projectiles rip through the Reagan's armored steel skin, traveling at upward of 5,000 mph. What's left of the carrier becomes a smoking inferno, flecked with radioactive chunks of uranium from the carrier's nuclear reactor. The impact destroys its complement of 90 fixed-wing jets and kills most of the 6,000 troops on board. What is this mysterious superweapon that just touched off World War III? In this imaginary scenario, the Reagan was sunk by a very real weapon: the DF-ZF, a hypersonic missile that can travel five times the speed of sound, striking targets from a distance of 3,400 miles. After being launched high into the atmosphere via a medium- or long-range ballistic rocket, the DF-ZF's arrowhead-shaped "glide vehicle" maneuvers on its own through the air before nosediving onto its target. You don't have to wait until 2023 to see the DF-ZF in the field. China has already included it in military parades and deployed it with active-duty units. While ballistic missiles travel in soaring, predictable parabolic arcs, like punted footballs, hypersonic missiles are more like speedy hockey pucks that keep low and change direction in an instant. The high velocity means more damage; the maneuverability and lower altitude make them harder to track and intercept. But for the Pentagon, the scariest thing about hypersonic weapons is that China and Russia have already deployed them in the field, while the United States is still developing them. Over the summer the Financial Times, citing anonymous Pentagon insiders, reported that China had fired a ballistic missile that released a hypersonic missile, which in turn jettisoned another projectile, possibly designed to foil a missile-defense system. In the grim humor of the arms-control world, this mysterious threefold weapon was dubbed the "turducken" missile. Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, likened the Chinese test to a "Sputnik moment" — a shocking public display of just how far America has fallen behind. There are reasons to be skeptical of Milley's assessment. Almost everything we know about hypersonic missiles comes to us from the nationalistic leaders of China and Russia, who like to exaggerate their strength for propaganda purposes, or the Pentagon, which has a long track record of exaggerating outside threats while seeking to bolster its funding. In an age when the US military is attempting to transition from the global war on terror to so-called great-power competition with China and Russia, hypersonics has become an appropriations buzzword. The Pentagon asked for $3.8 billion for its hypersonics programs in 2022, up from $2.6 billion in 2020. The military has a growing hypersonics bureaucracy that includes a hypersonics "war room," the Joint Hypersonics Transition Office, and a principal director for hypersonics. "The pursuit of a new technology can be as much about its marketability to congressional appropriators as it is about capabilities," says Cameron Tracy, a Stanford-affiliated scholar who has questioned the military benefit of hypersonics. "If you're the Department of Defense, your choice is between talking about a 50-year-old ballistic missile versus a hypersonic missile, where no one is really sure what it can do, and it sounds really cool. In that situation, you are incentivized to make it look as though we're behind." Resurrecting the logic of the Cold War For a while, the United States led the world in hypersonic-missile development. In 2003, George W. Bush asked the Pentagon to come up with a "Conventional Prompt Global Strike" — the ability to strike any target, anywhere, within minutes, even in places like Afghanistan that were far from US bases and nuclear submarines. By 2009, after a few years of research and testing, the Defense Science Board, which advises the Pentagon, came up with five "representative scenarios" for situations in which a hypersonic weapon might be used. Three involved terrorists or a "rogue state," like North Korea. Only one — an attempt to take out a US satellite — involved conflict with Russia or China. After that, funding for hypersonics dried up. The technology seemed to be a solution in search of a problem. There were certainly times when the US needed to hit distant targets fast, but old-fashioned subsonic Tomahawk missiles, or teams of Navy SEALs, could do the job just fine. But as China and Russia began making headway on their own programs, the rationale behind US hypersonics shifted. Before, hypersonic weapons were being developed for a specific mission. Now, the military argued, we needed them solely for the sake of keeping up with China and Russia. Michael Griffin, then the undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, proclaimed that it was "among my very highest priorities" to develop hypersonic missiles to "hold China and Russia at risk in a corresponding manner." Griffin was dusting off the circular logic of the Cold War: We had to win the arms race because there was an arms race. China has been parading its new hypersonic weapons, including these DF-17 ballistic rockets that are equipped to deploy DF-ZF missiles at five times the speed of sound. It's worth remembering that during the Cold War, the Pentagon consistently overestimated the strength of Soviet forces, first with the bomber gap and then with the missile gap. In both cases, the US military got spooked by fragmentary intelligence and successful tests like Sputnik and succeeded in convincing itself that it was falling behind. In 1959, for instance, military sources warned respected Washington reporters that the Soviet Union was on the verge of having 100 intercontinental nuclear missiles, versus 30 in the American arsenal. In fact, by the end of 1960, the Soviets had deployed only two long-range nukes. The military's claims that it was losing the arms race were really justifications for accelerating it. Military insiders insist that this time, the threat is real. "In my previous job, I was cleared into everything," Mark J. Lewis, who oversaw DARPA as the Pentagon's acting deputy undersecretary for research and engineering, told me. "I can tell you definitively that the Chinese really are ahead." (Lewis now works at the National Defense Industrial Association, a non-profit trade group that represents military contractors.) China is said to have the capacity to hitch a hypersonic missile to a medium-range DF-17 ballistic rocket or a long-range DF-41, with or without a nuclear warhead. Russia has the long-range Avangard, another ballistic missile with a glide vehicle attached, and two hypersonic cruise missiles: the ship-launched Zircon (still under development) and the air-launched Kinzhal (already in the field). The most important question is: So what? Does it really matter whether China and Russia have hypersonic missiles that we don't? The United States still rules the world in the two military technologies that matter most: nuclear weapons and airpower. You might have heard, for instance, that China is seeking to triple its nuclear arsenal, to 1,000 warheads, by the end of this decade. It sounds scary — until you consider that the US already has nearly 4,000 warheads. In 2022, the United States plans to devote $768 billion to military spending. China is expected to spend less than half that amount; Russia less than a tenth. It's true that a hypersonic missile could take out an aircraft carrier, which poses a serious tactical problem. But that vulnerability alone does little to alter America's vast military superiority. The United States trembling at the prospect of a few hypersonic missiles is a bit like a teenage bully whining about a kindergartener with a spitball. More game adjuster than game changer The question of whether hypersonic technology poses some kind of new and disruptive threat hinges on the doctrine of mutually assured destruction — the idea that no country will ever use its stockpile of nuclear weapons because every country is unwilling to suffer the nuclear consequences. The doctrine has worked, so far, because no great power has the ability to knock out its rivals' nuclear arsenals fast enough to prevent them from being deployed. And while the US leads the world in missile defense, it's still a long way from being able to stop a massive nuclear attack by Russia or China, which further reduces the likelihood that anyone will ever use such weapons. Ironically, the US lead in missile defense is one reason that China and Russia have bet so heavily on long-range hypersonic missiles, which have the ability to carry a nuclear warhead. If the US defense system ever reaches the point at which it can stop every ballistic nuke, hypersonic missiles could offer an alternative. "They want a hedge," explains Tracy, the critic of hypersonics. But there is one crucial difference between the two technologies. Nuclear bombs were immediately recognized as a revolution in warfare. The significance of hypersonic weapons, by contrast, is still hotly debated. Skeptics argue that they don't accomplish much that isn't already possible using other weapons. Low-altitude ballistic missiles launched from submarines can deliver speed; MaRV-equipped missiles can deliver maneuverability. Tracy, along with David Wright of MIT, argue that hypersonic weapons will underperform their ballistic peers because of their lower trajectories, which create more friction with the atmosphere and heats up the missiles. Their findings have been contested by hypersonics boosters, who have access to the results of classified tests being conducted in 26 hypersonic wind tunnels scattered across the US. But whoever is right, the mere existence of a debate over the efficacy of hypersonic weapons suggests that comparisons to Sputnik and the Manhattan Project are a stretch. There is one area, at least, where hypersonic weapons could live up to their billing as a true revolution in warfare. For smaller, regional powers that can't match Russia or China's advantage in long-range ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons offer a relatively inexpensive on-ramp to war. India, France, and Japan have active hypersonics programs; Israel, South Korea, and Iran are said to have done basic research. Because there hasn't been much of a rush to curb the development of hypersonics through treaties and nonproliferation agreements, and because smaller countries lack the kind of special hotlines and de-escalation protocols that Russia and the US developed during decades of Cold War brinkmanship, it's not hard to imagine how the new technology could accelerate and intensify local conflicts. After all, our most recent brush with nuclear war didn't involve the US, China, or Russia. It was a fight between India and Pakistan over the disputed territory of Kashmir, in 1999. As the conflict escalated, Pakistan was said to be preparing to deploy nuclear weapons — until American intelligence found out and confronted it within hours of the discovery. But as hypersonic know-how continues to spread, through science and espionage, the window for breaking up a fight could get much shorter. In early December, India announced its first successful test-fire of the hypersonic BrahMos II cruise missile, which travels almost three times as fast as its supersonic predecessor. That means Pakistan would have less than 10 minutes to decide whether an incoming BrahMos II was carrying a nuclear warhead and, if so, how to respond. It may not matter so much if the US is "behind" in the race to develop a flashy but redundant class of weaponry. But the spread of hair-trigger missiles — conventional weapons that are unregulated by nuclear-arms treaties — is something worth worrying about.

### 2nc – disinformation in Turkey

#### Russian disinformation in Turkey seeks to undermine NATO

Castello 18 (Katherine, defense analyst at the RAND Corporation, where her primary research areas include national and international security issues. Her background includes research on Turkish history, foreign policy, and popular culture, “Russia’s Use of Media and Information Operations in Turkey,” RAND Corporation, 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE278.html)-AT

Russian media have sought to undermine Turkey's political and security cooperation with the United States and Europe by exacerbating mutual skepticism and highlighting policy differences. In Turkey, Russian media have also contributed to anti-American discourse and have reinforced and informed the Turkish government's own propaganda pursuits. This analysis assesses how Russia has used media and information operations to pursue its foreign policy goals related to Turkey. It examines Russian media responses to three significant events in Turkey: (1) Turkey's November 2015 shootdown of a Russian military aircraft, (2) the July 2016 Turkish coup attempt, and (3) the December 2016 assassination of the Russian ambassador. Russian media efforts following these events exemplify the propaganda strategies of amplification of genuine uncertainty, creation of opportunistic fabrications, and use of multiple contradictory narratives. These strategies have supported Russian foreign policy objectives, which include undermining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and fomenting mutual suspicion between Turkey and its Western allies; enlisting Ankara's support and impeding its opposition to Russian actions in Eurasia and the Middle East; and influencing Turkish internal political developments to make Turkey a more compliant partner. The U.S. government, NATO, and independent media watch groups should take steps to monitor Russian media efforts in Turkey and outside coverage of Turkey. In addition, the U.S. government, other governments, and media watch groups should continue to monitor Turkish government efforts to stifle independent media in the country and to create a propaganda arm that may emulate well-honed Russian practices.

### 2nc – Russian escalation

#### Finland and Sweden joining NATO guarantees Russian escalation

Turak 22, (Natasha Turak Correspondent, CNBC, APR 14, 2022, “Russia threatens new nuclear deployments if Sweden, Finland join NATO”, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/14/russia-threatens-new-nuclear-deployments-if-sweden-finland-join-nato.html)

Russia says a nuclear-free Baltic region would no longer be possible if Finland and Sweden become NATO members, alluding to additional nuclear deployments in Europe. “If Sweden and Finland join NATO, the length of the alliance’s land borders with the Russian Federation will more than double. Naturally, these borders will have to be strengthened,” Dmitry Medvedev, former president and deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, wrote on his official Telegram channel Thursday. Russia will have to “seriously strengthen the grouping of land forces and air defense, deploy significant naval forces in the waters of the Gulf of Finland. In this case, it will no longer be possible to talk about any nuclear-free status of the Baltic - the balance must be restored,” he said. Finland’s position on NATO is a direct result of Ukraine war, says NATO chief The comments come a day after Finland and Sweden said their decision on whether to apply for NATO membership would come within a matter of weeks. The countries’ leaders said their security assessments had dramatically changed following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February. The Baltics — the northeastern European countries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia — are members of the EU and NATO. Sweden and Finland are members of the EU, but not NATO, and the latter shares an 830-mile border with Russia. If Finland and Sweden did join NATO, this would give Moscow “more officially registered opponents,” Medvedev added. He claimed that NATO was planning to admit the two Nordic states with “minimal bureaucratic procedures.” Russia’s response should be taken with “no emotion, with a cold head,” he added. Moscow sees neighboring Finland’s potential inclusion in NATO as a threat to its national security, as the U.S. could deploy advanced military equipment in Finland if it joined the alliance. ‘Nothing new’ Lithuania, which borders the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, brushed off Medvedev’s comments on Thursday. It’s “nothing new,” Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Simonyte said. The country’s defense minister, Arvydas Anusauskas, added that Russia already has nuclear weapons in the Baltic region. How NATO is defending Eastern Europe “The current Russian threats look quite strange, when we know that, even without the present security situation, they keep the weapon 100 km from Lithuania’s border,” Anusauskas was quoted by Lithuania’s BNS wire as saying. “Nuclear weapons have always been kept in Kaliningrad ... the international community, the countries in the region, are perfectly aware of this. ... They use it as a threat,” he added. Kaliningrad, which is slightly larger than Connecticut, borders the Baltic Sea on its west and is sandwiched between NATO members Poland and Lithuania. Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a U-turn in Finnish public opinion on becoming a member of the 30-country military alliance, which it has refrained from joining since World War II in a bid to maintain neutrality. Moscow has in the past warned of severe consequences and instability in the Nordics if Finland were to join. If Finland joined the alliance, Sweden would likely follow suit. Finland and Sweden, as well as Ukraine, are already “Enhanced Opportunity Partners” of NATO, the closest form of partnership with the alliance, and partake in military exercises with NATO states. Rather than urging the countries to pursue membership, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has repeatedly said it is for Finland and Sweden to decide their own path. He has also said, “the door remains open” for the alliance to welcome new members. UK commander on NATO’s presence in the Baltic region amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine But Russia has long warned against any enlargement of NATO, reportedly accusing the alliance of being “a tool geared towards confrontation.” Ahead of its invasion of Ukraine, it demanded that the organization, which was created in 1949 in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union, return to its pre-1997 borders — something the U.S. and NATO refused. Fourteen countries have joined the collective defense alliance since 1997, accounting for nearly half of its members. These countries include much of Central and Eastern Europe, and the first NATO members to border Russia and its exclave territory of Kaliningrad: Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Moscow blames Ukraine’s pursuit of NATO membership, among other things, for triggering the invasion, saying it threatened Russia’s security. NATO leaders have reiterated that they will not send troops into Ukraine to help in the fight against Russia, primarily because the country is not a member of the alliance. NATO has to prevent the war from escalating beyond Ukraine: Secretary-general ″The persistent attempts by NATO to draw those countries into the orbit of its interests and opportunistic policies haven’t gone unnoticed by Russia,” Russian’s Foreign Ministry said in December 2021. “It’s quite obvious that Finland and Sweden joining NATO … would have serious military and political consequences that would require an adequate response from the Russian side,” ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said at the time. Risks abound Finland’s and Sweden’s leaders say they are aware of the risk of escalation. “We also need to be very frank about consequences and risks. There are both short-term and more long-term risks. These risks are there both if we apply and if we do not apply,” Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin said during a news conference Wednesday. The leaders of Finland and Sweden have both said a decision on whether to apply for NATO membership can be expected sooner rather than later. The leaders of Finland and Sweden have both said a decision on whether to apply for NATO membership can be expected sooner rather than later. AAStill, looking at the devastation wrought on Ukraine in a matter of weeks, Marin pointed to the significance of being a fully fledged NATO member, rather than just a partner, which is its current status. “The difference between being a partner and being a member is very clear and will remain so,” Marin said. “There is no other way to have security guarantees than under NATO’s deterrence and common defense as guaranteed by NATO’s Article 5.” The alliance’s Article 5 embodies the principle of collective defense. In short, Article 5 means that an attack against one NATO member is considered an attack against all the allies.

#### Finland and Sweden NATO alliance leads to Russian response in the form of nukes

Moscow Times 22, (The Moscow Times, Independent News from Russia, May 16, 2022 “Sweden, Finland Joining NATO Doesn’t Threaten Russia But May ‘Trigger’ Response – Putin”, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/05/16/could-russia-use-the-nuclear-option-a77693)

Sweden and Finland’s anticipated bid for NATO membership “doesn’t pose a threat” to Russia but may “trigger a response,” President Vladimir Putin said at a summit of former Soviet allies on Monday. The two Nordic countries have made historic steps toward joining the U.S.-led military bloc in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, citing the need to guarantee their security from feared Russian aggression. Speaking at the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) summit in Moscow, Putin said that while Russia “doesn’t have problems” with either country, the expansion of NATO’s military infrastructure across their territory may “trigger a response.” “What kind [of response] it will be, we will decide depending on threats that are created against us,” Putin warned. Putin noted that NATO’s “expansionist politics” which led the alliance “to overstep its intended geographic boundaries” warrants the Kremlin to keep a close watch on the situation. NATO’s role was also highlighted in the collective statement issued by the CSTO. “Realizing our responsibility for ensuring lasting peace in the Eurasian region, we emphasize the importance of de-escalating tensions in the continent and reaffirm our readiness for practical cooperation with NATO,” the statement says. Russia sent troops into Ukraine on Feb. 24 after its demands for NATO and the United States to permanently bar Ukraine from joining the alliance and to halt NATO expansion in what Moscow sees as its sphere of influence were refused.

### 2nc - hypersonics

#### Russia claiming they possess hypersonic nuclear weapons increases the chance of nuclear war

Boyd 22 (Iain Boyd; Director, Center for National Security Initiatives; and Professor of Aerospace Engineering Sciences at University of Colorado Boulder; “Hypersonic weapons raise risk of nuclear war”; Asia Times; 4/16/22; DOA: 6/24/22; <https://asiatimes.com/2022/04/hypersonic-weapons-raise-risk-of-nuclear-war/>) // bh

Russia has claimed that some of its hypersonic weapons can carry a nuclear warhead. This statement alone is a cause for concern whether or not it is true. If Russia ever operates this system against an enemy, that country would have to decide the probability of the weapon being conventional or nuclear. In the case of the US, if the determination were made that the weapon was nuclear, then there is a very high likelihood that the US would consider this a first-strike attack and respond by unloading its nuclear weapons on Russia. The hypersonic speed of these weapons [means] increases the precariousness of the situation because the time for any last-minute diplomatic resolution would be severely reduced. It is the destabilizing influence that modern hypersonic missiles represent that is perhaps the greatest risk they pose. I believe the US and its allies should rapidly field their own hypersonic weapons to bring other nations such as Russia and China to the negotiating table to develop a diplomatic approach to managing these weapons. What is hypersonic? Describing a vehicle as hypersonic means that it flies much faster than the speed of sound, which is 761 miles per hour (1,225 kilometers per hour) at sea level and 663 mph (1,067 kph) at 35,000 feet (10,668 meters) where passenger jets fly. Passenger jets travel at just under 600 mph (966 kph), whereas hypersonic systems operate at speeds of 3,500 mph (5,633 kph) – about 1 mile (1.6 kilometers) per second – and higher. Hypersonic systems have been in use for decades. When John Glenn came back to Earth in 1962 from the first US crewed flight around the Earth, his capsule entered the atmosphere at hypersonic speed. All of the intercontinental ballistic missiles in the world’s nuclear arsenals are hypersonic, reaching about 15,000 mph (24,140 kph), or about 4 miles (6.4 km) per second at their maximum velocity. ICBMs are launched on large rockets and then fly on a predictable trajectory that takes them out of the atmosphere into space and then back into the atmosphere again. The new generation of hypersonic missiles fly very fast, but not as fast as ICBMs. They are launched on smaller rockets that keep them within the upper reaches of the atmosphere. Hypersonic missiles are not as fast as intercontinental ballistic missiles but are able to vary their trajectories. U.S. Government Accounting Office Three types of hypersonic missiles There are three different types of non-ICBM hypersonic weapons: aero-ballistic, glide vehicles and cruise missiles. A hypersonic aero-ballistic system is dropped from an aircraft, accelerated to hypersonic speed using a rocket and then follows a ballistic, meaning unpowered, trajectory. The system Russian forces used to attack Ukraine, the Kinzhal, is an aero-ballistic missile. The technology has been around since about 1980. The type of hypersonic missile Russia has used in Ukraine, the Kinzhal aero-ballistic missile, is essentially a ballistic missile launched from aircraft. It is not as advanced as other types of hypersonic missiles that Russia, China and the US are developing. Photo: Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP/The Conversation A hypersonic glide vehicle is boosted on a rocket to high altitude and then glides to its target, maneuvering along the way.Examples of hypersonic glide vehicles include China’s Dongfeng-17, Russia’s Avangard and the US Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike system. US officials have expressed concern that China’s hypersonic glide vehicle technology is further advanced than the US system.A hypersonic cruise missile is boosted by a rocket to hypersonic speed and then uses an air-breathing engine called a scramjet to sustain that speed. Because they ingest air into their engines, hypersonic cruise missiles require smaller launch rockets than hypersonic glide vehicles, which means they can cost less and be launched from more places.Hypersonic cruise missiles are under development by China and the US. The US reportedly conducted a test flight of a scramjet hypersonic missile in March 2020.Difficult to defend against The primary reason nations are developing these next-generation hypersonic weapons is how difficult they are to defend against due to their speed, maneuverability and flight path. The US is starting to develop a layered approach to defending against hypersonic weapons that includes a constellation of sensors in space and close cooperation with key allies. This approach is likely to be very expensive and take many years to implement. With all of this activity on hypersonic weapons and defending against them, it is important to assess the threat they pose to national security. Hypersonic missiles with conventional, non-nuclear warheads are primarily useful against high-value targets, such as an aircraft carrier. Being able to take out such a target could have a significant impact on the outcome of a major conflict.

#### Russia’s “escalate to deescalate” doctrine makes the risk of using hypersonics even more likely

Brookes 22(Peter Brookes - Senior Research Fellow, Center for National Defense. “Threat Assessment Grim on Weapons of Mass Destruction.” The Heritage Founation. February 8, 2022. <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/threat-assessment-grim-weapons-mass-destruction>”)

Beijing is expanding and diversifying its nuclear capabilities on an unprecedented scale. The commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Adm. Charles Richard, called it “breathtaking.” Discovery of the construction of nearly 250 new land-based ICBM silos in the summer of 2021 undermines the idea that China is still adhering to its long-standing “minimum deterrent” nuclear force. The silo expansion could mean China could soon rival the U.S.’ land-based ICBM force. China has also sent its nuclear strike force to sea on submarines and is developing a strategic bomber leg as part of what will soon be a nuclear triad. Beijing is also developing unique ways to deliver its nukes. Last year, China stunned many by testing a fractional orbital bombardment system, which circumnavigated the globe before releasing a nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle at a target. That increase in Beijing’s nuclear numbers and capabilities raises the specter of parity or near-parity with the U.S.—or even superiority. That’s a chilling thought in an era of great power competition and the level of strategic distrust that exists between Washington and Beijing. Besides modernizing its nuclear force, Russia is also diversifying it, testing and deploying a number of novel nuclear weapons. Those nontraditional nuclear-capable weapons systems include an ICBM, three hypersonic weapons, a long-range nuclear-powered underwater torpedo, and an unlimited-range nuclear-powered cruise missile. Add to that a concern about Russia’s doctrine for its nonstrategic (i.e., low-yield) nuclear weapons, aka battlefield or tactical nukes. Moscow’s “escalate to deescalate” doctrine contemplates using a tactical nuke in a conventional conflict with NATO to end resistance to its aggression by crossing the nuclear threshold. Considering Russia’s belligerence in Europe, those small nukes are a big problem for NATO. Weapons of mass destruction also include chemical and biological weapons—and their recent use is deeply troubling. Indeed, Israel reportedly struck targets in Syria that might be involved in the production of chemical weapons. The Damascus regime has already used chemical weapons against civilians in Syria’s civil war—and could use them in a conflict with Israel. Also, don’t forget Russia’s use of a nerve agent against political opponents Sergei Skripal and Alexei Navalny or North Korea’s use of VX nerve agent to assassinate Kim’s half-brother. While we’ve not seen a biological weapon used, the COVID-19 pandemic painfully reminds us of the potential power of a purposely unleashed biological pathogen. No one likes to think about these horrific weapons, especially in the hands of troubling regimes, but unfortunately, due to their destructive power, we’re going to have to in 2022.